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Logic programs with ordered disjunction (LPODs) extend classical logic programs with the capability of expressing alternatives with decreasing degrees of preference in the heads of program rules. Despite the fact that the operational meaning of ordered disjunction is clear, there exists an important open issue regarding its semantics. In particular, there does not exist a purely model-theoretic approach for determining the most preferred models of an LPOD. At present, the selection of the most preferred models is performed using a technique that is not based exclusively on the models of the program and in certain cases produces counterintuitive results. We provide a novel, model-theoretic semantics for LPODs, which uses an additional truth value in order to identify the most preferred models of a program. We demonstrate that the proposed approach overcomes the shortcomings of the traditional semantics of LPODs. Moreover, the new approach can be used to define the semantics of a natural class of logic programs that can have both ordered and classical disjunctions in the heads of clauses. This allows programs that can express not only strict levels of preferences but also alternatives that are equally preferred.
Preferences for end-of-life (EoL) care settings is of considerable interest for developing public health policy and EoL care strategies. Culture, the cause of illness, and background characteristics may impact preferences. The present study aimed to explore preferences for EoL care settings: homes, hospitals, and inpatient hospice units among the general healthy population in Israel. Possible associations between the setting preferences and socio-demographic characteristics were also examined.
A cross-sectional survey was conducted among 311 healthy adults who were recruited through a representative internet panel of the Israeli population using the Israeli census sampling method. The sex ratio was almost 1:1 with 158 women (50.8%) and 153 men (49.2%). All participants completed self-report measures using an online survey system. The questionnaires assessed sociodemographics and preferences for EoL care settings.
This survey revealed that 52.1% of the participants expressed preference for being cared for at home rather than in an inpatient hospice unit, 40.8% expressed being cared for at home rather than in a hospital, while 36.7% had no preference regarding being cared for in hospital or in a hospice unit. Among the socio-demographic variables, only age and gender were found to be significantly associated with preferences for EoL care settings.
Significance of results
The present study highlights the need to be cautious when regarding home as the preferred EoL care setting, as some individuals declared that they would prefer EoL hospice/hospital care. Age and gender should be considered when discussing and tailoring strategies regarding EoL preferences.
Research on the politics of social investment finds public opinion to be highly supportive of expansive reforms and expects this support to matter for the politics of expanding social investment. Expanding social investment, it is argued, should be particularly attractive to left-wing voters and parties because of the egalitarian potential of such policies. However, few studies have examined to what extent individual preferences concerning social investment really matter politically. In this paper, I address this research gap for the crucial policy field of childcare by examining how individual-level preferences for expanding childcare provision translate into voting behavior. Based on original survey data from eight European countries, I find that preferences to expand public childcare spending indeed translate into electoral support for the left. However, this link from preferences to votes turns out to be socially biased. Childcare preferences are much more decisive for voting the further up individuals are in the income distribution. This imperfect transmission from preferences to voting behavior implies that political parties could have incentives to target the benefits of childcare reforms to their more affluent voters. My findings help to explain why governments frequently fail to reduce social inequality of access to seemingly egalitarian childcare provision.
Preferences and wishes of patients is an important indicator of primary health care provision, although there are differences between national primary care systems.
The aim of this paper is to describe and evaluate the preferences and values of Hungarian primary care (PC) patients before accessing and to analyse their experiences after attending PC services.
In the Hungarian arm of the European QUALICOPC Study, in 2013–2014, information was collected with questionnaires; the Patient Values contained 19 and the Patient Experiences had 41 multiple-choice questions.
The questionnaires were filled by 2149 (840 men, 1309 women) using PC services, aged 49.1 (SD ± 16.7) years, 73% of them having chronic morbidities. Women preferred to be accompanied and rated their own health better. Patients in the lowest educational category and women visited their GPs more often, and they are consulted more frequently by other doctors as well. Men, older and secondary educated people reported more frequently chronic morbidities. Longer opening hours were preferred by patients with higher education. The most preferred expectations were availability and polite communication of doctors, not pressures on consultation time, clear instructions provided during consultations, shared decisions about treatments and options for consultations, the knowledge of the doctors concerning the living conditions, social and cultural backgrounds of patients, updated medical records, short waiting times, options for home visits, wide scope of professional competences and trust in the doctor.
