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China's mistreatment of its Uyghur minority has drawn international condemnation and sanctions. The repression gripping Xinjiang is also hugely costly to China in Renminbi, personnel, and stifled economic productivity. Despite this, the Chinese Communist Party persists in its policies. Why? Drawing on extensive original data, Potter and Wang demonstrate insecurities about the stability of the regime and its claim to legitimacy motivate Chinese policies. These perceived threats to core interests drive the ferocity of the official response to Uyghur nationalism. The result is harsh repression, sophisticated media control, and selective international military cooperation. China's growing economic and military power means that the country's policies in Xinjiang and Central Asia have global implications. Zero Tolerance sheds light on this problem, informing policymakers, scholars, and students about an emerging global hotspot destined to play a central role in international politics in years to come.
Since the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) as one of the leading insurgent forces in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s, the academic literature has increasingly focused on the phenomenon of foreign fighters. Most studies have analyzed transnational insurgents joining the ISIS; however, research on non-jihadi foreign fighters remains underdeveloped. The article sheds much-needed light on the factors motivating non-jihadi fighters to join conflicts abroad. Specifically, it presents the findings of an in-depth analysis of the factors leading Italian nationals to join the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG/YPJ)1 after 2011, their military contribution on the battlefield, and their reasons for returning to Italy. The contributions of the paper are twofold. First, it enriches our general understanding of the motivations of non-jihadi foreign fighters through detailed qualitative analysis, including first-hand accounts and an analysis of fighters' biographies. Second, it offers a more complete picture of the specific factors informing the Italian experience of transnational non-jihadi fighters in recent years. The qualitative data highlight the role of non-material factors in triggering the armed mobilization of foreign fighters. The findings indicate that the Italian foreign fighters contingent within the YPG/YPJ and the SDF has been highly committed, made up mostly of young males with no military experience, and had little to no impact on the battlefield.
Chapter 6 focuses on the electoral alliances that the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) forms with violent sectarian actors in Punjab province. Using a combination of extensive fieldwork and data on party organization and electoral candidates, I demonstrate that the PML-N is an organizationally weak party lacking a captive support base in Punjab’s political landscape of shared sovereignty. Because it has limited presence at the local level, the PML-N must rely on pre-existing, influential patrons who manage microlevel clientelistic structures and can function effectively as electoral intermediaries between the party and potential voters. Historically, these patrons have been landed elites. The PML-N has allied with them, often giving them party tickets on which to contest elections, in exchange for their vote bank. In recent years, anti-Shia sectarian actors associated with violent nonstate armed groups have started to challenge the influence of these traditional elites in many electoral arenas. As these violent actors have gained local power, they have replaced traditional elites as patrons and electoral intermediaries for the PML-N. In exchange for their help getting local votes, the PML-N turns a “blind eye” to their violence, resulting in their further entrenchment and empowerment.
The European Union's cooperation with Middle Eastern regimes to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism has received increased scholarly attention following several terrorist attacks in Europe the last decade. Despite the EU's emphasis on good governance, democracy, and human rights to prevent violent extremism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), I argue that the Union is in fact declining as a ‘normative power’ as it has prioritised a ‘security first’ centred approach. This article demonstrates how the EU's normative projects have, first, appropriated a logic of securitisation; and second, how the Union downplays democracy and good governance in fear of alienating authoritarian key partners in the region. There are consequently inherent limitations to, and contradictions in, the EU's Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Preventing Violent Extremism (PvE) efforts. These conclusions are based on interviews with EU representatives and implementing partners on the ground. The interviews are complemented by an analysis of the scope and focus of the EU's CT and PvE projects. The findings have implications for our understanding of normative powers’ priorities when facing a perceived dilemma of choosing between its security, on the one hand, and its identity and value aspirations, on the other.
Turning to the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, Chapter 10 explores the challenges Bonn faced amidst the turmoil of the early 1970s. Tightened budgets, occasioned by worries about inflation, hampered efforts by aid minister Erhard Eppler to follow through on Brandt’s promises of expanding development aid to the Global South. Karl Schiller insisted that trade, not aid, was the better path forward. Bonn’s liberal, free-trade approach drew criticism from African leaders, as West Germany invested heavily in apartheid South Africa; Brandt’s government did, however, enact tighter restrictions on weapons exports outside NATO. German officials frowned upon Global South demands for a more balanced world trading order, but they played a mediating role at UNCTAD III, a global trade and development conference in Santiago, Chile. Confronted with a rash of kidnappings in Latin America and Palestinian terrorism on German soil, Brandt’s government opted repeatedly to appease the hostage-takers rather than prosecute them. This passive response contributed to the disaster at the Munich Olympics in 1972, when Israeli athletes were captured and murdered.
