Focusing much attention on Unionist governments in Arkansas and Louisiana, congressional Republicans emphasize – in debating the Wade–Davis bill during spring 1864 – that Lincoln’s Reconstruction policy might allow the rebellious states to return to the Union without abolishing slavery. The US Senate also refuses to seat claimants from Arkansas’s Unionist government. The Republican national convention nominates Lincoln for reelection and endorses the Thirteenth Amendment, but the amendment fails to secure approval in the House of Representatives. Lincoln pocket vetoes the Wade–Davis bill, fearing it will invalidate Louisiana and Arkansas governments. The vitriolic language of the Wade–Davis manifesto disguises the substantive point – which historians almost always overlook – that the ten-percent plan might allow for the preservation of slavery. With the war stalled, it appears by August 1864 that Lincoln will lose the presidential election.

During fall 1865, Mississippi elects new government under Andrew Johnson’s policy, and governments in Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana conduct elections and continue the process of Reconstruction. Louisiana Unionists organize into Republican party and advocate black suffrage. Mississippi is first former rebellious state to enact “black code” and to define freedom for the former slaves, prompting protests from black Mississippians, and it refuses to ratify Thirteenth Amendment. African American leaders in Arkansas hold convention in Little Rock calling for political and legal equality. Thirteenth Amendment becomes operative in early December 1865, as Thirty-Ninth Congress convenes. Fears of “Christmas Insurrection Scare” become manifest, though for different reasons, among both black and white Southerners.

Chapter 3 looks at how the Southern minority used the three-fifths clause, the Electoral College, and parity in the Senate to protect itself from “tyranny” of the Northern majority. Even with the three-fifths clause, the South could not overcome the North’s increasing population advantage. Nonetheless, the three-fifths clause’s “slave bonus” did limit the South’s losses in the House. While the South’s determination to have the number of slave states equal the number of free states ensured that the North would not have a majority. Both parity in the Senate and the three-fifths clause inflated the South’s representation in the Electoral College. Of these two proslavery constitutional provisions, parity in the Senate provided greater protection to the South. Northerners understood only too well the political benefits the three-fifths clause and parity in the Senate conferred upon the South. Antislavery advocates bristled at this, while conservatives believed it was the result of the Founders’ grand plan. Both Northerners and Southerners realized that the three-fifths clause and parity in the Senate added to the difficulty of securing congressional approval of an antislavery amendment. In 1850, the South lost parity in the Senate, never to regain it.