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Operational Dilemmas and Cadre Education and Training at a County Party School in China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2023

Mattias Ottervik ,
Haoyu Wang  and
Zhen Li Open the ORCID record for Zhen Li [Opens in a new window]
Mattias Ottervik
Affiliation:
Center for Quality of Life and Public Policy Research, and School of Political Science and Public Administration, Shandong University, Qingdao, China
Haoyu Wang
Affiliation:
School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Zhen Li*
Affiliation:
School of Political Science and Public Administration, and Institute of State Governance, Shandong University, Qingdao, China
*
Corresponding author: Zhen Li; Email: lizhen@email.sdu.edu.cn
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Abstract

Since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, the Party school system has been subject to several reforms. How well these reforms have been implemented in lower-level Party schools has received little attention because access is difficult to obtain. We conducted on-site investigations, interviews with cadres and surveys of trainees at a county/district-level Party school in an economically typical city and county. Our findings show that operational dilemmas lead to the perfunctory implementation of policy that is substantively deficient. These operational dilemmas are likely to be found in varying degrees in other county/district Party schools. Our finding that cadre education and training policy is implemented in a pro forma manner suggests that cadres may not be receiving the ideological education and practical training intended for them by the centre.

摘要

摘要

自 2012 年 11 月的中共十八大以来，中国的党校系统历经了多次改革。然而，由于当前难以在地方政府及党校开展实地调查，学界很少能够对基层党校系列改革的执行情况进行系统研究。通过对一个从经济规模来看较为典型的区县的党校进行了实地调查、干部访谈和学员调查，我们填补了这一领域的研究空白。我们的研究结果表明，基层党校的运行困境导致了改革政策的形式化执行，从而造成政策的实际内容未被充分执行。这些运行上存在的困境在其他区县层级的地方党校也可能不同程度的出现。因此，从地方政府和党校对干部教育培训改革政策的形式化执行情况来看，地方干部并没有获得符合中央预期的意识形态教育和业务培训。

Keywords

cadre education and trainingParty school systemChinaChinese Communist Partypolicy implementationpro forma implementation干部教育培训党校系统中国中国共产党政策执行形式化执行
Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 258 , June 2024 , pp. 513 - 528
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of SOAS University of London

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