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This introductory chapter explains how, for African Americans the decade’s political disappointments and its social paradoxes also signaled a necessary transformation in culture. It details how the notion of transition, particularly as it informs understandings of poetry, prose, fiction, film, and music that emerge as important indications of the 1960s zeitgeist, and it offers an account of 1960s writers, musicians, and intellectuals who met this political moment in history with a renewed commitment to art. The period represents the moment when “Black” became a political identity, one in which social justice became inseparable from aesthetic practice. In this context, the rise of Black Power nationalism, which is often read as a radicalized version of self-defense in the face of increasing violence, features as a prominent theme to interrogate 1960s declarations of race, personal and collective empowerment, political action, and aesthetics. At the same time, however, experimentation, now a challenge to convention and a call for new ways of being and thinking, became an often overlooked, yet common artistic practice in which avant-gardes in many forms – “free jazz,” poetry, art collectives, and the novel – exposed the potentials and the contradictions that invite new evaluations and investigations.
The application of mobile health holds promises of achieving greater accessibility in the evolving health care sector. The active engagement of private actors drives its growth, while the challenges that exist between health care privatization and equitable access are a concern. This article selects the private internet hospital in China as a case study. It indicates that a market-oriented regulatory mechanism of private mobile health will contribute little to improving health equity from the perspectives of egalitarians and libertarians. By integrating the capability approach and the right to health, it is claimed that mobile health is a means of accessing health care for everyone, where substantive accessibility should be emphasized. With this view, this article provides policy recommendations that reinforce private sector engagement for mobile health, recognizing liberty, equity, and collective responsibility in the Chinese context.
This chapter covers how the debate over multiculturalism has evolved over the past fifty years (1970–2020). While the twentieth century was marked by fear of minorities, the twenty-first century is marked by growing fears of majorities. The panic hovering over Europe is not concentrated on the political arrangements of the present but on a deep concern for the future of liberalism. This perception of the future turns social and cultural relationships into a zero-sum game. But is there a way out? The chapter ends with a discussion of contemporary majority and minority tensions in liberal societies and offers a common moral ground that allows managing these tensions, reaching a political compromise that is likely to leave both sides dissatisfied, but it is the most one can achieve. Perhaps the most important lesson of the last fifty years of rights-talk, the chapter argues, is that the expansion of the notion of rights offers an inclusive tool of social discourse but cannot offer a receipt for how societies should handle themselves. That remains the role of democratic process and for that they should be cherished and protected.
The need to engage students in thinking about the politics of law, especially in a time of escalating climate and other crises, is increasingly urgent. In this paper, we discuss a series of place-based teaching strategies designed to foster critical legal thinking, but also hope and a sense of agency. Inspired by a range of scholars – Bruno Latour, Doreen Massey, Henry Giroux and J.K. Gibson-Graham – we use context in an effort to cultivate what Giroux calls ‘educated hope’. Our starting point is what the law does (and also what law does not do and what it could do), not what the law is. Instead of taking a field of law and then using examples to illustrate how it works in context, we discuss three courses that start with the context of a particular place. Our courses cover a range of laws that work together to shape that place, spanning multiple fields, and emphasise their peopled and place-based specificity. After discussing teaching and assessment strategies that we have found productive, we reflect on implications beyond our courses, and the potential for broader place-based legal pedagogies.
Investigating a fast-developing field of public policy, Stephen Winter examines how states redress injuries suffered by young people in state care. Considering ten illustrative exemplar programmes from Australia, Canada, Ireland, and Aotearoa New Zealand, Winter explores how redress programmes attempt to resolve the anguish, injustice, and legacies of trauma that survivors experience. Drawing from interviews with key stakeholders and a rich trove of documentary research, this book analyses how policymakers should navigate the trade-offs that survivors face between having their injuries acknowledged and the difficult, often retraumatising, experience of attaining redress. A timely critical engagement with this contentious policy domain, Winter presents empirically driven recommendations and a compelling argument for participatory, flexible, and survivor-focussed programmes.
