This study employs the “everyday nationhood” approach to explore how ordinary, ethnically diverse, native-born Germans in Berlin, Dresden, and Leipzig understand what it means to be German and whether outsiders can join that group. It puts findings from qualitative interviews conducted in Berlin in fall 2015 and in Dresden and Leipzig in April 2016 into conversation with two large-scale surveys conducted at about the same time. The interviews complicate the surveys’ finding that Germanness is now based primarily on language skills, citizenship, and workforce participation, as the respondents indicated that phenotype, ethnicity, and religion act as daily barriers to membership. This highlights the utility of the everyday nationhood approach for identifying how social categories are both understood and enacted through everyday practices of social inclusion and exclusion.

This paper explains how the possession of linguistic and cultural capital, real and imagined, works to “make” people Japanese and reify the boundary of Japanese identity. Drawing on case studies of celebrities with multiple heritage and ethnographic data, this paper shows how discursive associations with possessing cultural capital (re)create boundaries of Japanese identity, incorporating potential out-group members and excluding ostensible in-group members. The paper argues that the possession of native-level cultural capital will become an important way of differentiating “Japanese” from Others henceforth. These discursive processes apply old hegemonic ideologies in novel ways, allowing for the perpetuation of extant identity discourses and cultural institutions to be reproduced with new faces. It also argues that cultural capital is a more practical way of categorizing Japanese people from Others than identity constructions such as race and ethnicity. In doing so, it also demonstrates how Japanese people possess multiple understandings of Japanese authenticity, which both facilitates and hinders the absorption of potential Others into the collective.

Cet article porte sur le débat idéologique que suscite l'interculturalisme dans le champ intellectuel québécois depuis les années 2000. S'il a longtemps servi de point de convergence entre intellectuel.le.s néonationalistes, cherchant à allier pluralisme et nationalisme, l'interculturalisme n'a toutefois pas empêché la recrudescence des appels en faveur du resserrement du contrôle sur les personnes migrantes et les pratiques culturelles minoritaires. Notre thèse est que cette tendance confirme l’éclipse de la tentative de concilier nationalisme et pluralisme au sein de l'interculturalisme québécois. Pour soutenir cette thèse, notre article documente la faiblesse de l'interculturalisme québécois devant les blocs idéologiques formés par le multiculturalisme fédéral, le nationalisme conservateur et la montée des critiques antiracistes et décoloniales au Québec. Face à ces positions rivales, les contradictions de l'interculturalisme quant au privilège de la majorité sur les minorités ont été mises au jour au fil de controverses que l'article examine sur une période de vingt ans.

This article investigates the time allocation choices of US workers between farm work and other job alternatives. Results indicate that green card farm workers tend to allocate fewer workweeks to farm employment than citizens and undocumented workers, in favour of better opportunities in the non-farm sector. There is evidence of an assimilation effect, whereby undocumented workers also tend to re-allocate their time from farm to non-farm employment as their residence tenure increases, even though they experience constrained mobility and visibility during periods of strict immigration control. In the context of employers’ violations of the existing labour laws that currently protect even the rights of undocumented workers, such turnover decisions seem justified. The findings raise concerns about whether any governmental effort to legalise the immigration status of such workers would reduce farm job turnover rates and increase farm employment retention, so long as labour standards are not enforced. Moreover, external economic shocks could more easily induce citizen and green card farm workers to abandon farm employment, whereas undocumented workers tend to remain in their farm jobs during such difficult times.

This article explores the UK vote in 2016 to exit the European Union, colloquially known as ‘Brexit’. Brexit has been portrayed as a British backlash against globalisation and a desire for a reassertion of sovereignty by the UK as a nation-state. In this context, a vote to leave the European Union has been regarded by its protagonists as a vote to ‘take back control’ to ‘make our own laws’ and ‘let in [only] who we want’. We take a particular interest in the stance of key ‘Brexiteers’ in the UK towards regulation, with the example of the labour market. The article commences by assessing the notion of Brexit as a means to secure further market liberalisation. This analysis is then followed by an account of migration as a key issue, the withdrawal process and likely future trajectory of Brexit. We argue that in contrast to the expectations of those who voted Leave in 2016, the UK as a mid-sized open economy will be a rule-taker and will either remain in the European regulatory orbit, or otherwise drift into the American one.

