We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Why are religious minorities well represented and politically influential in some democracies but not others? Focusing on evangelical Christians in Latin America, I argue that religious minorities seek and gain electoral representation when (a) they face significant threats to their material interests and worldview and (b) their community is not internally divided by cross-cutting cleavages. Differences in Latin American evangelicals’ political ambitions emerged as a result of two critical junctures: episodes of secular reform in the early twentieth century and the rise of sexuality politics at the turn of the twenty-first century. In Brazil, significant threats at both junctures prompted extensive electoral mobilization; in Chile, minimal threats meant that mobilization lagged. In Peru, where major cleavages divide both evangelicals and broader society, threats prompt less electoral mobilization than otherwise expected. The multi-method argument leverages interviews, content analysis, survey experiments, ecological analysis, and secondary case studies of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala.
This chapter explores the crises of the Roman and American republics. Understanding these crises requires that we view politics as an arena of identity contestation rather than simply interest articulation. What changes in both Rome and the United States is that participants came to see each other as Strangers, no longer sharing the same background assumptions, the same sense of the past, nor the same anticipation of the future. Borne of distrust, norms of getting things down turned into norms of obstruction. This had implications for how politics was experienced. The changes in these norms not only disabled these institutions, making them unable to actualize a future, but also made possible alterations in the political framework that might have been inconceivable before. In particular, one sees the elevation of individuals who offered solutions by promising to bypass those ineffective and unresponsive institutions. That is, as institutions and processes become distant abstractions that no longer answer to fundamental questions of the future of the community, the individual becomes the tangible personification of politics, answering these questions in a singular voice.
During the 1920s, Harold Laski worked on producing a comprehensive account of a political philosophy appropriate for the new age of social democracy that was just emerging. During the 1930s, however, his optimistic political outlook waned and with this he modified his position and, in its place, presented a materialist account of British constitutional arrangements. This paper explains this later development of his thought. It examines the unfolding of his argument through his studies of the crisis of parliamentary democracy, the nature of the modern state and his materialist analysis of the British constitution and offers critical reflections of the significance of this phase of his work.
This chapter deals with the relationship between the rule of recognition of a legal system and the material constitution. While the former concerns the ultimate criteria to identify the law, the material constitution points to those of such criteria (rules) that are supreme within a legal order. We contend that the material constitutions can be conceptualised as the ’original constitution’. Instead, we propose understanding it as a facet of the rule of recognition. Thus intended, this notion can help illuminate the complex interplay between written and unwritten constitutional rules. Moreover, after casting doubts on the idea of the material constitution as a descriptive device to detect the ordering forces within society, we sketch the contours of a material constitution based on a normative political conception of the rule of recognition. The normative presupposition of such a conception is a strong linkage between the individuation/acceptance of the law by laypeople and the existence of a given constitutional order. In virtue of such a strong linkage, the material constitution, as a legal notion, enjoys a specific normative legitimacy within a legal order. In pluralistic contemporary societies, such legitimacy hinges fundamentally on democratic/procedural principles rather than substantive goals.
Has decentralization contributed to democratic accountability, civic engagement, transparency, and efforts to combat corruption in the contemporary Arab region? This chapter presents key findings from a two-year study assessing decentralization policies and initiatives in five countries – Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen. The chapter discusses several findings of our fieldwork. One is the legacy of colonial experiences which made deconcentration rather than decentralization prevail. Another is the simultaneous promotion and subversion of decentralization, which was not only practiced by governments across the region, but was often subsidized by international assistance. Still another finding discusses how effectiveness of local governments in the region is constrained by opaque regulatory environments and limited human and financial resources at their disposal. Finally, our study also points to instances of success and innovation, against many odds, where capable leadership, engaged civil society, and other factors have paved the way toward palpable improvements in service delivery and urban management. Accordingly, we find that, despite many constraints, decentralization policies in the Arab region may occasionally present significant policy windows that could form opportunities for social, political, and economic changes, if mobilized adequately.
