This chapter examines the policy issues that influence the shape and contours of the TV GVC. As with any trading system, the global TV industry is based on a set of social and political values that are predominantly those of open societies and market economies. These values are not universal and the nature and amount of participation of a country into the TV GVC depends on its elites’ degree of adherence to such values. Thus, the first section devotes special attention to China, which has largely shut its doors to the global TV industry. The second section examines the policy alternatives that exist for those countries that wish to embark on the path of GVC participation and economic upgrading. The chapter argues that such a policy has three key prongs: it must take into account the globalised nature of the TV industry and support firms that are best positioned to perform in the global marketplace, harness the benefits of trade, and incentivise creativity through regulation.

Even if populism is not simply an illiberal ideology, it is bad for democracy. Because populists are not constrained by power-seeking party elites, they are more likely, on average, to erode civil liberties and judicial and legislative constraints on their authority. At the extreme, populists so erode these constraints that they cross the threshold into authoritarianism. The best defense against this democratic rollback is not to be found in policy alone. Rather, institutional changes are needed that incentivize power-seeking politicians to create and sustain bureaucratic parties. The conditions that produced the mass membership parties of the twentieth century have essentially passed. But a new generation of programmatic political organizations could sustain democracy well into the future, taking advantage of new tools to map how we live and work, integrating people across space, and forging new civil and political spaces.

In 2000, udlakela was diverse in its trail, levels, spread and types transforming, and evolving in different ways, in different places and times, and used on different people. The resurgence of violence in 2000 was categorically a response to emboldened opposition as civil society united to mount a spirited stand against Zanu PF autocracy. In September 1999, the ZCTU led by Morgan Tsvangirai in coalition with largely urban-based civic groups collaborated and formed a new opposition party – the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In 1999 and 2000, unprecedented nationwide political violence rocked Zimbabwe, starting during a referendum campaign for the adoption of a long overdue new constitution. The MDC defeated the government after campaigning for a ‘No’ vote in the February 2000 referendum. Held from 12 to 13 February, the result was a majority ‘no vote’. Out of a total of 1,312,738 votes cast, 697,754 were against the draft and 578,210 endorsed it. The draft constitution was rejected by 54.7 per cent against 45.3 per cent on a 26 per cent largely urban turnout. Violence in 2000 was induced by three broad issues: the referendum, land reform and the parliamentary election. These influences and the violence often coalesced but also remained distinct.

Radislav Lapushin tracks Chekhov’s tortuous legacy through the Soviet period. While the Soviets attempted to co-opt Chekhov for their own uses, Chekhov also became, for many in the anti-Soviet intelligentsia, a democratic ideal, a moral authority, and an anti-authoritarian icon – a watchword, in short, for the ideologically impregnable.

The final chapter traces Yugoslavias violent disintegration and Serbias post-Yugoslav destiny. In 1990 Milošević and his Socialists (the renamed Communists) won in multi-party elections, but the following year Yugoslavia disinegrated. A short 1991 war in Slovenia was followed by more brutal and prolonged Croatian and Bosnian conflicts, characterized by ethnic cleansing and, in the case of Bosnia, genocidal violence. Serbs were the principal perpetrators but also the victims of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo and of international sanctions, which cripled the countrys economy and society. The 1999 Kosovo war led to a NATO military intervention against Belgrade. The following year Milošević lost elections and was forced to step down. Supported by the West, Kosovo declared independence in 2008, two years after Montenegro left a union with Serbia. The difficult transition to democracy of the post-Milošević era was halted by a return to populism, like elsewhere in the world. Serbias future will be shaped by the legacies of the historical developments discussed in this book. It will also depend on a world that emerges out of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

Chapter 6 looks at some of the security challenges Rwanda experienced for a large part of the First Republic and again at the end of the Second Republic. It therefore focuses Rwandan authorities’ ability to maintain their monopoly of legitimate violence. It stresses the extent to which Rwandan authorities, especially under the First Republic, faced important challenges to their tenure and perceived ability to control the territory.

The Conclusion turns to the lessons and takes a look at authoritarian trajectories in Rwanda and beyond suggests. It stresses how a focus on moments that we believe make or break authoritarianism draws us away from the making and decaying implicit in more ordinary moments of authoritarianism. It shows how this has been a specific gap of our studies of Rwanda prior to the genocide. Rediscovering some of the sources of instability over the course of the two republics would, indeed, have allowed us to make better sense of some of politics and choices surrounding the genocide.

Chapter 7 delves into contentious and competitive relations among security sector actors. Given how key to Rwandan political life security sector actors were over the course of the post-independence period, and especially during the Second Republic born of a military coup, security sector actors’ competitive relations with civilian authorities or among themselves always proved a destabilizing factor in Rwanda.

Chapter 5 explores the expanded repertoire of authoritarian strategies as deployed during the First and Second Republics. It largely focuses on tools used to convey norms for compliant behavior. The two republics stressed in their rhetoric themes to help ground their legitimacy, as well as to spell out their expectations for Rwandans. They also deployed structures and practices to promote their authoritarian norms, from mandatory community work in the name of the state, to celebrations stressing patriotism as a virtue.

Chapter 2 turns to what pre-genocide Rwanda adds as a case to the study of authoritarianism. Many would dismiss outright the country as too exceptional to illustrate the authoritarian realities. But Rwanda epitomizes in scholarship a common "achieved lens" perspective regarding authoritarian control. It also does so in an African context that has given rise to some of the more stereotypical depictions of authoritarianism.

Chapter 3 revisits the beginnings and endings of the First and Second Republics to shed alternative light on moments we often believe we know. Whether the 1959 "Social Revolution" or the coup d’état marking at the beginning of the Second Republic, these events have been largely studied in recent decades to the extent that they fit a specific narrative regarding Rwandan politics and violence. The chapter insists instead on the flux and complexity of events at the time.

Chapter 8 turns to the "political and economic grind," the ongoing political and economic friction the two pre-genocide republics experienced throughout their life span. Though never a challenge to the republics’ absolute survival, this grind nonetheless undermined their ability to achieve control in as important a manner as over crises, chipping away at the bases of performance and hence confidence in the two regimes.

Chapter 4 explores the shape of authoritarianism in Rwanda over the course of the First and Second Republics, inspired by debates surrounding the notion of soft authoritarianism. The chapter focuses on mapping and discussing the institutional manifestations of this authoritarianism, from dominant state parties and presidential power, to policies such as decentralization.

The introduction explores the argument at the core of the book. Despite authoritarianism scholars’ predilection for a focus on crises and elites, trivial authoritarian moments and what we sometimes take to be trivial relations are part of a country’s larger trajectory of authoritarianism. They even suggest — just as larger crises do — some of authoritarianism’s inherent fragility.

Chapter 9 shifts the focus away from the capital and national level to address the question of reach. While "achieved" depictions of authoritarianism suggest a vertical, overbearing chain to compel obedience, local level administrators and ordinary citizens were never absolute cogs in the authoritarian system in place in Rwanda. The chapter explores the ambiguous realities of lived authoritarianism under the two republics.