To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Kerala is a well-recognized ‘model’ of human development in the world. In this article, I look at a crucial aspect of this development, which is often approached in a positivist fashion of statistical aggregation alone: consumption. Instead, there is a need to study the meanings that surround it. I delineate the many forces, particularly the new material infrastructure, that have driven consumption in the last three decades, especially the last one. With increasing integration into global market forces through migration and investment, and cultural imaginations, I show that there is a tectonic change in consciousness about consumption, marked by fantasies, desires, and, contrarily, feelings of excess and ambivalence. I argue that the non-market sector has also played an important role in consumption. There is an increasing generalization of certain ideas about consumption as well as disenchantments across classes. But critically, I contend, there are caste, class, and gender disparities in consumption as well as differences in the meanings attributed to it. Thus, consumption is a socially meaningful, but discrepant, space. This article is based on fieldwork conducted in a town in central Kerala, supplemented with quantitative data.
As the profile of farm animal welfare rises within food production chains, in response both to consumer demand and greater ethical engagement with the lives of animals, animal welfare is increasingly being commodified by various foodchain actors. That is to say that, over and above regulatory or assurance scheme compliance, welfare conditions and criteria are being used as a ‘value-added’ component or distinctive selling point for food products, brands or even particular manufacturers and retailers. We argue in this paper that such a commodification process has major implications both for the way in which farm animal welfare is defined and assessed (with greater emphasis being placed either on those welfare elements that lend themselves to commodification processes or on those that respond to consumer interpretations of what ‘good’ welfare might be at a particular time) and for the ways in which farm animal welfare is articulated and presented to food consumers as a component of product value or quality.
The aim of this study was to assess the welfare of culled dairy cattle sent to an auction in the UK and identify associations between animal-based measurement and economic gain. The population of cull dairy cows sold at a Scottish livestock market were assessed on ten occasions for measures including body condition, mobility, hair loss and lesions, swelling, body cleanliness, claw conformation and total time in pre-sale pens. Details on breed, age, breeding status, farm, weight and price were gathered from market reports and cattle passports. Questionnaires sent to farms gathered information on reason for culling, retirement period (a finishing period to improve body condition), and number of lactations, among other variables. Measures such as bodyweight, breeding status, and breed type influenced price paid, with heifers and larger animals receiving higher prices. A negative effect over price paid was due to reduced mobility and hair loss scores, suggesting that some animal-based indicators of compromised welfare may be associated with a lower economic return from the cows sent to market. No influence of retirement length on price paid was noted. Reason for culling also did not influence price paid, but considering the association found between welfare and price paid, this suggests that the farmers’ reason for culling may not be necessarily revealed by the visual appearance of the cow. This study reveals reasons for culling and quantifies the welfare of dairy cows at market and demonstrates how measures of breeding status and body size, as well as measures of welfare, influence the buyers’ decisions and prices paid at auction.
This part considers how markets and other institutions decoupled society and environment and how to recouple them. Transitions along the way include the Western belief in progress by controlling nature, the reorganization from feudal to market systems, as discussed by Polanyi, and the idea that land can be divided and owned. The challenges and opportunities of collective use, of common-pool resources, were discussed and debated by Gordon, Hardin, and Ostrom. Economics needs to integrate ecology, as Daly emphasized. The implications can be dire, as Sen showed for famines. Catton and Dunlap made a like plea for sociology and the environment, and Bullard showed the environmental justice implications of unfairly sited urban waste and pollution. Lele explored the disconnect between the ideal of sustainable development and its application, arguing for knowing first the complex links between social and natural systems. Norgaard frames development as an evolutionary problem, arguing that knowledge, values, technology, organizations, and the environment coevolve. Diverse experimentation can provide the raw material for selecting more-sustainable paths.
