To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law is the most prominent example of legal normativism. This text traces its origins and its genesis. In philosophy, normativism started with Hume's distinction between Is- and Ought-propositions. Kant distinguished practical from theoretical judgments, while resting even the latter on normativity. Following him, Lotze and the Baden neo-Kantians instrumentalized normativism to secure a sphere of knowledge which is not subject to the natural sciences. Even in his first major text, Kelsen claims that law is solely a matter of Ought or normativity. In the second phase of his writings, he places himself into the neo-Kantian tradition, holding legal norms to be Ought-judgments of legal science. In the third phase, he advocates a barely coherent naive normative realism. In the fourth phase, he supplements the realist view with a strict will-theory of norms, coupled with set-pieces from linguistic philosophy; classical normativism is more or less dismantled.
Kant's Mathematical World aims to transform our understanding of Kant's philosophy of mathematics and his account of the mathematical character of the world. Daniel Sutherland reconstructs Kant's project of explaining both mathematical cognition and our cognition of the world in terms of our most basic cognitive capacities. He situates Kant in a long mathematical tradition with roots in Euclid's Elements, and thereby recovers the very different way of thinking about mathematics which existed prior to its 'arithmetization' in the nineteenth century. He shows that Kant thought of mathematics as a science of magnitudes and their measurement, and all objects of experience as extensive magnitudes whose real properties have intensive magnitudes, thus tying mathematics directly to the world. His book will appeal to anyone interested in Kant's critical philosophy -- either his account of the world of experience, or his philosophy of mathematics, or how the two inform each other.
The Prolegomena is often dismissed as Kant's failed attempt to popularize his philosophy, but as the essays collected here show, there is much to be gained from a careful study of the work. The essays explore the distinctive features of the Prolegomena, including Kant's discussion of philosophical methodology, his critical idealism, the nature of experience, his engagement with Hume, the nature of the self, the relation between geometry and physics, and what we cognize about God. Newly commissioned for this volume, the essays as a whole offer sophisticated and innovative interpretations of the Prolegomena, and cast Kant's critical philosophy in a new light.
This chapter reviews how the early post-Kantians perceived the need of reforming Kant’s Critique in order to complete the philosophical revolution it had initiated. In 1785, Jacobi had brought Spinoza to the discussion, claiming that his monism undermined human freedom and personality. He further claimed that this monism was the logical conclusion of all philosophy. The post-Kantians’ task was thus threefold: (1) to demonstrate that personalism is consistent which monism, which they in principle accepted as the necessary standpoint of reason; (2) to show that Kant’s idealism could be the basis for the desired personalism; and (3) to overcome what they took to be the formalism of Kant’s system that stood in the way of it. All this came down to ridding the system of its presumed unknown “thing-in-itself” while finding a principle that would unify it internally, not just by means of external reflection. Fichte had attempted this with his “I.” Even more important, however, was his analysis of feeling, which he considered the concrete counterpart of the “I” and which, as in the feeling of guilt, brought reason and nature together. This was the synthesis that the post-Kantian idealists explored in their different ways.
Prior to 1800, Schelling had tried to overcome Kant’s alleged formalism with a theory of nature which presented the latter as a process of progressively more complex forms of inanimate and organic existence. The process culminated in the reflectively intelligent life which made idealism possible. As Schelling contended regarding Fichte, in his Science the latter had abstracted only this last moment of the process, and this was a claim that Fichte could not accept. By 1800, Fichte was thus defending his Science of the “I” on two fronts – against Kant who in 1799 had singled it out as being empty logic and against Schelling who was in effect making the same claim. Chapter 2 is dedicated to an account of these events and the exposition of the texts associated with them. What transpires from Fichte’s response to Kant, and his controversy with Schelling, is that there was a disconnect between all involved because of an ambiguity inherent to the monism, and the intuitionism the latter required, which all concerned accepted (Kant only hypothetically, by default). The ambiguity was an encumbrance from classical metaphysics that still affected the new Idealism. It was Spinoza’s challenge.
Hegel and the Challenge of Spinoza explores the powerful continuing influence of Spinoza's metaphysical thinking in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century German philosophy. George di Giovanni examines the ways in which Hegel's own metaphysics sought to meet the challenges posed by Spinoza's monism, not by disproving monism, but by rendering it moot. In this, di Giovanni argues, Hegel was much closer in spirit to Kant and Fichte than to Schelling. This book will be of interest to students and researchers interested in post-Kantian Idealism, Romanticism, and metaphysics.
Editing a volume, we have found out, requires much modesty on the part of the editors who discover that their own perceptions and convictions are not always shared by others and that the area they thought they are fully familiar with is much richer and more diverse than they expected. And yet, despite all of that, we are bound to analyze and systemize the subject matter of privatization with a particular emphasis on the contributions made in this volume. What we wish to do in this introduction is to both develop an exhaustive classification of the major approaches to the permissibility and desirability of privatization and identify their structural strengths and weaknesses. We then describe briefly the different contributions to the volume and conclude with some observations on the future of the study of privatization.