The category of ‘human rights law’ is sometimes limited to bills and charters of rights on the model of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the case law of courts interpreting and applying these legal measures. This chapter argues that the measures that realise human rights in the law are the everyday, unremarkable measures that make up the full corpus of legal materials directing what may, must, and must not be done. The argument explores how all sound positive law finds its source in the human goods through one of two modes of derivation: deduction or specification. These are the same two modes of positive law’s derivation from natural law, for the reach of human rights law is more or less coextensive with the reach of positive law and the human goods from which are derived human rights law are the same human goods from which are derived natural law’s practical principles and precepts.
This chapter explores connections among one ‘virtue of acknowledged dependence’, humility, as elaborated by Augustine; the right or just according to nature; and human rights. The opening section argues that in defending virtuous humility, Augustine defends a new account of natural right, supporting this thesis with a reading of The City of God, books I-V. After this analysis, our focus shifts a central framer of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Lebanese philosopher-diplomat Charles Habib Malik. Drawing on the archive of Malik’s papers and on his publications and lectures, we offer a select history of Malik’s study of Augustine’s work and his distinctively Augustinian perspective on themes such as humility, natural right and natural law, and human rights. We turn next to the text of the Universal Declaration, considering its Augustinian affinities as well as key divergences from Augustine’s views. The final sections of the chapter argue that Augustinian notions of humility and pride are central to Malik’s appraisal of the Declaration and the contemporary human rights project more generally, in their substance as well as their modes of expression.
The Manchurian Candidate myth that Americans could be psychologically manipulated and turned into secret agents of a foreign power emerged in the early Cold War. The belief combined fears that Soviet/Chinese mind manipulators were so adept that they could transform honorable American soldiers into turncoats. However, while disquiet about the efficacy of communist brainwashing remained palpable in the aftermath of World War II, the result of China's communist treatment of prisoners of war did not create, as was greatly feared, actual Manchurian candidates capable of misleading their native publics once repatriated. If brainwashing in the American understanding of the term did not occur, what was the actual outcome and what sort of processes were used on Asians who were not part of the communist masses? We need to unravel the PRC's take on the processes of “thought reform” to understand why it kept returning to a policy designed to “re-educate” prisoners of war, often doubly labeled as war criminals. These policies not only reveal how the CCP aimed to render justice beyond the conclusion of its war with Japan but also demonstrate how this practice then grew into a later catalyst for unification plans in PRC-ROC relations during the 1970s.
Chapter 3 analyzes President Obama’s announcement on the killing of bin Laden to reveal the way discounting life is authorized and legitimized through extrajudicial, extraterritorial killing. Specifically, Obama’s celebratory narrative of the killing as a nation-healing, nation-securing achievement codes vengeance as “justice,” normalizes US imperialism, implicitly justifies “collateral damage,” and remakes the parameters of legitimate state conduct in relation to terrorism. Attending to how Obama’s announcement used image, narrative, political myth, and sound to manufacture necropolitical law’s authority, legitimacy, norms, and community, Chapter 3 argues that we are interpellated by the official announcement, not as liberal legality’s empowered citizenry but as docile spectator-subjects. Chapter 3 also shows how the announcement, in avoiding the category “law,” enables a lawyer-president-commander-in-chief to invest the category “justice” with a range of meanings that contradict liberal legality, in that they invite us, as subjects, to acquiesce in state secrecy and in necropolitical law’s extraterritorial, extrajudicial violence.
Chapter 10 reconstructs Durkheim's conception of sociology as a science of morality, which includes three tasks: orienting our conduct via an account of a morally healthy society; illuminating the connection between social functioning and morality (explaining why moral and social health are the same; and explaining why the moral ideals animating a given society do so and how they vary with changing social conditions. Durkheim's science of morality is similar to Marx's historical materialist account of morality, although the former leaves the moral authority of the rules it explains largely intact. While Durkheim's accounts of specific pathologies imply a critique of certain social rules, they do not discredit the fundamental norms at work in the societies he studies. The chapter concludes that Durkheim does not adequately explain how historically specific moral systems can claim a moral authority irreducible to the narrowly functional value they have for social reproduction.