In an era where legally binding international trade agreements are increasingly shaping domestic regulation in a wide range of areas, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement between the US, Australia, Japan and nine other Pacific Rim Countries, representing over 40% of world trade, has been described as setting the standards for 21st century trade agreements. This article analyses why the negotiations have dragged on for 5 years, and the resistance to the potential impacts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement on national democratic decision-making on health, environmental and other public interest regulation.
Was neoliberal capitalism the only possible development path in Eastern Europe after the collapse of real socialism? How did the restoration of capitalism in the former Eastern bloc affect the economic and political situation in the world? Is the support of workers and lower classes for right-wing populists that has been observed in Eastern Europe for the past 30 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall a permanent phenomenon? By asking these questions, the authors point out that the offensive of the far right began in Europe before the 2015 migration crisis and the 2008 financial crisis, and that it coincided with the weakening of leftist workers’ parties. This process began in the 1990s after the collapse of the Eastern bloc. What can stop this process and change the situation? The solution is to show that another model is still possible: greater egalitarianism, democracy and the rule of law. This sociopolitical alternative, however, must simultaneously oppose two powerful forces: neoliberal capitalism and nationalist populism.
This brief essay contrasts two modes of constitutional change: abusive constitutional projects that seek to erode democracy and restorative constitutional projects that aim to repair eroded democratic constitutional orders. Constitutional democracies are eroded and restored via the same mechanisms: formal processes of constitutional amendment and replacement, legislative amendment, changes to executive policies and practices (or respect for conventions), and processes of judicial decision-making. Under the right conditions, abusive uses of these mechanisms for antidemocratic ends can be reversed by prodemocratic or restorative uses. The more difficult question is what kinds of political discourses are most likely to sustain successful processes of democratic rebuilding. In recent work, we have pointed to the role sometimes played by liberal democratic discourses as purported justifications for processes of abusive constitutional change: we label this the rise of “abusive constitutional borrowing.” Less well understood are the kind of discourses likely to sustain successful democratic healing or rebuilding. Often, the most popular discourse is a restorative one, which focuses on repairing damage caused by authoritarians and returning to a constitutional status quo ante. In this essay, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of restorative constitutionalism as a response to prior episodes of democratic erosion.
This chapter focuses on the process of designation of MCZs in English waters at the basis of MCZs designation. The designation of MCZs is a very interesting case to study attempts at democratising conservation regulation as it has contemplated extensive participation. Departing from the technocratic and purely science-based approach to site selection typical of domestic and European nature conservation law, socio-economic considerations and participatory techniques have been key elements of the designation process of MCZs in England from the start. However, a critical reading of the participatory approach reveals certain weaknesses, mainly to do with the choice of an aggregative rather than a deliberative model of democracy. Advocating for a relational ontology and epistemology, the chapter ends with a call for bringing forth new, ‘thicker’ models of participation that are more attentive to multiple forms of communication and identities and more conducive to commoning practices.
This chapter discusses environmental democracy from an institutional perspective focusing on the role Inshore Fisheries Conservation Authorities and environmental NGOs have in marine conservation regulation. Environmental NGOs are the ‘usual suspects’ when discussing environmental democracy. They are the voice of the more-than human, operating as a proxy, and they are defending the environmental rights of present and future generations through a variety of strategies, more or less confrontational. Thus, NGOs are an obvious subject in discussions of environmental democracy. For radical scholars, Inshore Fisheries Conservation Authorities may seem less interesting. After all, their transformative potential is tamed by the statutory obligations governing their behaviour, they are local arms of the state. However, the chapter reveals that their set up and operation display important democratic aspects. Although both organisations contribute to the democratisation of regulation, they also experience some challenges and constraints, which the chapter discusses.
Authoritarian nationalism is on the rise in many countries around the world, threatening liberal democracies. Many on the left rightly fear that any and all celebrations of national identities risk heightening these dangers. It is questionable, however, whether illiberal nationalism can be defeated politically without some reliance on progressive stories of national identity that advance themes of equality, freedom, and inclusion in ways that resonate with many of the traditions in which those whom progressives seek to mobilize have been raised.
