On the 14 July 1958, a brigade of Iraqi army officers marched into Baghdad and declared the end of the Hashemite monarchy established by the British in 1921. Leading members of the royal family were brutally murdered in the courtyard of the opulent Rihab palace. Prime Minister Nurial-Said escaped disguised as a woman, but was given away by the fact that he was wearing men's shoes; he was captured and shot the next day. Iraq's first republic was established under the leadership of a young and zealous nationalist, General Abdul Karim Qasim. The revolution in Iraq seemed yet another exemplification of the Arab nationalist fervour spreading through the Middle East and destroyed all fledgling hopes for the existence of a conservative counterweight to Nasser. Policy-makers were so alarmed by events in Iraq that on the 15 July 1958, both the British and US governments deployed Marines and paratroopers to bolster pro-Western regimes in Lebanon and Jordan. Ultimately, the Iraqi revolt would transform the basis of the Anglo-American relationship with Nasser.

Most scholars writing about this seminal event have suggested that Western observers fundamentally misunderstood the revolutionary situation in Iraq. Hitherto neglected intelligence documents allows a fresh look at the nature of this ‘failure’, revealing that analysts were indeed aware of the pressures on the Iraqi monarchy. A detailed examination of the intelligence reports and in-house post-mortems suggest that this was more of a tactical failure than a strategic one. Perceptions of Egyptian influence were also fairly nuanced (after initial panic), noting the similarities in the socioeconomic problems in Iraq driving change but also the limitations of Nasser's ability to dictate events in the newly founded republic.

Far from being a Nasserist stooge, General Qasim proved to be a force of nature in his own right. He quickly demonstrated his desire to resist local Nasserists such as Abd al-Salam Arif, utilising the support of the Iraqi Communist party (ICP).