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Water rights and water market mechanisms are key characteristics to describe water management and allocation in the Limarí Basin in Chile. The 1981 Water Code strengthens private water use rights and declares them freely tradable. Engineering infrastructure, climatic conditions, and institutional capacities in terms of tradable water rights and private water user associations allowed economic development in the Limarí Valley. However, the lack of governmental regulation has led to overexploitation of water resources threatening water security, such as environmental and agricultural sustainability. In the face of climate change and decreasing water availability, the current infrastructural and management system requires reforms.
This chapter’s focus is on an equally important and perhaps surprising aspect of the historically layered and cultural complex composition of trading networks – their religious diversity. Long-term conflict and displacement in Afghanistan has resulted in the bleaching of ‘ethno-religious minorities’ from the country’s social fabric, what is sometimes referred to as the process of ‘decosmopolitanisation’. This chapter argues that processes of ‘de-cosmopolitinisation’ are best understood alongside recognition of the persistence in new settings of the legacy of past modes of doing commerce widely documented in multi-religious Muslim-majority societies. It explore the role traders play in cultivating and maintaining nuanced modes of engaging with religious diversity in the various settings in which they work, exploring the afterlife of Afghanistan’s legacy of cosmopolitan modes of urban living in the geographies and sociality of contemporary forms of trade. In order to do so, the ethnographic focus of the chapter is on relationships between Muslim traders from Afghanistan and those who identify with the country’s historic and substantial – but today geographically dispersed – Hindu and Sikh communities.
This chapter considers the relationship of mobile Afghan traders to Afghanistan. It argues that commercial nodes within Afghanistan act as vital hubs that are rich in the types of capital and commercial personnel critical for long-distance Afghan networks of credit and trade. A consideration of the entangled trajectories of commercial actors and migrants also challenges the depiction of Afghanistan as a one-dimensional departure point for migrants. The country instead plays a central role in inter-Asian circulations of goods, capital and people and occupies a critical role in interconnected and multidirectional geographical trajectories of merchants and migrants. The chapter documents the importance of practices of entrustment and the giving of favours to mobile Afghan to the country significance to long-distance trading networks. Afghanistan’s trading networks and the nodes important to them inform development across Eurasia in settings where we might least expect them to do so. In this sense, tracing Afghan trading networks reveal connections between different parts of Eurasia – connections in which Afghans are themselves active in constructing.
The legal approach to regulating data-driven personalisation has relied heavily on extending and reusing legal categories and concepts – in particular, the idea of privacy of personal information and the legitimating role of consent in permitting the use of personal information – that were originally devised to deal with a very different problem. This chapter argues that this approach is fundamentally flawed for two reasons. Firstly, data-driven personalisation – unlike the traditional core of privacy – is deeply enmeshed in contractual relationships, and both the gathering and the use of data are mediated by contractual terms. As this chapter shows, the result is that ‘privacy’ and ‘consent’ do not provide an adequate evaluative framework to model or mitigate the deleterious impact of data-driven personalisation on individuals. Secondly, consent derives its normative force from the presumption that it is necessarily autonomy-enhancing. As this chapter shows, however, data-driven personalisation has a strong derelationalising effect which erodes rather than enhances the data subject’s autonomy, calling into question the assumptions underpinning privacy-based approaches. The chapter concludes by arguing that dealing with these problems requires adopting a new, more substantive approach, which works to explicitly restrict the processes, structures, and purposes through which and for which personalisation is used.
Chapter 2 situates the book in the context of market associations in Lagos. It describes the structure of private trade associations around the world, and how such associations are organized in Lagos today, as well as their historical role. The chapter shows that the internal organization of trade associations is remarkably similar around the world; even specific executive positions like public relations officers can be found across continents. It demonstrates that within Lagos, there is only minor variation in the formal titles of association executives; the general structure of these groups is uniform. In the context of Lagos markets, the chapter shows how governments can meddle in the affairs of private associations, and how associations can counter these efforts. Chapter 1 outlined the theoretical importance of government intrusion in private groups. This chapter demonstrates, concretely, how these threats affect associations.