An intense debate has arisen among scholars concerning the financial sustainability of the grain funds that Greek and Roman cities used to cope with the instabilities of the grain market. In this paper, we apply a Monte Carlo simulation to model their financial dynamics. Due to the uncertainties pertaining to the scope of such funds (targeting urban dwellers only or including rural residents), our model takes into account two scenarios: ‘optimistic’ (urban only) and ‘pessimistic’ (both urban and rural). The analysis reaches several important findings: (1) For both scenarios, we witness a considerable rate of funds collapsing in their first 10 years of operation. After 10 years, however, the probability of failure displays very little change, as if there was a threshold over which the funds had accumulated enough capital to withstand shortages. (2) As expected, the survival rates are significantly higher for the optimistic scenario. (3) The withdrawals seem to have the most dramatic impact on the dynamic of the fund. Overall, while the grain funds do not appear to be sustainable in the urban-rural scenario, they show clear signs of sustainability in the urban-only scenario. The results invite reconsideration of the widespread view that grain funds were an inefficient and precarious response to food crisis.
Transform your research into commercial biomedical products with this revised and updated second edition. Covering drugs, devices and diagnostics, this book provides a step-by-step introduction to the process of commercialization, and will allow you to create a realistic business plan to develop your ideas into approved biomedical technologies. This new edition includes: Over 25% new material, including practical tips on startup creation from experienced entrepreneurs. Tools for starting, growing and managing a new venture, including business planning and commercial strategy, pitching investors, and managing operations.Global real-world case studies, including emerging technologies such as regulated medical software and Artificial Intelligence (AI), offer insights into key challenges and help illustrate complex points. Tips and operational tools from established industry insiders, suitable for graduate students and new biomedical entrepreneurs.
Studies of trade are predicated on the antithesis between ‘personalised exchange’ (the Network) and ‘arms-length exchange’ (the anonymous Market). As regards ancient trade, the putative incongruity between the two has informed the view of the supremacy of personalised exchange, and the concomitant absence of market exchange. In historical analyses, furthermore, trade networks are appraised solely for their role in the distribution of raw materials and commodities. This chapter challenges these views. Focusing on a formalised kind of network, the association, it first charts the diffusion of traders’ associations to, and their integration in the economic life of, eastern Mediterranean commercial centres. Then, it investigates the mechanisms that enabled associational networks to act as fighters of trade constraints, distance-shortening entities, bridge builders between state/fiscal concerns and private profit, co-determinants of routes and prices, and as producers of knowledge and trust. Formalised networks, it is concluded, helped trade to break out of its lone-peddler mode and to amalgamate with a wider organisational world, whose newly fashioned business behaviour approximated that of the firm. In all this, this chapter is in alignment with the more recent trend among social scientists to consider networks as integral parts of market models of the economy.
Those favoring greater medical device regulation tout the need to protect patients from the harms of insufficiently tested devices. Those favoring less regulation cite the need to promote innovation and move potentially life-saving devices to market faster. The best innovation creates medical devices that are superior to current alternatives, either because they lead to better patient outcomes or because outcomes are just as good, but the care is cheaper. This is not what the current system promotes. The FDA easily approves devices that are “substantially equivalent” to existing ones and does not require data on relative effectiveness, nor does it always require ongoing study of effectiveness. The tort system does little to force providers to assess relative efficacy. Payors have both the data and reason to care about relative effectiveness. They can refuse to reimburse for procedures that employ ineffective medical devices. Legal change might be required because government payors have little latitude to refuse reimbursement for procedures that use approved medical devices. But payors are best positioned to promote the kind of medical device innovation that is most needed. Manufacturers fearing a collapse in the market for ineffective medical devices will devote more resources to innovating for effective ones.
Metallic coinage, markets, and private merchants appeared in China during the Spring and Autumn era (771–453 bce), and they expanded rapidly during the Warring States era (453–221 bce). These periods were marked not only by rapid economic progress, but also by new conceptualizations of money, markets, and merchants. Both in times of political stability such as the Qin, Han, Sui, and Tang dynasties, and in times of political disunion such as the Warring States, the Three Kingdoms, the Jin, and the Northern and Southern Dynasties eras, money, markets, and merchants performed important economic and social roles. Which kinds of goods, then, served a monetary function from the Warring States to the Tang period? How did people use money, and how and where did they buy and sell commodities? What was the relationship between private merchants and governments? In this chapter, these issues will be examined using transmitted documentary records, archaeological materials, numismatic findings, and recently excavated texts.
