To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure email@example.com
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Human rights/dignity can be grounded in Buddhism as part of the freedom of human beings to liberate themselves from suffering. But there are markedly different approaches to this freedom in various Buddhisms. In early Buddhism, dignity can be seen as a worth that arises intrinsically due to the ability of each individual to free oneself from suffering. In Nishitani Keiji’s philosophy of Zen, dignity is an ability to free everyone from an ontologically shared suffering, as in Thich Nhat Hanh’s engaged Buddhism. Next, the chapter examines two very common forms of Buddhism that are often neglected in rights/dignity discourses – salvific Buddhism (Pure Land) and Confucian Buddhism. In Tanabe Hajime’s view of salvific Buddhism, “dignity”is not about attaining freedom oneself but about one’s being saved by absolute other power and being a mediator for that salvation. In Watsuji Tetsurō’s Confucian Buddhism, dignity is seen as the potential to be free from one’s egotism for the sake of serving one’s community. All of these show markedly different moral approaches to human dignity – and Sueki Fumihiko warns us not to miss the trans-ethical side of these Buddhisms.
In “Remarks on Nishida and Nishitani,” Rorty examines Kyoto School philosophers Nishida Kitaro and Nishitani Keiji in relation to the pragmatist tradition. Characterizing their epistemological orientations as the “Argument from Holism to Monism,” Rorty likens their perspectives to the idealism of T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Josiah Royce. He then contrasts those perspectives with the “Argument from Holism to Pragmatism” advanced by William James and John Dewey. He concludes by embracing those aspects of Nishida’s and Nishitani’s positions that are consistent with pragmatism’s “democratic humanism,” but rejecting their traces of transcendence, all while offering one of the more concise accounts of his classical and neopragmatist commitments.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.