Chapter 4 starts by presenting two broad critiques of the private governance literature. First, this research sometimes assumes that groups can self-regulate without group leaders. While this might be the case for some small groups, leaders are critical for cooperation in many groups. Second, scholars have overlooked the obstacles group leaders must overcome in order to govern well – such as impediments to truthful information sharing and impartial dispute enforcement – which has generated the faulty assumption that private order will emerge when it is needed. It then develops the logic of the argument, which sheds light on the conditions that make private trade-promoting policies more likely. While previous studies of private groups suggest that private institutions substitute for public institutions, the book’s argument is that state threats can encourage private good governance; private associations will predate without public institutions that force them to behave otherwise. The chapter also introduces the role of within-groups competition, theorizing about how competition increases the hurdles to private group leaders implementing trade-promoting policies. It then discusses the possibility of group leader-politician collusion, along with the way that relational contracting relates to the argument.
Property rights are important for economic exchange, but many governments don't protect them. Private market organizations can fill this gap by providing an institutional structure to enforce agreements, but with this power comes the ability to extort group members. Under what circumstances, then, will private organizations provide a stable environment for economic activity? Based on market case studies and a representative survey of traders in Lagos, Nigeria, this book argues that threats from the government can force an association to behave in ways that promote trade. The findings challenge the conventional wisdom that private good governance in developing countries thrives when the government keeps its hands off private group affairs. Instead, the author argues, leaders among traders behave in ways that promote trade primarily because of the threat of government intrusion.
Based on a year of fieldwork in Lagos markets, Chapter 5 looks in depth at four markets, demystifying leadership behavior and the role of politics, and testing the part of the theory that focuses on threats and leader strength. The first market is an archetype of private good governance, and the chapter assesses the extent to which the conditions that sustain these policies are consistent with the book’s theory. The other three markets are governed by leaders who fail to create supportive environments for traders. Prior studies assume that such groups disappear quickly, as current group members abandon them and prospective group members decide not to join. The chapter documents that these groups can persist for much longer than previously assumed. One of the markets highlights a special type of group: one in which the group leader extorts from their own members. Previous studies have assumed that group members are mobile and would simply move to a better group if a leader attempted to extort from them, and that group leaders would therefore refrain from extorting for fear of losing members. This case study illustrates how predatory leaders exploit traders’ immobility.
Chapter 3 describes how high quality and representative data was collected from traders, with an emphasis on sampling and survey strategies that could apply broadly to surveys of informal populations. It describes a trader census of tens of thousands of shops, how traders were sampled from this census, and strategies to reduce the likelihood that – for example – an enumerator avoids a shop where a trader is busy and picks the shop without customers. Next the chapter introduces strategies to increase trust with skeptical respondents, and strategies to enforce sampling and survey protocols. Last, the chapter discusses the brute-force approach to defining market association membership, and discusses implications for future researchers who aim to identify associational membership in a population.
In this chapter, we focus on the idea of the rule of law in the classical liberal tradition. The rule of law is a basic jurisprudential norm that undergirds liberal democracies. We show that discretionary central banking is inconsistent with the rule of law. Discretionary central banking fails the test of generality: It benefits special interests, but not the public as a whole. Also, discretionary banking fails the test of predictability: It does not create an environment conducive to reliable public expectations of future policy. For these reasons, it is unlikely that discretionary central banking can be reconciled with self-governance. We reaffirm the imperative of liberal democracy, as well as uncovering monetary institutions that are compatible with liberal democracy. Until we do so, we fail to meet the basic challenge of self-governance.