Malgré l’attention renouvelée de plusieurs médias sur la question des risques liés à la COVID-19 au sein de diverses communautés marginalisées au Québec, nous entendons encore très peu parler des personnes âgées immigrantes et de leurs proches. Dans cette note sur les politiques et pratiques, nous aborderons l’expérience du contexte pandémique chez les personnes âgées immigrantes montréalaises et leurs réseaux. Nous présenterons d’abord quelques données sociodémographiques sur les immigrants âgés montréalais. Nous exposerons ensuite nos constats sur les impacts de la COVID-19 sur les personnes âgées immigrantes, en particulier en ce qui concerne l’accès aux soins de la santé et aux services sociaux, la proche-aidance, l’emploi et le logement, à partir de nos travaux et de la littérature en gérontologie sociale. Nous terminerons en proposant quelques recommandations qui permettraient d’améliorer l’inclusion sociale des personnes âgées immigrantes et de leurs proches, autant en matière de politiques publiques que de pratiques sur le terrain.

Perceptions of numbers (numerical estimations of migrant flows) and mental images (beliefs about characteristics and motives of immigrants) have been shown to be important predictors of cross-national immigration attitudes. However, this finding has seldom been verified in Canada. As a result, we know little about how Canadians estimate the amount and type of migrants coming into the country, what drives the generation of these numbers and images, and what the consequences of numerical estimations and mental images of immigration are for public attitudes toward immigration. Using nationally representative cross-sectional survey data from 2019, this article reports that Canadians generally overestimate the number of refugees and asylum-seekers coming into the country but are comparatively less prone to overestimating the overall number of immigrants. Canadians also rely on mental images about the reasons for immigrating to Canada that diverge from the realities of Canada's immigration program. We document how reliance on these numbers and images is driven by the type of media consumed, feelings of threat, and individual-level characteristics of Canadians. In doing so, this article demonstrates that mental images strongly influence Canadians’ attitudes toward immigration; numerical estimates also matter, but less so. Furthermore, perceptions of the number of migrants arriving affect latent preferences toward immigration—such as ethnocentrism, perceptions of “threat,” and border insecurity—while mental images shape both preferences for lowering immigration intake and latent preferences.

There is a large discrepancy in European countries between the measured impact of immigration on the welfare state and how this impact is perceived by citizens. This study examines the determinants of individuals’ perception of the impact of immigration on the welfare state. A number of hypotheses at both the individual and contextual level are tested using a multilevel model with data from the European Social Survey. I find that the institutional features of welfare states are associated with different views on the impact of immigration on welfare states: generous contributory social welfare benefits are associated with more favourable attitudes about immigrants, while generous non-contributory benefits, by contrast, are associated with more pessimistic assessments about the fiscal impact of immigration. I argue that this can be because the latter potentially signals to natives that migrants could access generous benefits without any requisite work history. At the individual-level, the results indicate that subjective risk and general opposition to immigration are powerful individual-level predictors: people who feel more economically insecure or who are generally opposed to immigration are more likely to think that it constitutes a burden for the welfare state.

Racial mapping during the Progressive Era played into the political narratives of eugenic intervention and immigration restriction. This article argues that the racial cartographic work of the Yale geographer and prolific eugenicist Ellsworth Huntington was both developed within and contributed to this racist milieu. Huntington’s middle-class and educated upbringing, his familial history, and his expertise as a well-travelled geographer all conspired to shape his views on eugenics, race, and immigration. By applying the critical cartographic theories of John Brian Harley, Denis Wood, Heather Winlow, and others, I show that Huntington’s racial maps were a product of his cultural and political environment. The success of a map’s impact was often due to maps being seen as objective depictions of spatial variation. Indeed, for Huntington they performed an essential role in communicating and portraying racial information. But, as I argue, they were susceptible to bias, misunderstanding, and intentional manipulation. I show that Huntington’s maps are not accurate snapshots of reality, but rather cultural texts or rhetorical images intended to create a narrative and convince the reader of a particular subjective point of view.