This chapter positions the IPCC in the context of global efforts to understand and combat climate change. Throughout its first three decades, as nations have sought to understand and prioritise climate change in global policy, the IPCC has served as the world’s principal knowledge-making institution. It has created, authorised, and narrated a new kind of global knowledge, profoundly shaped global public imagination of the climate emergency, and provided epistemic support to the call for collective global action to tackle it. Looking forward, however, it is less clear whether the IPCC is well positioned to help support the work of institutions around the world to end fossil fuel use and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The chapter asks, therefore, whether the IPCC needs to be re-imagined if it is to help advance the transition to a climate-neutral global economy and energy systems.
Trilogues represent a decisive stage in the European Union (EU) legislative process and often settle the substantive content of EU legislation. During trilogues, negotiations move fast and new solutions are actively identified by the negotiators. The (lack of) transparency of trilogues has been repeatedly criticised in recent years, yet the EU institutions have defended their “space to think”. Relying on a set of interviews with trilogue participants, this paper mirrors the institutional practices in the final stages of EU law-making against the requirements of openness in the EU Treaties, which aim to strengthen “democracy by allowing citizens to scrutinize all the information which has formed the basis of a legislative act”. The paper argues that, despite noble proclamations, the EU’s legislative practices are characterised by institutional discretion and the lack enforcement of transparency requirements. The paper describes how trilogues are conducted and how questions involving risk management and technically complex issues are assessed in this process. Greater transparency would also help to ensure that risks and alternatives are properly assessed and would thus contribute to better-quality risk regulation in the EU.
The origins and definition of tyranny in ancient Greece have been debated in scholarship for well over three quarters of a century. Recently, it has been argued that tyranny as a political idea was not anathematised until late and that in the fifth century BCE and before, tyranny comported no negative judgment. While correct to point out that the distinction between ‘king’ and ‘tyrant’ in literature predating Aristotle was not clearly delineated, scholars have often failed to ask the more fundamental question of why that distinction was essential for Aristotle. This essay argues that Aristotle drew upon a much older intellectual tradition which saw tyranny as hateful and contrary to the rule of law. Though tyrants in many cases ruled lawfully, a distinction must be drawn between ‘lawful’ rule, which some but not all tyrants practised, and the rule of law, which anathematised tyranny.
Several concerns stand to lead policing away from its mandate to protect the full range of citizens in a pluralist democracy. Among them are special interests, coarse majoritarian rule, and populism. Given that policing involves the discretionary allocation of power and resources in a strategic sense, and that the enforcement of a wide range of laws is subject to police discretion in individual encounters, each of these concerns can turn policing toward illiberal ends when they exert undue influence. In this sense, the discretionary nature of police power is most typically turned toward injustice in the pursuit of sectarian or populist goals that may have a veneer of democratic process, but are insufficient to justify the ensuing disparities of privilege, protection, or access to public space. The duty of the police to resist this impulse and only act upon reasons that treat citizens as substantive equals (i.e., by employing Rawlsian public reason) is a critical way to mitigate this hazard. The chapter closes by recounting the failed but valiant struggle of police to prevent populist rioters from seizing the US Capitol on January 6, 2021 as an example of the duty of the police to safeguard democracy from virulent populist interests.
This chapter argues that policing can be justified at its various levels (e.g., strategic, transactional) utilizing the requirement of Rawlsian public reason, wherein the reasons supplied for coercive government decisions that take up basic matters of justice must be ones that all citizens can access and evaluate from positions of equality. It uses the highly publicized arrest of two Black men for trespassing at a café in Philadelphia to illustrate the concern that procedural justice without public reason can yield troubling outcomes, especially when our intuitions tell us the reasons motivating the procedural transaction do not apply equally to all citizens (e.g., concerns of trespass in a café in a wealthy neighborhood would not apply equally to all citizens based on race, no matter how scrupulously the police employed Tyler’s procedural justice in response to the trespass allegations). While a public reason approach to police justification is a process that would not rule out the subjective judgments police make in complex and evolving situations, it would provide an adequate basis for evaluating overall resource allocations, and more importantly set a high expectation of reason giving grounded in equality as police make lower-level discretionary judgments.
The policeman was beset by the same profound questions of moral philosophy as any other member of mankind.
