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Chapter 7 analyses a range of practical issues that the ICC can expect to encounter in prosecuting the crime of aggression, including implications for judicial elections and the staffing of the Court; the identification of the ‘victims’ of the crime for the purposes of victims’ participation and reparation; and how the obligation of States Parties to cooperate with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of Rome Statute crimes will work in relation to aggression. The chapter next considers the issues likely to arise in the context of domestic prosecutions, including the bases of criminal jurisdiction that may be relied upon, and challenges that will arise, including those relating to immunities, securing the presence of the accused and the necessary evidence, as well as the taint of victor’s justice and the risk associated with non-expert judges interpreting the definition of the crime of aggression. The chapter also canvasses the contemplated review of the amendments and suggests proposals for reform. Finally, the chapter concludes with an assessment of the geopolitical impact of the crime of aggression amendments.
Moral disengagement is a social cognition people use to engage in wrongdoings even when they know it is wrong. However, little is known about the antecedents that predict moral disengagement. The current study focuses on the development of self-control and cooperation during middle childhood as two antecedents of moral disengagement among 1,103 children (50% female; 77% White, 12% Black, 6% Hispanic, and 5% other). Children's self-control at age 8 and growth in self-control from age 8 to 11 were positively linked to adolescents seeing themselves as having self-control at age 15, which then predicted less moral disengagement at age 18. Children's cooperation at age 8 also was positively linked to adolescents’ self-views of cooperation at age 15, which in turn, was associated with less moral disengagement at age 18. These findings demonstrate the potential of self-control and cooperation as intrapersonal and interpersonal strengths during middle childhood for mitigating moral disengagement 10 years later.
The study of convergent cognitive evolution aims to understand how similarities in physical and social intelligence emerge in evolutionarily distant species. This field, which is relatively new, has focused on a number of taxa, including nonhuman primates, corvids, and other birds, cetaceans, canids, and elephants. In this chapter, we highlight the social minds of elephants in particular, with a review of existing observational and experimental research. Investigations of the proximate mechanisms that underlie social behavior require an understanding of how an animal "sees," "hears," "touches,"and "smells" its world. Thus, we emphasize the need to take elephants’ sensory perspective into account when investigating their cognition, especially considering their exceptional olfactory and acoustic senses. We briefly review the literature on elephant social cognition, and discuss the relevance of such research to elephant conservation.
The social intelligence hypothesis states that a complex social life is cognitively challenging and thus a driving force for mental evolution. Support for the hypothesis comes mainly from studies on primates, and more recently also from birds, specifically corvids. In this paper, I review what is known about the socio-cognitive skills of common ravens, a corvid species that has been intensively studied over the past twenty-five years. The findings show that temporary foraging groups are composed of individuals with different degrees of familiarity and structured by different types of social relationships. Familiar ravens show profound knowledge about their own and others’ relationships, and they appear to use this knowledge selectively and strategically in cooperative and competitive settings. The studies on ravens may thus inform our understanding of what constitutes social complexity and which cognitive skills are selected for.
Many animals cooperate even with unrelated individuals in various contexts, like providing food or allogrooming others. One possibility to explain the evolution of such apparently altruistic behaviour is reciprocity. In reciprocal cooperative interactions, individuals help those partners that have been previously cooperative and therefore exchange favours. This conditional help follows rules like “I help you because you helped me.” These rules are often assumed to be so cognitively demanding that they may be limited to humans. In this chapter, I will shed light on the cognitive underpinnings of reciprocal cooperation by reviewing work on one of the yet best-studied animal in this research area, the Norway rat (Rattus norvegicus). Various studies have demonstrated that Norway rats reciprocally exchange different goods and services. They most likely form attitudes toward social partners that are based on the cooperation level of the last encounter, which they remember over long time spans. Cooperation decisions based on attitudes appear cognitively less complex than calculations of received and given favors. Thus, reciprocal cooperation based on this cognitive mechanism might be in fact more widespread among nonhuman animals than commonly believed.
In this concluding chapter, we delineate theoretical insights drawn from relevant comparisons among the case studies and suggest policy recommendations. Specifically, we reassess the three hypotheses, identify and map relevant patterns from the different case studies across several regions of the world, offer several policy recommendations based on these patterns, and draw some general conclusions. In addition to the observable patterns as related to type of borders, political and institutional arrangements, and political economy, in the perusal of the eleven case studies we identified two additional elements that further explain the reality of peaceful borders and illicit transnational flows: the geopolitical location of regions and subregions, as hubs for transnational illicit flows; and the legacy of civil and intermestic wars. In the last part of the chapter, we suggest several policy recommendations: (1) be aware of the normative dilemmas of human security; (2) increase cooperation and develop effective mechanisms of governance at all the possible levels; and (3) promote and prefer peace rather than war, but be aware of its potential unintended consequences.