I argue that legitimacy discourses serve a gatekeeping function. They give practitioners telic standards for riding herd on social practices, ensuring that minimally acceptable versions of the practice are implemented. Such a function is a necessary part of implementing formalized social practices, especially including law. This gatekeeping account shows that political philosophers have misunderstood legitimacy. It is not secondary to justice and only necessary because we cannot agree about justice; instead, it is a necessary feature of actual human social practices, which must be implemented via practitioners’ discretion in changing contexts.
The movement toward increasing maternal age comes with many new challenges. As reproductive physicians now see increasingly older patients, they are also confronted with complex ethical questions regarding the medical, psychological, and psychosocial implications of providing services to this population. It is well established that increased maternal age is associated with many obstetric complications. These complications may have both short and long-term effects on the mother as well as the fetus and child. In addition to medical complications, many providers are concerned about psychosocial ramifications of pregnancies at the extremes of maternal age. These concerns largely pertain to the well-being of children born to older parents, and are often subject to societal and cultural norms. These factors combined have led many to question the ethics of providing ART to patients in their 40s and beyond, however most ethical scrutiny has been aimed at post-menopausal mothers and those greater than 50 years of age. This chapter explores the ethical issues and available guidance in relation to this group of patients and the practical application of medical ethics and the core ethical principles.
Some find the theology of an eternal punishment to be morally repugnant and theologically without warrant. But even if such is true of traditional doctrines of Hell, typified by those of Aquinas, it is not implausible to read Inferno as an “anti-narrative,” among other reasons because the literatures that write of a truly infernal mentality – for example,that of Dr. Faustus in Marlowe’s play – are vastly significant and their significance would not be lost even were Hell as an eternal condition impossible. For an infernal will is psychologically possible, even if the Hell willed is impossible as an existent state of affairs.
This article applies Charles W. Mills’ notion of the domination contract to develop a Kantian theory of justice. The concept of domination underlying the domination contract is best understood as structural domination, which unjustifiably authorizes institutions and labour practices to weaken vulnerable groups’ public standing as free, equal and independent citizens. Though Kant’s theory of justice captures why structural domination of any kind contradicts the requirements of justice, it neglects to condemn exploitive gender- and race-based labour relations. Because the ideal of civic equality must position all persons as co-legislators of the terms of political rule, the state must dismantle exploitive race- and gender-based labour relations for all persons to command political power as civic equals.
The problem of polarization – our growing inability to talk to each other across lines of disagreement – is the most fundamental challenge facing modern societies. The only viable response to this challenge is to identify a moral vocabulary that has more than one dimension, but whose dimensions are broad and coherent enough to provide a common point of orientation. This is what a liberal theory of freedom provides. Liberal freedom, like liberal society itself, has two distinct and complementary dimensions, which give rise to two distinct and complementary moral projects; on the one hand to create the social conditions under which we are fit to be held responsible for what we do, and on the other hand to carve out a domain of conduct within which we are not responsible to anyone else for what we do except by choice. Contractarianism, with its focus on identifying principles of justice that all reasonable people should accept, tends to exacerbate the problem of polarization that liberalism is best suited to solve.
Chapter 4 explores the role of alternative dispute resolution, specifically mediation, in CoP proceedings, the first academic piece on this topic. The use of mediation in CoP practice is increasing and there is a trend towards mediation as the primary form of ADR in civil and family justice. In analysing the role of mediation in the CoP, the chapter draws on original empirical data to explore the views of professionals working in mental capacity law. In analysing this data, emphasis is placed on the embodied benefits of flexibly resolving disputes outside of the formalities of the courtroom, as well as the challenges involved in maintaining neutrality, trustworthiness and participation without judicial oversight. The chapter concludes that mediation has an important role to play as a complementary part of the toolkit of a reimagined CoP because it has the potential to provide an improvement in procedural justice. However, the legalism present in discussions of mediation in the empirical data is also highlighted, arguing that if mediation is going to secure an improvement in access to justice, then it needs to be driven by the parties rather than notions of justice predetermined by legal professionals.