Property and markets are not fully intertwined. Although one cannot think about the idea of a market without thinking about property – property, after all, is one of the market’s foundational building blocks – it is possible to think about property without thinking about markets. Still, liberal property and markets are so deeply connected that a liberal theory of property cannot ignore the market. A liberal theory of property must explain how property can remain loyal to its liberal commitments in the context of large-scale economies heavily reliant on the operation of markets.
This chapter considers the economic context of urban food production of the Middle Ages and situates household-scale production within its wider context. It explores the emergence of evidence for urban markets for foodstuffs and suggests ways in which we might understand the absence of that evidence for the period prior to the eleventh century. In the absence of commercial-scale farming of foodstuffs, household-level cultivation was the principal means of acquiring food for most city-dwellers. The possession of food gardens and their exchange through horizontal networks of families or social groups allow us to see the prominence of family links in the management of urban property and the control of urban food production. The systems which emerged to permit the feeding of urban populations in the early part of our period arose in the context of new ideas about wealth, and emerging communities, such as religious households and priestly households, which required new solutions to feeding urban populations.
Property enhances autonomy for most people, but not for all. Because it both empowers and disables, property requires constant vigilance. A Liberal Theory of Property addresses key questions: how can property be justified? What core values should property law advance, and how do those values interrelate? How is a liberal state obligated to act when shaping property law? In a liberal polity, the primary commitment to individual autonomy dominates the justification of property, founding it on three pillars: carefully delineated private authority, structural (but not value) pluralism, and relational justice. A genuinely liberal property law meets the legitimacy challenge confronting property by expanding people's opportunities for individual and collective self-determination while carefully restricting their options of interpersonal domination. The book shows how the three pillars of liberal property account for core features of existing property systems, provide a normative vocabulary for evaluating central doctrines, and offer directions for urgent reforms.
As part of the roundtable, “Ethics and the Future of the Global Food System,” this essay examines how the key decisions within the global system of food production are shaped by the organization of the global political economy. The understanding of the global political economy follows standard definitions that focus on the dominant market practices and the institutional structures within which those practices are embedded. I identify examples of market practices and institutional policies that structurally impair the ability of states to secure the human rights of their citizens, and explain specific issues of structural injustice raised by each example. The conclusion provides a survey of a range of alternative solutions for transforming the global political economy and creating the conditions for a more just and ecologically sustainable food system. Ultimately, our conception of human rights and the mechanisms for their protection and enforcement must change in order to address the scale and gravity of problems affecting the future of agriculture and our ability to feed the world.
Discourse on food ethics often advocates the anti-capitalist idea that we need less capitalism, less growth, and less globalization if we want to make the world a better and more equitable place. This idea is also familiar from much discourse in global ethics, environment, and political theory, more generally. However, many experts argue that this anti-capitalist idea is not supported by reason and argument, and is actually wrong. As part of the roundtable, “Ethics and the Future of the Global Food System,” the main contribution of this essay is to explain the structure of the leading arguments against this anti-capitalist idea, and in favor of well-regulated capitalism. I initially focus on general arguments for and against globalized capitalism. I then turn to implications for the food, environment, climate change, and beyond. Finally, I clarify the important kernel of truth in the critique of neoliberalism familiar from food ethics, political theory, and beyond—as well as the limitations of that critique.
Michael Zürn's Theory of Global Governance is an original, bold, and compelling argument regarding the causes of change in global governance. A core argument is that legitimation problems trigger changes in global governance. This contribution addresses two core features of the argument. Although I am persuaded that legitimacy matters, there are times when: legitimacy appears to be given too much credit to the relative neglect of other factors; other times when the lack of legitimacy has little discernible impact on the working of global governance; and unanswered questions about how the legitimacy of global governance relates to the legitimacy of the international order of which it is a part. The second feature is what counts as change in global governance. Zürn reduces change to either deepening or decline, overlooking the possible how of global governance. In contrast to Zürn's map of global governance that is dominated by hierarchies in the form of international organizations, an alternative map locates multiple modes of governance: hierarchies, markets, and networks. The kinds of legitimation problems that Zürn identifies, I argue, can help explain some of the movement from hierarchical to other modes of global governance.