Economies - and the government institutions that support them - reflect a moral and political choice, a choice we can make and remake. Since the dawn of industrialization and democratization in the late eighteenth century, there has been a succession of political economic frameworks, reflecting changes in technology, knowledge, trade, global connections, political power, and the expansion of citizenship. The challenges of today reveal the need for a new moral political economy that recognizes the politics in political economy. It also requires the redesign of our social, economic, and governing institutions based on assumptions about humans as social beings rather than narrow self-serving individualists. This Element makes some progress toward building a new moral political economy by offering both a theory of change and some principles for institutional (re)design.
This chapter establishes a basis for the book's meta-narrative in a present-day context, highlighting the importance of intellectual property - particularly patents - for the foundation of Facebook. The chapter emphasizes the weaving together of formality and substantive rationality in contemporary patents, which are theorized as instruments of legal power. By showing how patents were important in the founding of Facebook, the chapter emphasizes the role that instruments of legal power - like patents - can play in linking people together into social groups, classes, and networks. Michael Mann's IEMP model for social power helps us to understand the dynamics of exclusivity, as seen in contemporary intellectual property, particularly in patents.
It is vital for those working in language revitalization to learn from each other, share resources and even implement initiatives together. When one community connects with another, they may realise that they are not the only ones struggling with language endangerment; connections between such communities can inspire enthusiasm for revitalization. This chapter describes activities that communities have engaged in when working together, including training activities, artistic activities such as film making, and political lobbying to influence language policy. It suggests ways to initiate contact, assess community needs and structure cooperation so that it addresses the most urgent needs, while also considering the factors that make cooperation successful. Such initiatives aim to bring language revitalizers to a global conversation about cooperation or solidarity between peoples suffering oppression and discrimination. The capsules describe interdialectical encounters between diverse Nahuatl communities, and the work of the Engaged Humanities project, which linked people and stimulated the creation of ‘communities of practice’ for revitalization initiatives.
The sociocognitive approach (SCA) to pragmatics initiated by Kecskes integrates the pragmatic view of cooperation and the cognitive view of egocentrism and emphasizes that both cooperation and egocentrism are manifested in all phases of communication, albeit to varying extents. While cooperation is an intention-directed practice that is governed by relevance, egocentrism is an attention-oriented trait dominated by salience. In the SCA, communication is considered a dynamic process, in which individuals are not only constrained by societal conditions but also shape them at the same time. Interlocutors are considered as social beings searching for meaning with individual minds embedded in a sociocultural collectivity. As a consequence, the communicative process is characterized by the interplay of two sets of traits that are inseparable, mutually supportive and interactive. Individual traits (prior experience > salience > egocentrism > attention) interact with societal traits (actual situational experience > relevance > cooperation > intention). Each trait is the consequence of the other. Prior experience results in salience, which leads to egocentrism that drives attention. Intention is a cooperation-directed practice that is governed by relevance, which (partly) depends on actual situational experience.
Cooperation among militant organizations contributes to capability but also presents security risks. This is particularly the case when organizations face substantial repression from the state. As a consequence, for cooperation to emerge and persist when it is most valuable, militant groups must have means of committing to cooperation even when the incentives to defect are high. We posit that shared ideology plays this role by providing community monitoring, authority structures, trust, and transnational networks. We test this theory using new, expansive, time-series data on relationships between militant organizations from 1950 to 2016, which we introduce here. We find that when groups share an ideology, and especially a religion, they are more likely to sustain material cooperation in the face of state repression. These findings contextualize and expand upon research demonstrating that connections between violent nonstate actors strongly shape their tactical and strategic behavior.
Like domestic law, international law has experimented in recent decades with new approaches to changing legal subjects’ behavior. Realist and institutionalist scholarship in international law and relations generally assume that states will cheat on their obligations if doing so is in their interest. Below the radar, however, a variety of international regimes have begun to emerge that seek to coordinate state behavior without relying exclusively upon credible commitments, instead relying on producing information relevant to an underlying cooperative problem. This chapter takes a first cut at describing this newer mode of international cooperation, describes the relationship between epistemic and credible commitment regimes, and argues that states increasingly choose epistemic regimes over credible regimes in designing international institutions, but also that which option is truly better depends on which regime minimizes the transaction costs of coordinating state behavior.
