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This brief, concluding chapter draws together the main themes and arguments of the book and the ways in which peacekeeping has become embedded in the contemporary history and politics of large parts of the African continent. The chapter also reflects on the future of African peacekeeping. In doing so, it points to two trajectories relating to political systems and 'new' and 'old' peacekeepers. The authors underscore the different ways in which peacekeeping has interacted with domestic and regional politics in countries and regions governed by authoritarian versus democratic governments. Peacekeeping has played a particularly critical role in the former, it is suggested, where it has been incorporated into practices of illiberal, militarised statebuilding. The authors conclude the chapter, and book, by pointing to the relatively rapid emergence of a 'new generation' of African peacekeeping states since the early 2000s and the implications this has for the future of African peacekeeping itself.
Rather than exploring peacekeeping as a largely external phenomenon, the chapter examines how it has become, in some African states, a core mechanism for the consolidation and maintenance of political power. Peacekeeping operations, often funded by international actors and linked to increased salaries, training and status, provide an opportunity for African governments to prefer or circulate elites, enhance and augment the discipline and capacity of security forces, and socialise the cost of an expanding security state. The authors examine a number of states, including Uganda and Burundi, where peacekeeping has become a semi-permanent element of – largely illiberal - statebuilding in recent decades. They also highlight the delicate balance African governments must strike in building peacekeeping into the management of domestic political and military actors without sowing the seeds of resentment and rebellion, examining the cases of Burkina Faso and Gambia in particular.
This chapter begins by comparing the developmental ecologies of bananas and coffee, showing how banana production for export has tended to arise on capital-intensive and fully proletarianized plantations dominated by vertically integrated transnational fruit companies. The spread of proletarianized and peripheralized banana regimes in the early part of the twentieth century generated local labor unrest throughout the banana-producing regions of Latin America, but this unrest was largely quelled by partnerships between authoritarian governments and the banana companies. This partnership unraveled as British world hegemony collapsed in the 1930s and 1940s. However, the world banana market was reconstructed under US world hegemony through a process of vertical disintegration that transformed banana transnationals into buyers/distributors and created spaces for the formation of local banana exporters through domestic development initiatives. In Colombia, this process transformed Urabá’s banana zone into a key site of development, but it only permitted entrance into a peripheral niche of the market. Collective action strategies akin to the ICA for coffee failed to generate opportunities for upgrading, pressuring Colombia’s banana planter-exporters to become heavily reliant upon the authoritarian practices of the National Front regime to quell worker unrest and maintain labor control on Urabá’s banana plantations.
This chapter analyzes how Urabá’s despotic labor regime shifted to a deep crisis of labor control in the 1980s and then returned to despotism in the 1990s. It argues that that shift to crisis was not due to any significant changes to the international banana market, as was the case for Colombia’s coffee regime of Viejo Caldas. Instead, it was caused by the democratization of Colombia’s political system, which opened up new spaces for labor mobilization and worker’s political participation. In Urabá, however, this democratization process undermined Augura authoritative power over the region’s banana plantations and local political offices and therefore threatened to undermine their capacity to adapt to their peripheral niche in the international banana market. By the 1990s, Augura was able to regain control of the banana labor regime facilitating the paramilitarization of the region. I conclude with a discussion of how the rise of paramilitarism in Urabá was not the result of Colombia’s adoption of neoliberal reforms, but was instead a regional solution to peripheralization in the context of political democratization.
The comparative study of authoritarianism has neglected plebiscites, and the comparative study of referendums tends to see in them a form of direct democracy regardless of the regime. We conceptualize dictatorial plebiscites as a genuine authoritarian tool, as part of a repressive strategy with the objective of hindering internal regime rivals and discouraging the coordination of the external opposition. We provide empirical evidence from dictatorships for the period 1946–2008 that is compatible with our expectations.
Chapter 5 reads Carl Schmitt’s Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy as an account of a rhetorical crisis. Schmitt characterizes twentieth-century parliamentary speech as an empty ritual and proposes a turn toward effective rituals of speech that might supplant it. Schmitt’s assimilation of rhetoric and ritual is an important insight. But his rhetorical theory takes a troubling, authoritarian turn in its understanding of the conditions under which ritual becomes meaningful. For Schmitt, “eloquence is only possible against the background of an imposing authority,” and ritual must actively shape the political world. But with a richer understanding of ritual, we can retain what is of value in Schmitt’s account without following him to his authoritarian conclusions. Just such a richer understanding of ritual is available in the work of Adam Seligman et al. For them, ritual is action in the “subjunctive” mood, “the creation of an order as if it were truly the case.” Ritual is not an effort to shape the world, but a response to the world’s perceived brokenness. In this light, what the rhetorical tradition has to offer us is not a way of resolving the tension between speech and action, but a way of living in that tension.