– William K. Muir, Police: Streetcorner Politicians, 1977
Moral Issues in Police Work, published in 1985, opens with this observation:
The police are among the most powerful agents of the state. They can disrupt the daily routines of citizens more than any other public official by deciding who shall be stopped, who shall be detained, who shall be arrested, and who shall go free. Not even the President of the United States has their immediate and direct power over life and death. Yet despite their awesome capacities, until recently they have been studied little by social scientists or philosophers.
(Elliston & Feldberg, 1985, p. 1)
There has since been much progress, at least where social science is concerned. There have been many systematic studies of police behavior and its effects. Criminal justice and criminology have grown into popular, although often vocational, fields of inquiry. Legal scholarship on the intersection between policing and the American justice system thrives. The ethics of policing has also seen considerable growth as a result of fruitful research by John Kleinig, Seamus Miller, and John Blackler, among others. John Kleinig’s (1996) work consists of sustained and nuanced thought about issues such as discretion, deception, coercion, and the institutional culture of policing’s ethical challenges. Seamus Miller (2016) takes up the police use of deadly force at length, and along with former police officer John Blackler (2017) has examined the role of the police and its practical implications as an exercise in applied philosophy. At present, the cutting edge of the philosophical tradition is represented by Luke Hunt’s 2018 book, The Retrieval of Liberalism in Policing. It looks at policing through the lenses of dignity and a liberal conception of personhood, seeking to ground the issues that concern Kleinig and Miller in the concepts of political philosophy. Hunt offered his work in response to what he perceives as a receding of liberalism in policing, and perhaps society at large, over the last several decades (2018, pp. 1–2).
This book is the first ever written on English marine conservation regulation from a socio-legal perspective. The monograph presents an in-depth analysis of key aspects of Marine Protected Areas regulation in England, offering the reader access to an under-investigated field. Such regulatory mapping is complemented by an interdisciplinary treatment of the subject exploring the relationship between people and marine parks through central themes in environmental social sciences and regulatory theory, namely space, rationalisation, democracy and adaptation. Thus, the book is of interest to environmental lawyers and regulatory scholars but also to human geographers, environmental sociologists and political scientists. As the book provides critical reflections on current legal and regulatory structures, it contains valuable insights for policymakers and regulators. The book has a strong methodological basis drawing on in-depth desk-based research, complemented by primary qualitative research, conducted over a number of years.
As we wrestle with the role and limits of policing, a political philosopher who spent over two decades as a New York City police officer and Vermont chief of police presents a normative account of what it means to police a pluralist democracy. Invoking his vast experience, Brandon del Pozo argues that we all have the prerogative to use force to protect others, but police embody the government's unique duty to do so effectively and with restraint. He recasts order maintenance as brokering and enforcing the fair terms of social cooperation in our public spaces, for the protection of minority interests, and for a society where diverse conceptions of the good can flourish. The reasons why we police, he says, must be ones that all citizens can evaluate as equals. His book explains the democratic commitments of policing, and lays the groundwork for meaningful police innovation and reform.
The introduciton opens my exploration of Cicero’s notion of will. I argue that the will is an original Latin contribution to the Western mind. Cicero’s letters, speeches, and treatises show how his skill for language gave him a subtler take on events and a richer repertoire of persuasion. Practical uses of will are foremost: mapping alliances, winning elections, and navigating the “economy of goodwill.” From his earliest writings, however, voluntas emerges in normative claims about law and politics: that Rome’s mass of precedents could be rationalized through Greek ideas. Chief among these is Plato’s precept that reason must rule, and thus an alliance of philosophy and tradition can save the dying Republic. Transmuting political failure into philosophical innovation, Cicero lays the foundation for an idea – the will and its freedom – with tremendous consequences for Western thought. For Cicero, voluntas populi becomes the binding force of a nominally popular but functionally aristocratic constitution. If this state of affairs looks familiar in today’s “democratic” republics, we have Cicero in part to thank. Insistence on the singularity of popular will and mistrust of the common citizen lie at the heart of today’s political crisis and will require Ciceronian creativity to fix.