People have the ability to estimate frequencies of different behaviors, beliefs, and intentions of others, allowing them to fit into their immediate social worlds, learn from, and cooperate with others. However, psychology has produced a long list of apparent biases in social cognition. We show that this apparent contradiction can be resolved by understanding how cognitive processes underlying social judgments interact with the properties of social and task environments. We describe our social sampling model that incorporates this interaction and can explain biases in people’s estimates of broader populations. We also show that asking people about their social circles produces better predictions of elections than asking about their own voting intentions, provides good description of population attributes, and helps predict people’s future voting and vaccination behavior.

Chapter 3 summarizes existing theories of election-related violence and introduces a theory of violence as a result of elite misperception. Existing theories rely upon the assumption that politicians choice of violence as an electoral tactic is based on an accurate assessment its relative costs and benefits. The theory of elite misperception, on the other hand, builds on two insights: (1) that voter backlash against violence is substantial and can cost politicians votes and (2) politicians frequently misjudge voter preferences – including with respect to violence – which can lead them to overestimate its benefits as an electoral tactic. The theory points to the difficulties politicians face in accurately assessing the impact of electoral tactics, as well as to the prevalence of cognitive biases that can cause them to misinterpret what information they have. It also highlights the importance of founding elections in determining which electoral tactics – violence included – are considered effective and worthy of emulation. With these insights in mind, the theory explains the incidence and persistence of election-related violence as a result of politicians misperceptions about voter preferences and the effects of violence on voting rather than the objective electoral benefits that violence provides.

Chapter 6 addressed the puzzle of why politicians employ violence as an electoral tactic in Kenya when the benefits of doing so are uncertain at best. Data from survey experiments with politicians that parallel those conducted with voters – as well as evidence from qualitative interviews – show that, contrary to what the literature assumes, politicians misperceive the effects of violence and violent ethnic rhetoric on voter preferences over candidates for office, underestimating the size and breadth of voter backlash against the use of these tactics. This misperception explains why election-related violence continues to occur in Kenya despite its questionable efficacy as an electoral tactic. Furthermore, access to information alone does not appear to be enough to correct politicians misperceptions in this domain. Elite misperception can explain why violence occurs in the course of electoral competition even when its efficacy is in doubt.

This chapter summarizes the argument and findings presented in the book, explores a number of their implications, and discusses their relevance to broader debates. It argues that the books findings point to a need for research to more carefully evaluate the costs of violent electoral tactics in addition to its electoral benefits, including more micro-level research – such as that presented in the book – that explores voter responses to violence. In addition, scholars should ask more explicitly whether and how political elites are able to accurately assess the relative costs and benefits of violence and other electoral tactics. Future research should delve deeper into the question of how and why elite misperceive voter preferences, and when and why it is most likely to occur.

Chapter 4 evaluates the overall relationship between violence and election outcomes, finding that violence provides no benefit, on average, to the parties that use it. In some cases, it may even undermine the candidacies of the politicians associated with it. In particular, an analysis of the relationship between the incidence of violence prior to elections in Kenyas first two multiparty elections in the 1990s and constituency-level election outcomes for the ruling KANU party (the primary instigator of the violence) finds no relationship between the incidence of violence and KANU vote share or the likelihood that their parliamentary candidates won election. Second, an analysis of the subsequent electoral performance of candidates allegedly involved in the large outbreak of violence in 2007/08 finds that these candidates lost their reelection bids at a much higher rate than the average incumbent. Several lost in rather unusual ways, including by losing their party primaries, losing to minority ethnic group candidates, or losing the general election after securing the nomination of the locally dominant party.

This chapter introduces the research question and motivation for the book. It introduces and defines the concept of election-related violence, defining it as physical acts of violence carried out for the purpose of affecting the results of an election. It introduces existing explanations for election violence and previews the theory of elite misperception presented in the book, highlighting its basis in observations about voters opinions about violence and politicians difficultly in inferring what voters want. Finally, it summarizes the empirical strategy the book uses to evaluate the argument and competing explanations, and it provides a roadmap for the rest of the book.

This chapter analyzes the effects of violence – via coercion and persuasion – on voting. Existing research provides some evidence that violence can be used to prevent voters from turning out to vote. However, an analysis of the relationship between violence and turnout in Kenyan elections in the 1990s finds no relationship between violence on the one hand, and the aggregate level of voter registration or turnout on the other, suggesting that the relationship between violence, turn-out and electoral geography may be less straightforward than previously thought. On persuasion, the analysis finds consistent evidence of a large and broad-based voter backlash against violence, including among the coethnic voters that politicians rely on to win elections. Furthermore, while antagonistic ethnic rhetoric does appear to increase the likelihood of violence breaking out, it is not a useful strategy for mobilizing coethnic support. These results suggest that voter backlash against violence and violent rhetoric may undermine the efficacy of violence as an electoral tactic, and they help explain why violence is not associated with better outcomes for candidates in real elections.

In June 2016 the UK shocked the world by voting to leave the European Union. In our previous book (Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union) we told the story of what happened in the referendum and why it produced a leave vote. This book is a sequel to the earlier one and examines what happened after the decision was made looking at events up to the point that the UK formally left the EU in January 2020. This was a period of unprecedented political and electoral turmoil in British politics which for a period looked like it could shatter the party system. It encompassed three elections and three different Prime Ministers and unprecedented volatility in both Parliamentary and electoral politics. The book maps out the twists and turns of the Brexit process, both at the level of the political elites and among the mass public. It then goes on to examine the long-run antecedents of this momentous decision, using data that goes back more than fifty years. Finally, it speculates about the economic and poltical consequences of Brexit for the future, while taking into account the Covid Pandemic which itself added to the turmoil in British politics.

Boris Johnsons victory over Jeremy Corbyn in the 2019 general election

The electoral consequences for Theresa Mays government in the 2017 general election examining the role of Brexit and other factors in explaining the results

The political twists and turns of the Brexit process

The fragmentation of the UK party system in the European Elections of 2019. Why the Brexit party won, Labour came third and the Conservatives came fifth.