This chapter focuses on contractarian arguments to bring PSID into our political community. The most obvious argument is by showing that it is advantageous for other members of the community to include them in their ‘cooperative venture.’ This inclusion can be done either directly – by thinking of PSID’s social input differently – or indirectly – by showing that their integration into our community indirectly benefits us, even if they were mostly passive beneficiaries. This first kind of justification, I argue, seems empirically dubious and the latter offers a problematically derivative or contingent status to PSID. I conclude that taking a collectivist, multipartite stance on reciprocal relations to elaborate a kind of rule-contractarianism remains a promising avenue. However, for this argument to be convincing, the contingency objection ought to be met by rendering the inclusion of PSID as less of an opportunistic happenstance and more of a necessity based on their traits and on the nature of the contribution they can provide.
This chapter assesses five strategies that contractualist thinkers have put forward to conceptualize PSID as active participants to the social contract. These focus on (1) PSID’s talents; (2) their capacity to have a conception of the good; (3) their ability to engage with others or play a part in society; (4) their potential to develop (further) contractual capacities; and (5) their need for assistance by ‘collaborators’ or ‘cognitive prostheses’ in the nurturing and exercising of these capacities. These strategies attempt to ‘normalize’ PSID by modifying the benchmark requirements for counting as a contractor; or by arguing that PSID do meet these requirements, despite appearances to the contrary. While they are promising in terms of its application to less seriously disabled individuals, I find that social support, including ‘mental prostheses,’ is not a plausible solution for many profoundly disabled individuals, unless this support is conceptualized in a way that alters it beyond recognition or takes it beyond the autonomy-based contractualist paradigm to which it purports to be attached.
This paper examines two strands of literature regarding economic models of cooperation. First, payoff transformation theories assume that people may not be exclusively motivated by self-interest, but also care about equality and fairness. Second, team reasoning theorists assume that people might reason from the perspective of the team, rather than an individualistic perspective. Can these two theories be unified? In contrast to the consensus among team reasoning theorists, I argue that team reasoning can be viewed as a particular type of payoff transformation. However, I also demonstrate that many payoff transformations yield actions that team reasoning rules out.
Cooperation is a universal phenomenon, it is present in all human cultures from hunter–gatherers to industrialised societies, and it constitutes a fundamental aspect of social relationships. There is, however, variability in the amount of resources people invest in cooperative activities. Recent findings indicate that this variability may be partly explained as a contextually appropriate response to environmental conditions. Specifically, adverse environments seem to be associated with less cooperation and recent findings suggest that this effect is partly mediated by differences in individuals’ life-history strategy. In this paper, we set out to replicate and extend these findings by measuring actual cooperative behaviour in three economic games – a Dictator game, a Trust game and a Public Goods game – on a nationally representative sample of 612 people. Although we found that the cooperation and life-history strategy latent variables were adequately captured by the models, the hypothesised relationship between childhood environmental adversity and adult cooperation and the mediation effect by life-history strategy were not found.
Groupishness is a set of tendencies to respond to group members with prosociality and cooperation in ways that transcend apparent self-interest. Its evolution is puzzling because it gives the impression of breaking the ordinary rules of natural selection. Boehm's solution is that moral elements of groupishness originated and evolved as a result of group members becoming efficient executioners of antisocial individuals, and he noted that self-domestication would have proceeded from the same dynamic. Self-domestication is indicated first at ~300,000 years ago and has probably gathered pace ever since, suggesting selection for self-domestication and groupishness for at least 12,000 generations. Here I propose that a specifically human style of violence, targeted conspiratorial killing, contributed importantly to both self-domestication and to promoting groupishness. Targeted conspiratorial killing is unknown in chimpanzees or any other vertebrate, and is significant because it permits coalitions to kill antisocial individuals cheaply. The hypothesis that major elements of groupishness are due to targeted conspiratorial killing helps explain why they are much more elaborated in humans than in other species.
In an era of corporate surveillance, artificial intelligence, deep fakes, genetic modification, automation, and more, law often seems to take a back seat to rampant technological change. To listen to Silicon Valley barons, there's nothing any of us can do about it. In this riveting work, Joshua A. T. Fairfield calls their bluff. He provides a fresh look at law, at what it actually is, how it works, and how we can create the kind of laws that help humans thrive in the face of technological change. He shows that law can keep up with technology because law is a kind of technology - a social technology built by humans out of cooperative fictions like firms, nations, and money. However, to secure the benefits of changing technology for all of us, we need a new kind of law, one that reflects our evolving understanding of how humans use language to cooperate.