To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
According to a standard account liberalism is committed to the rejection of legal paternalism. But the fact is that paternalistic policies are common currency in most liberal democracies, and liberal governments claim or at least assume that those policies are not inimical to liberal principles. My argument in this chapter is, first, that paternalistic interventions do infringe the right to direct one’s life, and that, therefore, the scope of this right cannot be redefined to conceal the conflict. However, the fact that there is an unavoidable conflict between individual sovereignty and paternalism does not mean that paternalism is necessarily unjustifiable. Second, since the right to direct one’s life is not absolute, it can be outweighed by considerations related to an individual’s positive freedom. I will argue that the protection of an agent’s positive freedom is a permissible moral goal, and, sometimes, this goal can offset the right to direct one’s life. I acknowledge that paternalistic actions set back individuals’ autonomous choices, but I nonetheless claim that such interferences are justified because, on some occasions, positive freedom considerations outweigh the right to sovereign individual choice.
Public reason approaches to political legitimacy typically claim that members of society are free and equal when they live under institutions that are publically justified. Institutions are publically justified when they can be justified in the right way to the reasoning of each member. However, the requirements of publically justified institutions are also backed by political coercion or other social practices through which individuals are held accountable to those requirements, though the result is supposedly citizens being free in a positive sense. Throughout this development, public reason theorists have seemed to presume that legitimate institutions are sufficient for securing the freedom of its members, even the members that do not think those institutions are best. This change from best to merely legitimate, however, raises serious difficulties for the account of freedom within public reason theories, particularly when we consider the level of divergence that may exist between the institutions favored by one’s own reason and the merely legitimate institutions one may live under. This chapter elaborates the difficulties that public reason views face regarding liberty in a merely legitimate regime, and considers the main strategies available to such accounts for understanding the liberty of members of legitimate societies.
Over the last century, many philosophers have argued in favour of a liberal-egalitarian accommodation of capitalism, in which the liberty of the market is to be combined with an egalitarian distribution of property. Theorists of positive freedom, amongst others, have been prominent in arguing for the liberal-egalitarian accommodation. They have argued that an egalitarian distribution of private property is necessary to give every citizen equal positive freedom. To lead an autonomous life, every citizen needs control over some private property. The liberal-egalitarian accommodation to capitalism has come under threat in the last decades, as documented by a renewed widening of inequalities in wealth and income. In this essay, I will argue that this predicament requires us to look at one important precondition of the positive freedom argument. This precondition I call the de-politization of private property. Private property is conceived of as a purely private phenomenon, which has no effects on the exercise of political power. However, whether this precondition is met is a contingent matter; and so defenders of the positive freedom argument therefore need to turn their attention to the problem posed by the relation between private property and political power.
A novelist by trade whose intellectual capaciousness brought him directly into the field of politics, Mailer is somewhat adrift in the general categories of political analysis we are accustomed to in the United States. For him, the Left was either too blindly ideological or too unfocused; the Right only crafted national sensibility by force; and the liberals in the middle had so far created a world without mountains and valleys, a land hard-pressed to accept the existential longings of the modern individual. Instead of situating himself within these categories, Mailer firmly and repeatedly called himself a “Left Conservative.” He even ran for mayor of New York City in 1969 as an advocate of a “Left Conservative” platform. This chapter will work to define Mailer’s position, situating it amongst other political conversations in mid-century America.
This chapter explores distributive justice and beneficence. Justice involves giving individuals what they are due. Distributive justice governs the distribution of valuable resources and of burdens, and the granting of certain legal rights. Beneficence concerns agents’ duties to benefit other individuals. The chapter highlights distinctions (1) between the ideal and the nonideal and (2) between how institutions should be arranged and how individuals should act. We understand nonideal theory to address what particular actors – both states and persons – should do in the actual world today. Regarding institutions, domestically, we defend a liberal egalitarian view about distributive justice: unchosen differences in individual advantage within a society are prima facie unjust. Globally, we endorse cosmopolitanism: similar principles of justice apply internationally as apply domestically. Regarding individuals’ obligations, we defend moderately extensive duties of beneficence. We argue that national governments should ensure that all their residents have access to affordable health care and that the international community ought to amend the global intellectual property regime that governs pharmaceutical patents.