After four decades of learning by trial and error, the CCP has achieved total control over every aspect of society, including all resources, firms, and the population. This, along with its objective of “treating the entire nation as a chessboard” has propelled the CCP to run the country as a giant corporation. Living, working, and doing business in China is not a right, but a privilege granted by the party. To a great degree, state-owned firms are business units, state-related firms are subsidiaries, private firms are joint ventures, and foreign firms are franchisees of the party-state, with the party leader being the CEO of China, Inc. China, Inc. enjoys the agility of a business firm and the vast resources and capabilities of a state. The interplay between China and other countries is essentially a rivalry between a huge corporation and other countries. And the competition between a Chinese firm and a foreign firm can become a match between the Chinese state and the latter. This new perspective will help the international community reexamine global competition. It will also aid researchers to further explore this new phenomenon.
This chapter explains how the imperial urban system expanded into south China. After the fall of the Han Dynasty, fighting in the north caused southern migration, particularly after the An Lushan Rebellion in 755. This led to the growth of commercial cities in the Lower Yangzi Delta, which were linked to the northern capitals via the Grand Canal after the reunification of China under the Sui Dynasty. At the same time, Chinese cities were linked to the medieval international world over land along the Silk Road, and over sea via Guangzhou. In northern capitals, which reflected the influence of the Kaogongji, cities continued to be walled and divided into wards. However, in the Lower Yangzi Delta commercial cities were more open plan. Meanwhile, the arrival of Buddhism and Daoism into China brought monasteries and temples into cities, while monks began to take responsibility for aspects of urban governance along with imperial officials. Wards divided cities socially as well as physically. The wealthy enjoyed lavish lifestyles, built palaces and mansions, donated to monasteries, and constructed gardens. Goods and people from outside China made cities more cosmopolitan, and writers reflected on this and other aspects of urban life in their poetry.
Chinese late imperial urban civilization was made up of loose regional economies with a few large cities supported by lots of market towns. The Grand Canal remained its backbone, and China’s most prosperous cities were distributed along its length, and international maritime connections to the early modern global economy saw the growth of the Pearl River Delta. Elsewhere defence was important. Ming Dynasty coastal cities faced threats from pirates. Then as the Qing Dynasty expanded into the northwest, cities in the new province of Xinjiang developed around military garrisons. Walls remained a primary characteristic of Chinese urban form, and they surrounded large commercial and administrative cities, as well as those built for defensive purposes. All cities were now governed by a mixture of state and private interests, including the newly established merchant societies. The Ming and Qing Dynasties saw the flowering of late imperial urban culture. The cities of the Lower Yangzi Delta set the standards of style and taste, but the movement of gentry, merchants, and other urban residents brought this urban culture to the farthest corners of the empire. They produced travel guides, urban histories, prose, and poetry that recorded all aspects of urban life in minute detail.
During the Tang-Song transition, urbanization created regionally distinct hierarchical networks of large and small cities, market towns, and villages, which were closely connected in complex economic, social, and political relationships. The Lower Yangzi Delta was the most urbanized region of China, and remained linked to northern capitals via the Grand Canal. Within Chinese capitals, emperors, aristocrats, and officials remained enclosed within palace and imperial cities. Outside, the ward system broke down, and in many smaller cities there were no walls at all. Now commerce could be found along every street, and it also brought new forms of social organization and governance. Merchants organized different trades into guilds and took their place alongside the state and religious institutions in governing urban life. In capital cities, imperial families continued to assert their symbolic right to rule through participation in now well-established rituals. Elsewhere, people from all social classes were more invested in the urban life of their city, and distinct urban cultures emerged. Local gentry wrote urban histories and guides, bought and sold property, and invested in businesses or religious institutions. They describe lives of urban men and women in levels of detail that do not exist for earlier eras.
This chapter examines the response proposed by the OECD Secretariat to the challenges to the international tax framework posed by the digital economy. The challenges are very different because some, such as the allocation of taxing rights and taxable nexus, are comparatively recent challenges emerging from the enormous success of the digitalisation of the economy. As companies have been able to secure massive business advantages from the network effect, the use of data, the role of users and the ability of business to identify customer needs, so has the need to address taxation on remote sales become more urgent. Pillar One, with its proposal to allocate taxing rights to the market jurisdiction in circumstances where there is no physical presence, is a key part of this response. Other challenges, such as the issues in tax competition and transfer pricing, are more generic and long-standing. These are addressed by Pillar Two using broad-brush remedies against base erosion and profit shifting. They can be seen as a backstop to the more specific actions proposed by the BEPS 15 point Action Plan.