International legal discourses clash in violent ways within the state. For example, the international discourse on human rights identifies some individuals who oppose state-sanctioned projects as Indigenous peoples while the international discourse about terrorism may identify them as terrorists. These clashes are occurring throughout the world, particularly surrounding extractive resource projects, but this article considers one example from the Philippines where some B'laan individuals and communities oppose the Tampakan Copper-Gold Mine, and examines how various actors identify those individuals and communities. It explores how some identify them as Indigenous peoples while others identify them as terrorists. In highlighting the violent effects of international law, it investigates how discourse inhibits appreciation of violent erasures and the continuing coloniality of extractive resource development.
Failed states, I argue in the conclusion, do not necessarily afford terrorists a conducive context for recruiting new members. This is due to four challenges that confront terrorist organizations. The first challenge is the lack of government-enforced order in failed states that is needed to provide security against local authorities. Second, is the unreliability of local allies, as in the case of Somalia, where local ties of clan and sect overlap in complicated ways. The third challenge is that the better an area is for training recruits, the more remote and sparsely populated it is, the harder it to meet basic sustenance needs. The fourth problem is the challenge of getting fiscal resources in place. Financial services in the region continue to be weak and Islamic militants have not been able to effectively use the Hawalaat to provide key financial services in weakly governed areas of the Horn of Africa.
Endless armed conflicts against terrorist groups put civilian populations at risk. Since France has been involved in the Sahel from 2013 onwards, transnational non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) of extended geographical and temporal scope against groups designated as terrorists are not a US exception anymore. NIACs against terrorist groups, conducted not only by the United States but also by France, persist and have been reconfigured around threat anticipation. How can anticipatory warfare be best constrained? This article argues that it can be best done through more constraining rules regulating target selection in NIACs and, in particular, by redefining the notion of continuous combat function (CCF). Many elements explored in this article indicate that the United States and France select targets that they pre-designate as terrorists, before these targets are engaged in hostilities. Instead of responding to the observed participation of these individuals in hostilities, strikes are based on contextual and behavioural elements ahead or outside of such moments. This paper argues that when war consists of threat anticipation, it becomes very extensive and particularly risky for civilians. Furthermore, recent State practice in the counterterrorism context reveals the pitfalls of the notions of direct participation in hostilities and CCF as defined in the 2009 International Committee of the Red Cross Interpretive Guidance. Outside this context, the interpretations proposed in the Interpretive Guidance might seem sufficient to constrain target selection processes and to protect civilian populations. However, when applied to armed conflicts that are driven by threat anticipation, the pitfalls of these interpretations emerge. I formulate a critique of these interpretations as being partly responsible for anticipatory warfare and propose an alternative theory for the CCF test.
Chapter 7 presents the third of the three case studies: Killing the Individual Human Being via Drones. Here I look at targeted killings and the growing use of drones in this practice. The chapter offers a detailed discussion of the predominantly legal and ethical debate. In doing so, the chapter demonstrates the relevance of an analysis guided by insights from IR theory. But it also discusses legal questions concerning International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law. The case study engages in detail with the general discourse on drone strikes and targeted killings and provides an in-depth analysis of specific strike types and drone strikes. The analysis demonstrates how the individual human being appears as an innocent civilian who should not be killed (if possible) or as a guilty terrorist who should be killed.
Chapter 12 applies what we have learned from prehistory to explain why religions exist and how they emerged and persisted into the present day even while their precepts are clearly contrary to all that we have learned from science. Looking at the present human challenges of warfare and terrorism from an evolutionary standpoint helps readers to better understand and deal with the problems of our modern globalized world.
Terrorist incidents occur with alarming frequency. Much is known about acute injuries and psychopathology arising from terrorism, as well as medical care and functional status assessed in early post-disaster periods. Survivors’ memories of these experiences may change over subsequent decades, and their perspectives may evolve. Little information is available on how survivors describe these experiences decades later.
This longitudinal qualitative study of directly-exposed survivors of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was conducted nearly a quarter century after the disaster. It collected systematic, open-ended descriptions of survivors’ injuries and medical care, assistance received and given, and disaster-associated losses. It sought to illuminate whether survivors recall long-term consequences of disaster exposure so long after the event, providing important details with great clarity and associated emotion, or alternatively lose memory and sharpness of recollection for these aspects of their bombing experience.
A sample of 182 bombing survivors was randomly recruited from a state registry of 1,092 bombing survivors and interviewed at approximately six months after the bombing (71% participation). The sample was re-interviewed an average of 23 years after the disaster (72% follow-up participation) using an open-ended interview with survivors describing in their own words their personal experience of the bombing and its effects on their lives. The interviews were audio recorded and professionally transcribed. Themes were identified in the text of the interviews, and passages were coded using qualitative software, achieving excellent inter-rater reliability for each theme. This article covers three of twelve total themes identified.