Chapter 6, ‘Imagining a Community’, brings together, and builds on, the findings made throughout the book about the nature of the international community imagined within the archive. This shows that whilst the tribunal functioned as a site of liberal international governance, that underneath this liberal vision sat a distinctly illiberal understanding of community. In particular this shows that the archive divided the international community into the international, as a site of peace and order, and the local, as a site of barbarity; protected a space wherein violence was a legitimate aspect of international relations; and projected a patriarchal and colonial vision of community as the voice of the subaltern was denied.
This chapter explores a range of possible intersections between music, politics, and Romanticism in France and German lands in the first half of the nineteenth century. Beginning with a discussion of early German Romantic theories of political organisation and how they influenced Romantic conceptions of art, I subsequently unpick the complicated relationship between the French Revolution and Romanticism in music, and between the politically revolutionary and the artistically revolutionary. I show the extreme adaptability of the Romantic aesthetic when it came to its political interpretation, not only through the contrast between German and French Romanticism, but also through the surprising twists and turns in the political associations of Romanticism in France over three decades. In the second section, I look at the political mobilisation of Romantic symbols in Prussian musical life to nationalist and dynastic ends, before ending with a brief consideration of politicised anti-Romanticism amongst music critics in 1848.
The suburbs, which now contain the majority of the US population, have also become increasingly diverse, with more immigrants and people in poverty living there than in cities. Against this backdrop, the privileged, all-white enclaves conjured by New Yorker writers such as Cheever and Updike are outdated. This chapter focuses instead on New Yorker suburban fiction written by women contributors to demonstrate the magazine’s ongoing role in shaping the class consciousness and political sensibilities of its white female readers, who by 1954 accounted for 55 percent of its subscribers. Postwar, it became a symbol of its women readers’ education and refinement. Further, the liberal ideals advanced in the magazine’s essays consistently offered means for enhancing readers’ standing in their communities by championing social causes that would conveniently not raise taxes, lower property values, or compromise their children’s education. The female-authored New Yorker fiction discussed here offers a composite portrait and subtle critique of the white suburban woman voter whose current clout at the polls could be redirected to serve a larger purpose than self-aggrandizement.
This chapter explains the concept of reasonable multiculturalism. Building on the Rawlsian notion of reasonableness, and on Kymlicka’s formulation of multiculturalism, the mechanisms for reconciliation between liberalism and multiculturalism are outlined. What are the boundaries of multiculturalism within the framework of liberal democracy? What are the boundaries of state interference in the business of minority cultures whose norms and practices are at odd with liberal democracy? Reasonability assumes acceptance of the underpinning shared principles. Cultures that do not adhere to these principles are perceived as less reasonable. The extent of reasonability varies. But lacking reasonability does not immediately entail that the liberal majority should intervene in the business of the subcultures. Interference is warranted to restore justice. The chapter discusses the concept of mutual respect, distinguishing between two forms of cultural pluralism – ‘multination’ and ‘polyethnic’ states – and between two kinds of rights that a group might claim: the first involves the right of a group against its own members, the second involves the right of a group against the larger society. Furthermore, the nature of liberal tolerance and the mechanisms of deliberative democracy are explained, the latter instrumental for resolving disputes in a liberal democracy in a civil, non-violent way.
The opening chapter revolves around the questions: What does liberalism purport to include within the defence of neutrality? What scope is available for conceptions of the good to meet, to mingle and to rival each other? In order to answer these questions, we need to understand what liberal democracy is about, what its ground rules are and how we can distinguish liberal democracies from illiberal societies. To address these important questions, the chapter avails itself of the Rawlsian justice as fairness theory which greatly influenced the liberal discourse during the past century. The Rawlsian theory of justice is supplemented with Kantian and Millian ethics. The chapter elucidates two important concepts without which it is impossible to imagine any liberal democracy: respect for others, inspired by Kantian and Rawlsian philosophies, and the Harm Principle derived from J. S. Mill’s ethics. It is the Harm Principle that guides us in prescribing boundaries to conduct. The necessity in introducing boundaries is further explained by the concept of the ‘democratic catch’.