Privatization – the outsourcing of public responsibilities to private actors – is a pervasive phenomenon across the world. Welfare and healthcare delivery, military defense and prisons management are only some of the functions that governments increasingly contract out to private actors.
In this chapter, I will argue that even if privatization could facilitate the achievement of socially desirable goals, there would still be non-instrumental reasons to object to it (or, at least, to many of its instances). Importantly, my argument is meant to apply also to cases where the privatized function does not involve the direct exercise of force and where the private actor is a nonprofit organization, as opposed to a for-profit firm. Political philosophers have recently developed several powerful non-instrumental objections to privatization.
Within the Frankfurt School tradition of critical social theory Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth propose intersubjectivist conceptions of freedom, in which the freedom of individual human subjects develops adequately only in relationship with other human subjects. Their conceptions incorporate intuitions central to conceptions of negative as well as positive liberty, while moving beyond either of these traditions of thinking about freedom. In Part One of my contribution to this volume I argue that Habermas’ and Honneth’s conceptions of freedom should be viewed as a “paradigm shift” in the Western modern tradition of thinking about freedom. Their decisive move is to conceive of individual freedom as constitutively intersubjective – as a mode of human being in the world that comes into existence and develops only in certain kinds of relationship with other humans. With this, they destabilize once and for all the polarity between negative and positive freedom. I see this as an important and valuable move. However, in Part Two I argue that the constitutively intersubjective accounts of freedom offered respectively by Habermas and Honneth are, in different ways, unsatisfactory. In Part Three I propose an alternative constitutively intersubjective account of freedom.
Kant states in §76 of the third Critique that the divine intuitive intellect would not represent modal distinctions. Kohl (2015) and Stang (2016) claim that this statement entails that noumena lack modal properties, which, in turn, conflicts with Kant’s attribution of contingency to human noumenal wills. They both propose resolutions to this conflict based on conjectures regarding how God might non-modally represent what our discursive intellects represent as modally determined. I argue that (i) these proposals fail; (ii) the viable resolution consists in recognizing that we modalize human noumenal wills as a merely regulative-practical principle in our judgements of imputation.
The harmonious free play of the imagination and understanding is at the heart of Kant’s account of beauty in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, but interpreters have long struggled to determine what Kant means when he claims the faculties are in a state of free play. In this article, I develop an interpretation of the free play of the faculties in terms of the freedom of attention. By appealing to the different way that we attend to objects in aesthetic experience, we can explain how the faculties are free, even when the subject already possesses a concept of the object and is bound to the determinate form of the object in perception.
Chapter V applies concepts from preceding chapters to investigate the future character of war and war’s future as a human activity. The chapter begins by exploring the challenge of future forecasting and strategy development, which is compounded by the accumulation of human and environmental effects that invalidate assumptions. The chapter asserts that forecasting may be improved by considering three sets of factors: history and trends, current circumstances, and theory. Next, it explores political, technological, and doctrinal developments that could impact war’s future character, like artificial intelligence and nanotechnology, and provides strategic advice for both high and low capacity groups. The chapter’s latter half uses the history-current circumstances-theory model to assess the feasibility and desirability of ending war forever. Using evidence from archaeology, anthropology, history, trends, and war and peace theories, the chapter concludes that war’s existence is inextricably linked to humanity, i.e., eliminating either eliminates both. It wraps up by offering practical suggestions for minimizing the potential for war.
Having found a way to justify a world of state-machines, German lawyers thought about how to manage those machines so as to produce "happiness", which would eventually be understood to include the freedom of the nation and its members. At the University of Göttingen from 1734 onwards ius naturae et gentium eventually produced four specialised idioms: empirical state-science, economics, philosophy and modern law of nations, each opening a distinct way to address an increasingly international world. Among legal professionals, the view of the law of nations as the formalisation of European diplomacy became generally accepted. But the most influential aspect of the German debates concerned the role of the state in realising freedom in conditions of political modernity. Individual rights were to be reconciled with the flourishing of the nation; the state was to adopt its historically appropriate position in relationship to expanding bourgeois civil society. The search for a new vocabulary to address such features of modernity persuaded international lawyers finally to settle on “civilisation”, as will be briefly noted in the Epilogue.
theory of art in the conventional sense. He does not provide a systematic account of art, nor does he provide criteria for aesthetic judgment. He is concerned rather with the role art plays in forming our culture and its meaning in our individual and communal lives. This chapter situates Gadamer’s views in the context of the history of philosophy–the ancient Greek view of art and the modern views of art, especially the view of Kant. For Gadamer, art is an event of understanding. The concepts of play and the game are important to his account. This chapter considers the temporal, the dialogical, and the communal aspects of art for Gadamer. It considers arts claim to truth. And finally, it shows how Gadamer thinks that art has an important transformative potential.