Nearly a quarter century after the bombing, this highly trauma-exposed Oklahoma City bombing survivor sample had memories that were still vivid, graphic, and evocative. They described injuries and medical care, assistance given and received, and losses with great detail and intensity. Despite the continuing strong emotions expressed by these survivors in relation to the bombing, the qualitative content suggested that lasting psychopathology was not a central concern.
This is one of the longest prospective longitudinal, qualitative studies ever conducted with highly trauma-exposed survivors of a terrorist bombing. These findings are critical to disaster emergency response and effective management of the disaster response and early care for the survivors, as the effects of the disaster may shape the rest of their lives.
In fostering community and culture through entertainment in shared spaces, performing arts venues have also become targets of terrorism. A greater understanding of these attacks is needed to assess the risk posed to different types of venues, to inform medical disaster preparedness, to anticipate injury patterns, and to reduce preventable deaths.
A search of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) was conducted from the year 1970 through 2019. Using pre-coded variables for target/victim type and target subtype, attacks involving “business” and “entertainment/cultural/stadium/casino” were identified. Attacks targeting performing arts venues were selected using the search terms “theater,” “theatre,” “auditorium,” “center,” “hall,” “house,” “concert,” “music,” “opera,” “cinema,” and “movie.” Manual review by two authors was performed to confirm appropriateness for inclusion of entries involving venues where the primary focus of the audience was to view a performance. Descriptive statistics were performed using R (version 3.6.1).
A total of 312 terrorist attacks targeting performing arts venues were identified from January 1, 1970 through December 31, 2019. Two-hundred nine (67.0%) attacks involved cinemas or movie theaters, 80 (25.6%) involved unspecified theaters, and 23 (7.4%) specifically targeted live music performance venues. Two-hundred thirty-four (75.0%) attacks involved a bombing or explosion, 50 (16.0%) damaged a facility or infrastructure, and 17 (5.4%) included armed assault. Perpetrators used explosives in 234 (75.0%) attacks, incendiary weapons in 50 (16.0%) attacks, and firearms in 19 (6.1%) attacks. In total, attacks claimed the lives of 1,307 and wounded 4,201 persons. Though fewer in number, attacks against music venues were responsible for 29.4% of fatalities and 35.0% of those wounded, and more frequently involved the use of firearms. Among 95 attacks falling within the highest quartile for victims killed or wounded (>two killed and/or >ten wounded), 83 (87.4%) involved explosives, seven (7.4%) involved firearms, and three (3.2%) involved incendiary methods.
While uncommon, terrorist attacks against performing arts venues carry the risk for mass casualties, particularly when explosives and firearms are used.
This chapter explores how people characterize and cope with the cognitive challenges they face when they perceive uncertainty. Economists normally model how people think about uncertainty in terms of probability distributions assigned to rival outcomes on the dimension in question, but people commonly speak with a focus on whether outcomes are “probable” or merely “possible.” The chapter therefore explores differences between subjective probability concepts and Shackle’s possibility-based “potential surprise” view of uncertainty and his theory of focus outcomes. We also examine probability-assigning heuristics and inductive and deductive philosophies for assigning how probable or possible events might be. We then consider rule-based method by which people deal with “fundamental uncertainty,” where probabilities cannot be assigned and a leap in the dark must be made. Finally, the chapter focuses on how people deal with dread that specific problematic events may occur, including decisions to bail out of commitments due to short-run loss of nerve, leading to losses of major long-term benefits. This discussion includes analysis of how terrorism works despite low odds of being a victim.
Much of the psychosocial care people receive after major incidents and disasters is informal and is provided by families, friends, peer groups and wider social networks. Terrorist attacks have increased in recent years. Therefore, there is a need to better understand and facilitate the informal social support given to survivors.
We addressed three questions. First, what is the nature of any informal support-seeking and provision for people who experienced the 2017 Manchester Arena terrorist attack? Second, who provided support, and what makes it helpful? Third, to what extent do support groups based on shared experience of the attack operate as springboards to recovery?
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with a purposive sample of 18 physically non-injured survivors of the Manchester Arena bombing, registered at the NHS Manchester Resilience Hub. Interview transcripts were thematically analysed.
Participants often felt constrained from sharing their feelings with friends and families, who were perceived as unable to understand their experiences. They described a variety of forms of helpful informal social support, including social validation, which was a feature of support provided by others based on shared experience. For many participants, accessing groups based on shared experience was an important factor in their coping and recovery, and was a springboard to personal growth.
We recommend that people who respond to survivors’ psychosocial and mental healthcare needs after emergencies and major incidents should facilitate interventions for survivors and their social networks that maximise the benefits of shared experience and social validation.