The first several chapters of the book focused on a set of related constraints on human cognitive abilities that systematically influence the ability of decision makers make choices consistent with their underlying preferences. In this chapter, we turn squarely to where preferences come from that those decision makers are trying to maximize in the first place. The discussion starts with a challenge to a common assumption: that people are mostly concerned with their personal, material self-interest when they make decisions about politics. BPS approaches have discovered a wide variety of motivations for political choices that reach far beyond simple economic self-interest. Symbolic values springing from personality traits, social norms, group identities, and morals can lead to decisions quite far removed from what would be in many individual’s narrow material self-interest. By bringing such alternative motivations into our models, we can understand politics much more deeply and delve into the “black box” of preference formation.
This article applies a regime cycle framework to understand patterns of change and continuity in African competitive autocracies. We observe that regime change in African autocracies is rarely the result of actions carried out by rebels, opposition leaders or popular masses substantially altering the structure of power. Instead, they are more frequently carried out by senior regime cadres, resulting in controlled reshuffles of power. We argue that such regime shifts are best explained through a cyclical logic of elite collective action consisting of accommodation and consolidation, and ultimately leading to fragmentation and crisis. These dynamics indicate the stage of leader-elite relationships at a given time, and suggest when regimes may likely expand, contract, purge and fracture. We argue that, by acknowledging in which stage of the cycle a regime and its senior elites are dominant, we can gauge the likelihood as well as the potential success of a regime change. Our framework is finally applied to understand recent regime shifts in competitive autocracies across Africa.
A growing literature has begun to more closely examine African legislatures. However, most of this research has been attentive to emerging democratic settings, and particularly the experiences of a select number of English-speaking countries. By contrast, Cameroon is a Francophone majority country that reintroduced multiparty politics in the early 1990s but continues to exhibit significant authoritarian tendencies. This article provides a longitudinal analysis of Cameroon's National Assembly and builds on a unique biographical dataset of over 900 members of parliament between 1973 and 2019. The article describes changes in the structure and orientation of the legislature as well as the social profile of its members, in particular following the transition to multipartyism. While the legislature in Cameroon remains primarily a tool of political control, it is more dynamic, and the mechanisms used to manage elites within the context of complex multiethnic politics have evolved.
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the founding of the Republic in 1923 under the rule of Atatürk and his Republican People's Party, Turkey embarked on extensive social, economic, cultural and administrative modernization programs which would lay the foundations for modern day Turkey. The Power of the People shows that the ordinary people shaped the social and political change of Turkey as much as Atatürk's strong spurt of modernization. Adopting a broader conception of politics, focusing on daily interactions between the state and society and using untapped archival sources, Murat Metinsoy reveals how rural and urban people coped with the state policies, local oppression, exploitation, and adverse conditions wrought by the Great Depression through diverse everyday survival and resistance strategies. Showing how the people's daily practices and beliefs survived and outweighed the modernizing elite's projects, this book gives new insights into the social and historical origins of Turkey's backslide to conservative and Islamist politics, demonstrating that the making of modern Turkey was an outcome of intersection between the modernization and the people's responses to it.
The Hong Kong statute criminalizing disrespect of the Chinese national anthem, passed in 2020, is one of many recent moves to suppress political dissent in the former British colony. The law restricts freedom of political expression, but its constitutionality is practically assured courtesy of earlier decisions upholding laws against flag desecration. This article draws on sociological and political literature to argue that symbolic nationalism, particularly when given the force of law, is a tool of the authoritarian state. Against this backdrop, it critically and comparatively analyses Hong Kong judicial decisions upholding the suppression of symbolic dissent, assessing their doctrinal coherence, normative defensibility, and consequences. It concludes with observations on the efficacy of attempts to enforce patriotic orthodoxy and on how deference to authoritarianism affects the rule of law.
How did the Gestapo enforce laws governing criticism? Recent historiography highlights denunciation driven policing as well as the overrepresentation of Communists and Jews in cases taken to trial. A system of selective enforcement is well-established fact, but the dynamics remain unclear. Enemies of the People randomly samples two categories of “criminal opinion” to capture the changing decision-making processes behind routine investigation, interrogation, and enforcement practices. Five arguments take shape. First, a conscious policy of selective enforcement based on political reliability as defined by standing within the Nazi people’s community. Second, the system punished subversive motive rather than actions. Third, political police viewed targeted minorities as subversives, privileged minorities as supporters, and carefully investigated “politically colourless” Germans. Fourth, from 1935 to 1944, the Gestapo behaved as an ordinary detective service when investigating individual Germans. Fifth, selective enforcement involved state prosecutors and the Party through five configurations. The violence of revolution and collapse were bookends on a decade of much cooler suppression.
The second Chilean constitutional republican experience is examined, focusing in its authoritarian President, the state of exception and the limitation of rights as well as the rising of new political parties. The Second Republic is the Authoritarian Republic (1830-1870) that is characterized by the dominance of the executive function and the use of states of exception. The debate about the authoritarianism of Latin America in the works of Bello and Lastarria is explained. The first Chilean constitutionalism is compared in the works of the Carrasco Albano and Huneeus is also subject to analysis. This Republic also shows several changes in the structure of rights and of the constitutional property law that is explained. Last but not least, the main political agents and the mutation of the Second Republic into the Third Republic is also explained.