The first chapter offers a general overview of the interpretative framework that guides the selections and commentary in this volume. One thing has remained a constant fixture in American history: the enduring belief in an American exceptionalism. This book suggests that, besides the remarkable endeavor of leaving the Old World and of framing a new government by the people for the people, what has made American political thought exceptional is the unique combination of theoretical influences that were intertwined during the founding era. American statesmen combined two languages—liberalism and republicanism—and two conceptions of the people: the understanding of the people as a corporate entity and as a multitude of individuals. This paradigm of the people’s two bodies may be nothing more than a fiction, but it shaped American history and institutions profoundly. The guiding threat of the subsequent chapters is to trace the combination of republican and liberal ideas about the people and about representation in the primary sources from the Puritans’ arrival on the shores of New England to the Civil War.
The litmus test for measuring the extent of democratization of any given society is the legal status of minorities and their enjoyment of equal civic and human rights. The less discriminatory the society is against minorities, the more democratic it is. In this respect, Israel is struggling. Egalitarianism in terms of safeguarding basic civic and human rights for all is still in the making. Israel has navigated between liberalism, on the one hand, and promoting its religion and nationality as a Jewish state, on the other. Throughout the years, Israeli leaders have given precedence to Judaism and Jewishness over liberalism. While sometimes their language uttered liberal values, Israeli leaders’ actions were perfectionist in essence, preferring one religion and one nation over others. While accommodations were sought and some compromises were made, the underlying motivation was not to achieve just egalitarianism. This chapter argues for accommodating the interests of the Israeli-Arabs/Palestinians, and that Israel should strive to safeguard equal rights and liberties for all citizens – notwithstanding religion, race, culture, ethnicity, colour, gender, class or sexual orientation.
To understand the conflicts in many of Roth’s novels, it is important to situate his narratives within the context of class conflict, in particular. Class identity – particularly, Jewish middle-class identity – is an influential factor in the development of Roth’s protagonists. As Ruth Wisse points out in her article “Philip Roth Then and Now,” “Roth’s fictional interpretation of American Jews as a regnant bourgeoisie disturbed as much as it amused,” as it addressed an anxiety about materialism and upper class assimilation, particularly in works like Goodbye, Columbus. Moreover, the striving of a character like the Swede in American Pastoral and the identity of Faunia Farley in The Human Stain can be further understood when considered in light of American class structure the assumptions and promises proffered by American liberalism.
Why should regional organisations, having developed progressive checks on sovereignty at the start of the twenty-first century, roll them back at the first challenges to these principles? Dominant norm theories suggested a ‘cascade’ of internalisation of liberal norms that had begun at the end of the Cold War, but these had come to be challenged by emerging theories of normative contestation. The chapter critiques the expectations generated by norm cascade theory, suggesting a rethink of the role of power and a more evolutionary, anti-foundationalist approach to understanding norm development.
As Richard Wright was establishing his career in the 1940s, he maintained profitable but uneasy relationships with white audiences, especially those approaching his works within the political liberalism that held sway over much of American culture in this period. While Wright’s works struck a powerful chord in redirecting American culture to acknowledge the costs of race-based exclusion, the extent of that change was only ever partial, and often depended on Wright’s narratives being disseminated and received along the lines of established, white cultural parameters. At the same time, the commercial and critical successes of Native Son and Black Boy established the foundation for Wright’s career, and his interactions with white writers, living and dead, provided influential models and connections. This essay explores this tension while situating Wright’s work and publishing history in relation to civil rights activism and cultural liberalism in the 1940s, and its (sometimes distorted) reflection in the images of Wright circulated by his publishers and the mainstream press, by tracing the paratextual materials attached to Wright’s books and the wide range of publication venues in which his stories and essays appeared.