The opening chapter revolves around the questions: What does liberalism purport to include within the defence of neutrality? What scope is available for conceptions of the good to meet, to mingle and to rival each other? In order to answer these questions, we need to understand what liberal democracy is about, what its ground rules are and how we can distinguish liberal democracies from illiberal societies. To address these important questions, the chapter avails itself of the Rawlsian justice as fairness theory which greatly influenced the liberal discourse during the past century. The Rawlsian theory of justice is supplemented with Kantian and Millian ethics. The chapter elucidates two important concepts without which it is impossible to imagine any liberal democracy: respect for others, inspired by Kantian and Rawlsian philosophies, and the Harm Principle derived from J. S. Mill’s ethics. It is the Harm Principle that guides us in prescribing boundaries to conduct. The necessity in introducing boundaries is further explained by the concept of the ‘democratic catch’.
This chapter analyses Simmel’s worldview during his early period (until ca. 1900). It argues that Simmel held an unusually optimistic view regarding the contradictions of modernity at that time, subscribing to the idea that modern differentiation leads to a comprehensive unity which naturally emerges from variety. This claim is supported by an analysis of Simmel’s writings of the period, starting from his early monograph on Dante and ending with his early sociology and his interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. In respect of sociology, it is argued that the young Simmel subscribed to a kind of reductionist sociologism in the spirit of the founders of Völkerpsychologie, Lazarus and Steinthal. In respect of Kant, it is argued that the young Simmel conceived of his thought as the ultimate philosophical solution to the problems of modernity, and that he distanced himself from Kant once he began to doubt the possibility of reconciling the contradictions of modernity.
Many have difficulties understanding what Kuhn meant when he spoke of “world change” due to revolutions. I reconstruct the historical path in which the idea emerged that reality is not something purely object-sided. The path starts with Copernicus’ new planetary system. The motions of the Sun and the planets, previously seen as purely object-sided, were now seen as containing genetically subject-sided contributions. A similar process, also at the center of the constitution of modern science, was the introduction of secondary qualities in the seventeenth century. In these historical processes, the reality status of something, whose reality seemed beyond doubt, changed dramatically. Philosophical reflection of such processes culminates in Kant’s critical philosophy. Ever since, this kind of “post-Copernican thinking” has been an indispensable part of the Western intellectual tradition, and it surfaced in the development of special relativity and quantum mechanics. I argue that Kuhn is continuing this tradition. Understanding this genealogy may make Kuhn’s metaphysics accessible to those realists who maintain that talk of genetically subject-sided contributions to reality is utterly inconsistent.
Two questions should be considered when assessing the Kantian dimensions of Kuhn’s thought. Was Kuhn a Kantian? Did Kuhn have an influence on later Kantians and neo-Kantians? Kuhn mentioned Kant as an inspiration, and his focus on explanatory frameworks and the conditions of knowledge appear Kantian. But Kuhn’s emphasis on learning; on activities of symbolization; on paradigms as practical, not just theoretical; and on the social and community aspects of scientific research as constitutive of scientific reasoning are outside the Kantian perspective. Kuhn’s admiration for Kant is tempered by his desire to understand the processes of learning, initiation into a scientific community, experimentation using instruments, and persuasion, drawing on the work of Piaget, Koyré, Wittgenstein, and others. Both Kuhn and Kant were interested in the status of science, and the role of the scientist in its development and justification. But Kuhn presents science in a much more messy, historically contingent, and socially charged way than Kant does. The paper’s conclusion evaluates Kuhn’s reception among researchers including Richardson and Friedman, assessing the prospects for future work.
On my interpretation of Kant, feeling plays a central role in the mind: it has the distinct function of tracking and evaluating our activity in relation to ourselves and the world so as to orient us. In this article, I set out to defend this view against a number of objections raised by Melissa Merritt and Uri Eran. I conclude with some reflections on the fact that, despite being very different, Merritt and Eran’s respective views of Kantian feelings turn out to have something potentially problematic in common: they blur the boundary between feelings and other kinds of mental states.
Chapter 3 further establishes the significance of Aristotelian virtue theory within the landscape of British moral philosophy, where it has been almost entirely neglected. It begins with the 1874 publication of Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics, which was a significant literary event because it identified virtue ethics with “aesthetic” modes of reasoning. An Aristotelian conception of stylistic character subsequently flourished in the philosophical writings of J.S. Mill, John Grote, T.H. Green, and Bernard Bosanquet, all of whom rejected the dissociation of ethics from aesthetics and imagined character as an aesthetic realization of the self. In this way, philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition provided an ethical justification for aesthetic autonomy and the character-based formalism of Victorian stylistic criticism.