During this period occurred the collapse, not only of the Fourth Republic but also of the republican institutionality that was forged in Chile from its independence. The catalyst of this collapse is the decision to transfer the constituent power from the people to the Military Junta, headed by Pinochet. This transfer has no previous precedent in the republican history of Chile, and therefore breaks with our political and constitutional tradition, begun at Independence. During the Chilean dictatorship, starting in 1973, a new constitutional ideal of anti-republican orientation is installed by force. This process was consolidated in 1980 when Pinochet "granted" a Constitution that, together with assigning the military a political function not subordinated to the civil power, sets out to institutionalize a conception neo-liberal in respect of the laws and authoritarian in respect of government, inspired in Freidrich von Hayek and Carl Schmitt and, in the Estatuto de Garantías Constitutionales, adopted as law in 1970.
While research on women's substantive representation in legislatures has proliferated, our knowledge of gender lobbying mechanisms in authoritarian regimes remains limited. Adopting a state-society interaction approach, this article addresses how women's interests are substantively represented in China despite the absence of an electoral mandate and the omnipresence of state power. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, this article maps out the intertwining of key political agents and institutions within and outside the state that mobilize for women's grievances and demands. We find that representation of women's interests in China requires the emergence of a unified societal demand followed by a coalition of state agency allies navigating within legislative, executive, and Party-affiliated institutional bodies. The pursuit of women's interests is also politically bounded and faces strong repression if the lobbying lacks state alliances or the targeted issue is considered “politically sensitive” by the government.
In Sudan the era of the oil boom resulted in a flood in labor remittances that circumvented official financial institutions, thereby undercutting the state’s fiscal and regulatory capacity and fueling the expansion of the informal foreign currency trade. Initially, developments in Sudan paralleled those in Egypt as the boom witnessed the rise of an Islamist-commercial class that formed as a result of its successful monopolization of informal financial markets. However, in contrast to Egypt, by 1989 Sudanese Islamists were able to take over the levers of the state via a military-coup. This development was made possible by Sudan’s weaker state capacity and the extreme weakness of its formal banking system. As a result, the financial power of the Muslim Brotherhood continued to increase in relationship to the state as they continued to profit from participation in the lucrative speculation in black market transactions and advantageous access to import licenses.
Chapter 7 explains how militant Islamist leaders adapted “traditional” Egyptian rural norms in ways that allowed them both to supplant the political power of local notables, while simultaneously institutionalizing extortion practices and implementing their own brand of “law and order.” Islamic militants exploited the high levels of social and economic uncertainty in Cairo’s informal housing areas. An important reason behind the popularity of radical Islamists among local residents is due to the ways in which their leaders have utilized highly coercive methods to settle local disputes and enforce informal labor contracts for their members, while simultaneously preaching against the ills of conspicuous consumption in their sermons and imposing strict Islamic modes of conduct. The chapter shows how the socio-economic conditions that have served, as a “recruiting ground” for Islamist radicals was made possible as result of economic change at both the international as well as domestic level.
In Somalia the boom in labor remittances inflows fueled a different type of informal economy. More specifically, while the oil boom period reduced the Somali state’s ability to regulate the economy as in Egypt and Sudan, the consequences of this development differed. In Somalia informal financial networks facilitated a thriving commercial sector comprised of firms oriented around clan families. It was not religious or class affiliations, but rather ethnic mobilization and conflict that became the most salient. This difference was due to two factors: the dearth of formally organized institutions (i.e., official banks, and publicly registered enterprises); and the fact that President Siad Barre pitted one clan against another in his search for legitimacy and financed a patronage system excluding clans and constituencies that opposed his rule. Thus, with the expansion of the parallel economy, the politics of ethnicity and personalistic networks quickly eclipsed the power of the state.
Party development in post-transition Latin America has often proceeded unevenly, as right-wing elites opted for non-partisan forms of political action and conservative parties remained poorly institutionalised. Recent research has demonstrated that party-building was facilitated where the political Right benefited from valuable political assets – party brand, territorial organisation, sources of funding and clientelistic networks – inherited from authoritarian regimes. This article argues that authoritarian inheritance in isolation is insufficient to foster conservative party institutionalisation. It analyses the trajectories of the major right-wing parties in Brazil and Chile, where former authoritarian incumbents benefited extensively from authoritarian inheritance and yet levels of institutionalisation differed widely across parties. The comparative analysis demonstrates that right-wing parties were most likely to consolidate where, in addition to inheriting valuable resources from the dictatorship, they experienced ideologically driven, violent conflict during their early years.
The Article deals with the actual functioning of the judicial power and the limits of its independence facing an illiberal or authoritarian state. The Article offers a skeptical analysis of the past and especially of the judiciary’s future in Central Europe, with a primary focus on Czechia and Slovakia. After a brief excursion into the times before the installment of communist regimes in the late 1940s, attention shifts to the development of the judiciary during the three decades after the fall of communist rule. In this context, the Article deals with different models of administration of the judiciary and shows how they can function in normal democracy and under the conditions of emerging authoritarianism. It also characterizes different perspectives on the judiciary in common law and continental law and posits different capacities of judges to resist authoritarians in various legal cultures. Finally, it sketches future prospects and attempts to define the typology of judiciary models in authoritarian and totalitarian states.