Wishes, preferences of patients and fulfilment were similar than described in other participating countries of the study. Although there are room to improve PC services, most of the questioned population were satisfied with the provision.
All forms of cancer pose a tremendous and increasing problem globally. The prevalence of cancer across the globe is anticipated to double over the next two decades. About 50% of most cancer cases are expected to occur in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where there is a greater disproportionate level in mortality. Access to effective and timely care for cancer patients remains a challenge, especially in LMICs due to late disease diagnosis and detection, coupled with the limited availability of appropriate therapeutic options and delay in proper interventions.
This study explored several mixed-method researches and randomized trials that addressed the preferences of quality delivery of palliative care among cancer patients in LMICs. A designated set of keywords such as Palliative Care; Preferences; Cancer patients; Psycho-social Support; End-of-life Care; Low and Middle-Income Countries were inserted on electronic databases to retrieve articles. The databases include PubMed, Scinapse, Medline, The Google Scholar, Academic search premier, SAGE, and EBSCO host.
Findings from this review discussed the socioeconomic and behavioral factors, which address the quality delivery of palliative care among cancer patients. These factors if measured with acceptance level in cancer patients could help to address areas that need improvement from the stage of disease diagnosis to the end-of-life.
Significance of the results
Valuable collaborations among international and local health institutions are needed to build and implement a systematic framework for palliative care in LMICs. Policies and programs that are country and culturally specific, encompassing both theoretical and practical models of care in the milieu of existing quandaries should be developed.
This chapter lays out some of the basic aspects of how political institutions identify and aggregate the preferences of their constituents. Most democratic political systems use elections to aggregate preferences, and the contours of those political systems are mapped out in a number of voting rights. Voting rights, though, are not unidimensional: they cover everything from casting a ballot to ensuring that ballots are properly weighted to policing the very ability to place alternatives on a ballot in the first place. At the core of all these rights, though, is the recognition that voting should be tied in some way to a person's interest, or stake, in the outcome of an election. Because there are problems with relying upon self-reports of that interest, democratic institutions typically rely upon markers of that interest that allow them to identify and regulate those voting rights. Those markers, though, need to be both accurate descriptions of voter interest (not over- or underinclusive) and manageable.
People often fail to make the choices that best satisfy their preferences. The design of the social environment inevitably makes some choices easier than others. According to Libertarian Paternalists, these facts justify governments nudging people towards better choices through changes to the so-called choice architecture. This is a form of means paternalism. However, the social environment affects not only people's choices or means, but also the preferences they adopt in the first place. Call this the problem of ‘preference architecture’. This article argues that preference architecture constitutes a fundamental challenge to the justificatory basis of Libertarian Paternalism. More generally, it explores when, if ever, government paternalism that influences preference formation can be justified. While Libertarian Paternalism cannot provide a satisfactory answer, the author defends a contractualist account of paternalism based on a notion of primary goods and democratic deliberation.
The social and economic forces that shape attitudes toward the welfare state are of central concern to social scientists. Scholarship in this area has paid limited attention to how working part-time, the employment status of nearly 20% of the U.S. workforce, affects redistribution preferences. In this article, we theoretically develop and empirically test an argument about the ways that part-time work, and its relationship to gender, shape redistribution preferences. We articulate two gender-differentiated pathways—one material and one about threats to social status—through which part-time work and gender may jointly shape individuals’ preferences for redistribution. We test our argument using cross-sectional and panel data from the General Social Survey in the United States. We find that the positive relationship between part-time employment, compared to full-time employment, and redistribution preferences is stronger for men than for women. Indeed, we do not detect a relationship between part-time work and redistribution preferences among women. Our results provide support for a gendered relationship between part-time employment and redistribution preferences and demonstrate that both material and status-based mechanisms shape this association.
Few studies to date have analysed individual support for universal basic income (UBI). This article theorizes and explores empirically the relationship between different strands of left ideology and support for UBI across European countries. We delineate three types of concerns about capitalism: “Labourist Left” worry about exploitation; “Libertarian Left” about repression and “Social Investment Left” about inefficiencies. Contrary to expectations we derive from political theory and welfare state literature, our results based on data from the European Social Survey suggest that having high concerns about exploitation is positively correlated with support for UBI, whereas repression concerns are negatively correlated with support. In line with our hypothesis about social investment ideology, left-leaning individuals with efficiency concerns are more likely to support UBI. Our findings call for more detailed surveys as well as further research on the different ideologies within the Left and how these relate to variation in support for UBI, which crucially shapes the potential political coalition behind the introduction of UBI.