In chapter five, we argue that the economic collapse and famine of the 1990s profoundly transformed North Korea’s political economy. North Korea’s population increasingly turned towards market activities for their survival. North Koreans have continued to rely on markets for food and everyday goods, though marketisation has since expanded to the services, transport and housing sectors. While much of the existing literature has presented state and market as situated in a zero-sum relationship, we challenge the ontological separation between state and market to argue that the rise of the market in North Korea has been closely intertwined with the state. State officials have increasingly become involved in market activities, and the growing entrepreneurial class have entered into partnerships with officials as a means of negotiating the lack of clear property rights. The state has also taken a leading role in furthering the process of marketisation through the creation of new economic sectors, such as the mobile communications sector, for example.
Kevin Gray and Jong-Woon Lee focus on three geopolitical 'moments' that have been crucial to the shaping of the North Korean system: colonialism, the Cold War, and the rise of China, to demonstrate how broader processes of geopolitical contestation have fundamentally shaped the emergence and subsequent development of the North Korean political economy. They argue that placing the nexus between geopolitics and development at the centre of the analysis helps explain the country's rapid catch-up industrialisation, its subsequent secular decline followed by collapse in the 1990s, and why the reform process has been markedly more conservative compared to other state socialist societies. As such, they draw attention to the specificities of North Korea's experience of late development, but also place it in a broader comparative context by understanding the country not solely through the analytical lens of state socialism but also as an instance of post-colonial national development.
Neuroscience has begun to intrude deeply into what it means to be human, an intrusion that offers profound benefits but will demolish our present understanding of privacy. In Privacy in the Age of Neuroscience, David Grant argues that we need to reconceptualize privacy in a manner that will allow us to reap the rewards of neuroscience while still protecting our privacy and, ultimately, our humanity. Grant delves into our relationship with technology, the latest in what he describes as a historical series of 'magnitudes', following Deity, the State and the Market, proposing the idea that, for this new magnitude (Technology), we must control rather than be subjected to it. In this provocative work, Grant unveils a radical account of privacy and an equally radical proposal to create the social infrastructure we need to support it.
Modern literary prizes date from the Nobel Prize in Literature, first awarded in 1901. In France, the Prix Goncourt followed in 1903 and by mid-century numerous others had been established, many of which garner significant public interest to this day. This chapter considers French book prizes, their progressive commercialization heralded by the development of new media in the early twentieth century, and the question of their reliability as indicators of literary quality and durability. It examines the development of the practice as well as the politics of awarding prizes, the relative success of individual publishers, authors and works, and how this feeds into the wider concerns of literary history. The award of prizes is considered against the shifting political currents of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This historical examination evokes well-known names as well as many now largely forgotten.
The introuduction lays out the book’s main concerns, core arguments, historical, theoretical and theatrical scope, and interdisicplinary and materialist approach. It argues that the theatres analysed in the rest of the book, when taken together, deliniate a theatre that is increasingly taking up the mantle of the mixed economy: to combine economic efficiency with social security, while promoting liberal democracy. This has occured during a period when the mixed economy has been in electoral and ideological decline. This introduction also argues that the theatres examined in subsequent chapters play three key roles within their market economies: as enactments of the real economy in economic contexts that have become increasingly dominaed by finance capital and rent-seeking; as spatial fixes to productivity problems arising both within theatre and in the wider political economy; and as localisation machines, as apparatuses that render otherwise intangible of remote political and economic relations concrete and proximate.
Theatre in Market Economies explores the complex relationship between theatre and the market economy since the 1990s. Bringing together research from the arts and social sciences, the book proposes that theatre has increasingly taken up the mission of the 'mixed economy' by seeking to combine economic efficiency with social security while promoting liberal democracy. McKinnie situates this analysis within a wider context, in which the welfare state's tools have been used to regulate, ever more closely, the lives of citizens rather than the operations of markets. In the process, the book invites us to think in new ways about longstanding economic and political problems in and through the theatre: the nature of industry, productivity, citizenship, security and economic confidence. Theatre in Market Economies depicts a theatre that is not only a familiar cultural institution but is, in unexpected and often ambiguous ways, an exemplary political-economic one as well.