In the decades immediately following the Vietnam War, there were no significant conflicts with free speech resulting from major policy or military action. In contrast, the global war on terror following the events of September 11, 2001, mirror in many ways where prior conflicts and government action clashed with Free Speech. Forty-five days after the worst attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act. In the months and years that followed, American forces fought abroad and opponents of and advocates for the Act fought at home. This article will review the implementation of the Patriot Act and two provisions, section 215 and 805, to follow the actions of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government and those of civil liberties advocacy groups to review America’s efforts to meet the challenges of providing security for the homeland and protecting Free Speech.

Terrorism elicits strong public reactions immediately after the attack, with important implications for democratic institutions and individual well-being. Are these effects short-lived? We answer this question using a natural experiment design and combining data on terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom with a Continuous Monitoring Survey. We find that heightened risk perceptions and emotional reactions in the wake of deadly attacks do not dissipate in the very short run but are sustained over time and up to 120 days after the attacks. Whereas large-scale attacks cause a long-lasting shift in risk assessments and emotions, the corresponding effect of smaller-scale terrorism incidents appears to subside within one month. Overall, the impact of terrorism does not fade away easily.

Mass-casualty terrorism and terrorism involving unconventional weapons have received extensive academic and policy attention, yet few academics have considered the broader question of whether such behaviours could pose a plausible risk to humanity’s survival or continued flourishing. Despite several terrorist and other violent non-state actors having evinced an interest in causing existential harm to humanity, their ambition has historically vastly outweighed their capability. Nonetheless, three pathways to existential harm exist: existential attack, existential spoilers and systemic harm. Each pathway varies in its risk dynamics considerably. Although an existential attack is plausible, it would require extraordinary levels of terrorist capability. Conversely, modest terrorist capabilities might be sufficient to spoil risk mitigation measures or cause systemic harm, but such actions would only result in existential harm under highly contingent circumstances. Overall, we conclude that the likelihood of terrorism causing existential harm is extremely low, at least in the near to medium term, but it is theoretically possible for terrorists to intentionally destroy humanity.

On March 11, 2004, Madrid suffered one of the worst terrorist attacks in the history of Spain, leaving more than 190 dead and 2,000 injured. For years, the psychological consequences of the attacks have been studied; however, its long-term effects on symptomatology and especially on well-being remains unknown. This study aims to explore, through a qualitative approach, pathways and obstacles to the well-being of those affected directly or indirectly by the attacks of March 11 in Madrid. Two focus groups were held, one for indirect victims and one for direct victims. Subsequently, a thematic analysis of the materials obtained was carried out. More than 10 years after the attacks, most of the participants reported great difficulty in achieving well-being. Acceptance and victims’ associations seemed to act as key facilitators, while symptoms, political institutions and the media were the main obstacles. Direct and indirect victims presented similar data although aspects such as guilt and family relationships played a different role in their well-being.

Terrorists attacked the United States diplomatic compound and adjoining CIA Annex in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012. Despite repeated warnings from officials about the security risks in Tripoli and Benghazi, we argue that intelligence, security, and organizational deficiencies within the Department of State created vulnerabilities contributing to the deaths of four Americans, including Ambassador Christopher Stephens. Scholarly assessment of these failures has been precluded as a consequence of the incident’s use in partisan attacks. Republicans in Congress used investigations into the incident to damage presumed 2016 Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Rodham Clinton, who was then President Obama’s secretary of state. Setting aside political considerations and examining the failures that led to the attack is important to protect diplomatic personnel abroad in the future.

As the silence of male CRSV victims continues to be debated, some argue that gender norms and a lack of agency contribute to the silence of victims, even as others assert that victims exercise agency by speaking selectively about their experiences. In northern Nigeria, the concept of kunya—a model for appropriate behaviour rooted in the importance of secrecy and discretion—plays a role in the silencing of victims. We examine how kunya contributes to the invisibility of victims and influences their silence, as well as how victims use silence to gain social tolerability and/or protect themselves from re-victimization. We argue that an attentiveness to such community-specific cultural precepts and norms can further our understanding of the silence (and silencing) of victims and survivors.

Discussions of terrorism assume actual or threatened violence, but the term is regularly used to delegitimize rivals' nonviolent actions. Yet do ordinary citizens accept descriptions of nonviolence as terrorism? Using a preregistered survey-experiment in Israel, a salient conflictual context with diverse repertoires of contention, we find that audiences rate adversary nonviolence close to terrorism, consider it illegitimate, and justify its forceful repression. These perceptions vary by the action's threatened harm, its salience, and respondents' ideology. Explicitly labeling nonviolence as terrorism, moreover, particularly sways middle-of-the-road centrists. These relationships replicate in a lower-salience conflict, albeit with milder absolute judgments, indicating generalizability. Hence, popular perceptions of terrorism are more fluid and manipulable than assumed, potentially undermining the positive effects associated with nonviolent campaigns.

This essay aims to analyse the presence of neofascist organisations and far-right terrorism in Italy in the early 1970s from a new perspective. Firstly, it will focus on the activities to combat the subversive structures of the ‘black galaxy’ carried out by regional institutions through the creation of special ‘regional commissions of inquiry on the problems of neofascism’. Between 1974 and 1975, these commissions carried out an extensive inventory of the movements, associations and organisations of the Italian far right. Their aim was to show the spread of the phenomenon and its local roots. Building upon the information gathered by the regional commissions, the essay will analyse the relationships between the various far-right groups in Italy and their European counterparts. The final part of the article will focus on the influence of local specificities in defining the relations between extremist movements beyond national borders.