The European Union provided a mixed response to the 2008 financial crisis. On the one hand, it refused to pursue fiscal integration through a common budget; on the other, it introduced significant transfers between countries that were designed to produce financial stabilization. The authors analyze this response as the outcome of democratic constraints on EU leaders. Given the EU’s current institutional structure, citizens’ preferences pose a binding constraint on what leaders can do as these preferences limit the scope of risk-pooling among members and the degree of political tolerance for different courses of action. The authors show that citizens’ preferences reflect differences in the geography of income, production regimes, and institutional organization. The heterogeneity of constituencies’ redistribution preferences combined with a diverse economic geography helps to explain why political constraints on national governments prevent them from engaging in further fiscal integration. By contrast, externalities among member states shift the preferences of citizens who may experience negative effects and make international redistribution politically feasible. The authors analyze these two mechanisms and present novel empirical results on the determinants of preferences for fiscal integration and international redistribution in the aftermath of the eurocrisis.
Many reforms of education governance throughout the postwar decades have been heavily contested politically. Since around the 1980s, governments in several advanced Western countries have reformed their education systems by increasing private provision, school choice, decentralization, and competition; by lowering or increasing the number of educational tracks available in secondary education; and by reorienting the role of vocational education and training in the education system. Yet, to date we possess insufficient knowledge of the extent to which such reforms are actually in line with individual preferences. This chapter studies individual preferences toward education governance for four educational sectors (early childhood education and care, schools, vocational education and training, and higher education) along three dimensions of education governance. On average, our findings reveal a strong support of public opinion for a publicly dominated, comprehensive model of education provision, coupled with a high degree of choice for students and parents. Yet, for most issues, preferences toward education governance are highly contested between individuals of different ideological orientations and partisan constituencies. Conflicting preferences at the individual level reflect the oftentimes high degree of partisan conflict on many reform issues in the governance of education.
This chapter analyzes attitudes and preferences toward education spending. Relying on representative survey data for eight European countries, it (1) studies what citizens want when it comes to education spending and (2) explores explanations for these preferences, i.e. the main latent political cleavages over education reform. The first part of the chapter sheds theoretical and empirical light on the question how salient is education expenditure compared to other (social) policy areas. Moreover, it explores how attitudes toward education spending relate to attitudes toward means to finance this spending (via taxation, debt, or retrenchment in other areas). The second part of the chapter studies preferences toward the distribution of spending on different sectors of the education system. The results show, among other things, that compared to other issues education is highly salient, particularly schools and vocational education and training. While public support drops considerably once increases in expenditure come at a price, there is an astonishingly high support for education-related taxes. The chapter reports evidence for several potential cleavages over education spending (e.g. along respondents’ income and educational backgrounds), the most consistent one being a partisan divide.
If apathy, risk, and information cannot explain the participation gap in the Muslim world, then what accounts for lower levels of political and economic activity in the region? The alternative theory that is developed here focuses squarely on interpersonal trust. It identifies two key conditions -- interdependence and uncertainty -- that, when met, make cooperation and coordination trust dependent. Different types of interpersonal trust are able to sustain collective action at different scales, with the broadest forms of cooperation and coordination requiring trust that is non-particularized, or not based on direct previous experience with the entrusted. Levels of trust and trustworthiness in the Muslim world are assessed, and the region is found to have high levels of honesty, but significantly less interpersonal trust. In contrast to some existing theories arguing that this distrust is culturally determined and unable to change, I find evidence that low trust expectations can indeed be updated. This speaks to the potential for collective action in the Muslim world, based on the high levels of trustworthiness there, if only individuals can learn to trust one another.