With suggestions that settlements reached through mediation lack the ‘legitimacy’ of authoritative judicial decisions, the mediation process has elicited criticism. The referral of commercial disputes to mediation gives rise to the understandable concern that mediation could inhibit the development of commercial law. The benefit of mediation over litigation and arbitration – its private and informal nature – can also create potential risks; given the absence of judicial due process safeguards, opportunities can exist for manipulative and oppressive behaviour. Courts and tribunals play an important role in defining the appropriate limits of the mediation process. The primary controversies relating to the commercial mediation process can be categorised into three groups: substantive fairness, procedural fairness and public interest concerns. Much of the criticism of mediation stems from the fact that many different processes are, regrettably, characterised collectively as ‘mediation’. The judicial system and mediation should be viewed as having a symbiotic relationship, with each contributing different principles to an interconnected and increasingly integrated justice framework.
The Eumenides contains one of the earliest descriptions anywhere of Hades as a universal judge. The Erinyes threaten Orestes with a continuation of his punishment after death by “the great assessor of mortals beneath the earth.” This passage contains the first extant catalogue of Hades’ ethical concerns: he is said to punish human–divine, parent–child, and guest–host transgressions. Although he “sees all things,” the name Hades derives from a-idein, literally the “unseen,” a moniker that exemplifies the human inability to confront this nonpolitical, absolute judge. By differentiating Hades from the Erinyes, this chapter draws out the dynamics of his character and ethical law. Like them, Hades’ connection with blood and punishment entails pollution, but unlike them, he is never subordinated to Athens. The analysis then contrasts Hades’ law to the “new law” that Athena creates. It argues that Hades represents an alternate, yet still valid ethical code that can be used to critique the jingoistic and bellicose politics of the trilogy’s ending.
The stature of the medicolegal expert grew in France over the course of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. Although the trajectories of medicolegal experts in France and in the American adversarial system diverged, both American and French citizens today have relatively high levels of confidence in forensic expertise. This conclusion and epilogue explores the legacy of the rise of forensic medicine in nineteenth-century France, the enduring public interest in forensics, the dangers of the TV-induced “CSI effect,” and changing attitudes towards expertise in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
No statutory mental health services exist for justice-involved individuals in Pakistan. The lack of expertise in forensic psychiatry serves to deny individuals with mental illness the critical support needed for mental healthcare and adequate court dispositions with serious unintended consequences including capital punishment for those who could otherwise be deemed treatment and not punishment worthy. A landmark judgement by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in February 2021 criticized the lack of forensic psychiatry expertise in Pakistan and directing the development of forensic mental health services and forensic psychiatry training in Pakistan.
The key objectives are: 1. Understanding the timeline of how justice invloved individuals are manged by psychiatric services 2. The importance of the Supreme Court of Pakistan Judgement in affecting change 3. Highlights on how Queen’s University will enhance forensic psychiatry in Pakistan
A literature review and personal networking facilitated the collection of important data in how justice invloved individuals are supported in Pakistan. The author has published and presented to Pakistani psychiatrists and the Pakistani judiciary on this topic. Queen’s University is aiming to implement a 3-year plan to develop an online curriculum and certificate course to help train the trainers.
In the Pakistan’s most populous province, Punjab, prevalence rates for psychotic illnesses (3.7%), major depression (10%), and personality disorders (65%) among men with higher rates for psychotic disorders (4.0%) and major depression (12%) among women.
In conclusion there is a dire need to develop forensic psychiatry in Pakistan and other low/middle income countries.