Violence against primary care providers (PCPs) has increased during the current pandemic. While some of these violent acts are not defined as terrorist events, they are intentional events with an aim to disrupt, kill, or injure. Despite their pivotal role in health care, little is known about the risk for PCPs as targets of terrorism.
Data collection was performed using a retrospective database search through the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD was searched using the internal database search functions for all terrorist attacks against PCPs and their offices from January 1, 1970 - December 31, 2019. Years 2020 and 2021 were not yet available at the time of the study. Primary attack and weapon type, location (country, world region), and number of deaths and injuries were collated. Results were exported into an Excel spreadsheet (Microsoft Corp.; Redmond, Washington USA) for analysis.
There were 29 terrorist attacks against PCPs and their offices from 1970-2019. The majority of attacks occurred during or after 2010. There were 58 fatalities, 52 injured, and 13 hostages. Most documented attacks took place in Pakistan, the United States, and Sri Lanka. Bombings concerned 55% of cases and 21% were hostage-takings.
Although less common than attacks on other health care related targets, terrorist attacks against PCPs have occurred. The majority of attacks occurred during the last decade. Future studies are warranted to further assess the risk of terrorist attacks against PCPs: before, during, and beyond the current pandemic.
Terrorism often seeks to impact democratic politics. This article explores how it can influence the electoral fortunes of the incumbent. Existing research is contradictory. Models of retrospective voting predict a negative impact, as terrorism is detrimental to voters' welfare. However, the well-known ‘rally around the flag’ effect suggests otherwise: following a terrorist attack, voters often cling to the incumbent. We reconcile these arguments and argue that while both effects can coexist, the retrospective assessment is more durable than the rally around the flag. Using data on all deadly domestic terrorist attacks in Spain between 1977 and 2008, matched with municipal-level national election results, we show how exposure to strikes that occur during the last quarter of the term benefit the incumbent, while more temporally distant attacks are electorally harmful. In line with our theory, we find a more pronounced temporal heterogeneity for indiscriminate attacks and those that target civilians.
This chapter delves into one of DeLillo's frequently recurring themes, terrorism, yet develops the ways in which different novels' approaches to understanding terrorism significantly differ despite their surface similarities.
The Philosophy of Freedom from Rousseau to Heidegger launched a great protest against modern liberal individualism, inspired by the virtuous political community of the ancient Greeks. Hegel argued that the progress of history was gradually bringing about greater freedom and restoring our lost sense of community. But his successors Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger rejected Hegel's version of the end of history with its legitimization of the bourgeois nation-state. They sought to replace it with ever more utopian, apocalyptic and illiberal visions of the future: Marx's Socialism, Nietzsche's Overman, and Heidegger's commitment to Nazism. This book combines an exceptionally clear and rich study of these thinkers with a deep dive into the extent to which their views fed the political catastrophes of revolution, tyranny and genocide, including the Jacobins, Bolsheviks, Nazis, Khmer Rouge, ISIS and populist nationalism, but argues that the Philosophy of Freedom remains indispensable for understanding today's world.
Bakary Sambe is Regional Director of the Timbuktu African Institute for Peace Studies (Dakar, Niamey, Bamako). Founder of the Observatory of Religious Radicalism and Conflicts in Africa, Sambe is a teacher–researcher at Gaston Berger University in St Louis (Senegal).
Sambe's current work focuses on endogenous strategies, cross-border dynamics and experimenting with agile approaches in crisis zones. An expert working with the United Nations, European Union, African Union, etc., he has notably designed and led advocacy for the establishment of the regional group for the prevention and fight against radicalization of the G5 Sahel (CELLARD), assisted in the process of developing national strategies in Niger, Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic, and produced the first manual of good resilience practices.
In addition to numerous articles, Sambe has published several books: Islam et diplomatie : la politique africaine du Maroc (2010–2011), Boko Haram : du problème nigérian à la menace régionale (2015) and Contestations islamisées : Le Sénégal entre diplomatie d'influence et islam politique (2018).
No religious tradition or country seems to be unequivocally, inherently free from the threat of extremism. As a result of domestic and international acts of terrorism, much of the world seems occupied with the views and actions of Muslims, calling particular attention to the Salafi sect. Some groups belonging to this sect disseminate and promulgate their views through online periodicals, in order to solidify their ideological base and recruit new members. In particular, this chapter relates secular and non-secular characterizations of √KFR – the Arabic triliteral root referring to disbelievers and states of disbelief – to the characterization espoused in electronic periodicals from al-Qa’ida and Da’esh. Over one thousand tokens of derived lexemes of √KFR are extracted using AntConc from thirty issues, reduced to a taxonomy, and examined through the discursive strategies utilized.