This book explores the main challenges against multiculturalism. It aims to examine whether liberalism and multiculturalism are reconcilable, and what are the limits of liberal democratic interventions in illiberal affairs of minority cultures within democracy. In the process, this book addresses three questions: whether multiculturalism is bad for democracy, whether multiculturalism is bad for women, and whether multiculturalism contributes to terrorism. Just, Reasonable Multiculturalism argues that liberalism and multiculturalism are reconcilable if a fair balance is struck between individual rights and group rights. Raphael Cohen-Almagor contends that reasonable multiculturalism can be achieved via mechanisms of deliberate democracy, compromise and, when necessary, coercion. Placing necessary checks on groups that discriminate against vulnerable third parties, the approach insists on the protection of basic human rights as well as on exit rights for individuals if and when they wish to leave their cultural groups.
Disavowing Disability examines the role that disability, both as a concept and an experience, played in seventeenth-century debates about salvation and religious practice. Exploring how the use and definition of the term 'disability' functioned to allocate agency and culpability, this study argues that the post-Restoration imperative to capacitate 'all men'—not just the 'elect'—entailed a conceptual circumscription of disability, one premised on a normative imputation of capability. The work of Richard Baxter, sometimes considered a harbinger of 'modernity' and one of the most influential divines of the Long Eighteenth Century, elucidates this multifarious process of enabling. In constructing an ideology of ability that imposed moral self-determination, Baxter encountered a germinal form of the 'problem' of disability in liberal theory. While a strategy of 'inclusionism' served to assimilate most manifestations of alterity, melancholy presented an intractability that frustrated the logic of rehabilitation in fatal ways. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This conclusion makes two arguments. First, it contends that containment strategies need sound “theories of change,” which are predictions about how the pressures of containment will compel the target state to change its behavior without the need for war. A robust theory of change is crucial for maintaining both strategic coherence and domestic political support for containment strategies. I explore this point with a comparison of Cold War and Iraqi containment strategies in which I show that the former policy had a robust theory of change while the latter did not. Second, the conclusion argues that US foreign policy-makers, politicians, and intellectuals have long interpreted the ultimate cause of other states' behavior as stemming from the nature of their political regimes. This type of thinking, inherent to certain strains of liberalism, has often pushed the United States to pursue total solutions by seeking to fundamentally change other states' regimes, as it did with Iraq.
The conceptual framework that accompanies stylistic virtue was the product of over two thousand years of rhetorical, critical, and philosophical development, much of which appears to collapse in the first decades of the twentieth century. However, the Afterword suggests that stylistic virtue persisted in constituent and strategically obscured forms: for example, in T.S. Eliot’s analysis of stylistic “impersonality” and I.A. Richards’s conception of the poem as “pseudo-statement.” The Afterword goes on to claim that contemporary virtue theory provides a promising avenue for the continued defense of style, and of aesthetic value more generally, as an ethical good, offering an innovative way of defending the humanities at a moment of contemporary crisis.
Nathan Chapman considers the link between free exercise and freedom of conscience in the US Constitution and legislation. Some theorists emphasize the similarity between religion and other moral or philosophical commitments and insist there is no reason to privilege the former over the latter. However, for the founding generation, freedom of conscience meant religious freedom, exercised as a response to one’s duty to God. Courts and legislatures often negotiate different relationships between freedom of religion and of conscience. Speech, press, and association rights have been employed to protect conscience. And some state and federal statutes accommodate religion and other commitments under the label of conscience. However, the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses have not been interpreted to prioritize nonreligious conscience. The Supreme Court has interpreted the law about conscientious objection to military service to include non-theistic beliefs. Some statutes accommodating religion also protect nonreligious beliefs or practices, for example, statutes governing abortion, physician-aided suicide and capital punishment.