This chapter studies the role of public opinion in the politics of education reforms in Spain between 2011 and early 2018. The influence of public opinion in education reforms varied, depending on how salient and coherent public opinion was. Public opinion sent a loud and clear signal in opposition to the government´s cuts in public education spending. Although heavily constrained by the major financial and economic crisis, the government corrected some of its budget cuts in the run-up to the 2015 elections and especially once it had lost its parliamentary majority in the same elections. On aspects related to the structure and governance of the education system, salience was high, but public opinion was much more divided (loud but noisy politics). In this case, the conservative government was clearly appealing to its core constituencies and relied on its parliamentary majority to enact its major education reform in 2013. In this political environment, the public gave little attention to policy reforms in early childhood education and care and vocational education and training. Quiet politics lent greater influence to the government’s budgetary concerns and to organized interests in the development and implementation of reforms in these sectors.
This chapter studies the role of public opinion in the politics of education reforms in England from 2010 until early 2018. We find the influence of public opinion to vary depending on the salience and coherence of public opinion. When issues were highly salient and public opinion was coherent (loud politics), the government appealed to public opinion. It expanded free access to childcare and partly corrected its original attempts to cut public spending on schools and increase tuition fees for higher education. With high salience on the issue but conflicting preferences across partisan constituencies (loud but noisy politics), the government pushed through its reform agenda, which targeted the preferences of its core constituencies. It was able to continue to do this provided it possessed sufficient strength in parliament (in the case of its attempt to expand selective grammar schools) and as long as public opinion remained sufficiently split between supporters and opponents of the government (in the case of tuition fees). When salience was low, quiet politics predominated. Several reform issues related to the governance of the education system failed to capture much public attention, which gave interest groups an opportunity to insert their preferences into the decision-making process.
In this paper we develop a concept aware multi-preferential semantics for dealing with typicality in description logics, where preferences are associated with concepts, starting from a collection of ranked TBoxes containing defeasible concept inclusions. Preferences are combined to define a preferential interpretation in which defeasible inclusions can be evaluated. The construction of the concept-aware multipreference semantics is related to Brewka’s framework for qualitative preferences. We exploit Answer Set Programming (in particular, asprin) to achieve defeasible reasoning under the multipreference approach for the lightweight description logic ξ$\mathcal L_ \bot ^ + $.
In this study, we analyse the relationship of participation in the Finnish basic income (BI) experiment and people’s attitudes towards a BI. The experiment, implemented in 2017–2018, aimed to improve citizens’ employment and well-being by reducing the eligibility conditions of basic social benefits and by increasing monetary incentives to find employment. The data on attitudes come from responses to a survey carried out during the experiment. Identical questions were posed to the treatment (receiving the BI) and the control group of the experiment. The contributions of this paper are (1) an estimation of the relationship between participation and opinions on BI, (2) an analysis of the heterogeneity of the relationship and (3) an estimation of the relationship between participation and people’s ability to express their opinions on BI. Our findings indicate that participation in the experiment significantly explains people’s support for a BI and their ability to express opinions.
In this paper, we study the relationship between occupational vulnerability and attitudes toward immigration in Western Europe. We measure occupational vulnerability as the risk of unemployment due to routine-biased technological change and offshoring of jobs to other countries. Previous empirical studies in political economy have shown that individuals’ policy preferences echo their economic risks and prospects. Workers in low routine occupations are most worried about their job market prospects, most likely to demand social protection and least likely to support free trade. We find that attitudes toward immigration become considerably more negative as occupational task routineness increases. We do not find a similar association between occupational offshorability and immigration attitudes. Direct exposure to global competition is not associated with increased worries about immigration. However, offshorability seems to be associated with the polarization of attitudes toward immigration between routine and nonroutine workers.
The informal sector challenges economic growth and hinders the abatement of income disparities in developing countries. This study argues that a weak and poorly governed welfare state can cause the informal sector to increase when individuals use it as an exit option from an unsatisfying welfare system. The article explores how the welfare state’s benefit structure and citizens’ trust in institutions to deliver public goods affect the likelihood of informality. A logistic hierarchical model, based on cross-sectional survey data from Latin America and the Caribbean and descriptive panel data from Brazil, is used to test the hypothesis. Findings reveal that social policy discontent, low trust, an elitist distribution of welfare benefits, and dysfunctional institutions increase the likelihood of being informally employed. However, workers with greater agency—the better-educated—seem notably less likely to informalize when social policy benefits are targeted toward their own socioeconomic group.
This chapter introduces preference orderings and their representation by utility functions. Also, the consumer choice problem as a utility-maximization problem and its applications. Income and the substitution effect are discussed.