This chapter investigates the social, political and environmental characteristics and impacts of food and farming in the current era of neoliberal globalization. Drawing from environmental sociology, political economy and political ecology, we consider the ways that problems with capital, labour and land intersect with ecological constraints (such as climate change and declining fossil fuels). Productivist agriculture, industrialisation, supermarketization and financialization have contributed to the demise of local food systems, the promotion of ‘obesogenic’ diets, the creation of food waste and the global ‘land rush’, with implications for both the natural environment and for deteriorating conditions for labour. Farmers have shifted from feeding nations to producing for a global economy in which food is overproduced while global hunger increases. These contradictions have prompted significant social, political, and financial struggles. Multiple ‘neoliberalisms’ have therefore emerged, and neoliberal food and farming is highly contested. The chapter concludes with a discussion of alter-globalization; an alternative to neoliberal globalization that challenges the notion of capitalist growth, highlights limits to consumption, and largely rejects market solutions to environmental problems. The right to food, ‘food sovereignty’, redistributive land reform, smallholder and family farming, de-corporatization, agro-ecology and improved democracy are discussed as key elements informing critique and resistance.
In premodern economic systems where the social embedding of exchange provided actors with the ability to control or monopolize trade, including the goods that enter and leave a marketplace, “restricted markets” formed. These markets produced external revenues that could be used to achieve political goals. Conversely, commercialized systems required investment in public goods that incentivize the development of market cooperation and “open markets,” where buyers and sellers from across social sectors and diverse communities could engage in exchange as economic equals within marketplaces. In this article, we compare market development at the Late Postclassic sites of Chetumal, Belize, and Tlaxcallan, Mexico. We identified a restricted market at Chetumal, using the distribution of exotic goods, particularly militarily and ritually charged obsidian projectile points; in contrast, an open market was built at Tlaxcallan. Collective action theory provides a useful framework to understand these differences in market development. We argue that Tlaxcaltecan political architects adopted more collective strategies, in which open markets figured, to encourage cooperation among an ethnically diverse population.
We examine how variation in antisemitism across countries can be explained by economic freedom. We propose two mechanisms. First, the more economic freedom, the greater the scope of market activities. If people perceive Jews as particularly skilful at doing business at the expense of others, a greater reliance on markets can increase antisemitism. Second, a key type of institution undergirding the market is an effective and fair legal system, or the rule of law. The stronger the rule of law, the smaller the risk for exploitative behaviour, and the less hostile people will be towards groups seen as exploiters. If Jews are seen as such, more economic freedom reduces antisemitism. We use the ADL Global 100 survey of antisemitic attitudes and relate them, for up to 106 countries, to the Economic Freedom of the World index and its five areas. Our empirical findings confirm the two predictions: The more economic openness, the more antisemitism; and the stronger the rule of law, the less antisemitism. These findings indicate a complex relationship between markets and attitudes towards Jews.
For the Comaroffs criminality has become a global idiom for social and economic life. Here, eleven case studies of criminal markets in India (Harriss-White and Michelutti, 2019) are found to support the Comaroffs’ global model in which state privatization generates contested jurisdictions and plural sovereignties. But distinctively Indian characteristics of criminal markets are also found. As suggested by Jha, these are preconditions for the funding of electoral democratic politics. The recent history of riverbed sand markets in Tamil Nadu on which urbanization and infrastructure depend reveals the capture and complicity of all levels of the revenue and regulative bureaucracy and of entire party political hierarchies. Profits and tribute resulting from rapid technological aggrandizement, the formation of regional monopolies, and of mafianized cartels in sand are the object of both competition and collusion. Resistance expressed through PIL results in un-enforced judicial decisions. Tamil Nadu’s famed populism coexists with predatory, pork barrel politics. The implications of criminalized sand markets for theories of actually existing markets and institutional change are discussed.