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Section K first provides an overview of bilateral treaties between the United States and the Russian Federation/former USSR, with New START being the only agreement remaining in force. The Section then addresses multilateral treaties and arrangements. After a brief assessment of the NPT and related instruments, it provides an in-depth analysis of the TPNW. Finally, the Section addresses UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and specific UN Security Council resolutions concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Iran.
The 1960s and 1970s are often remembered as the age of the Third World guerrilla. But by the mid-1970s, the seemingly unstoppable force of secular Third World liberation, embodied by the Tricontinental Conference, had lost momentum. A new generation of liberation fighters mobilizing sectarian and ethnic identities in local struggles gradually overtook secular left-wing revolutionaries.
Nowhere were these changes more pronounced than the Middle East. During the heyday of the Third World guerrilla, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) captured attention by casting itself as an Arab Viet Cong. Despite spectacular operations against Israel and its Western supporters, the PLO could not achieve lasting gains. By the mid-1970s, Palestinian fighters were pulled into the bloody Lebanese Civil War, which devolved into a conflict between rival sectarian groups. Soon after, the 1979 Revolution in Iran demonstrated that theocratic radicalism had become a significant player on the world stage. By the late 1980s, secular liberation fighters such as the PLO were replaced by the likes of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Mujahideen as the vanguard of revolutionary forces in the Middle East.
Throughout the mid-1980s, the Soviet-American rivalry in the Muslim world had remained a “zero-sum game.” Even after Mikhail Gorbachev embraced perestroika and Ronald Reagan toned down his Cold War rhetoric, the two superpowers continued to butt heads. Then between 1988 and 1991, the “end of history” seemed to arrive and George H. W. Bush trumpeted the emergence of a new world order based on cooperation, not confrontation, between capitalist America and communist Russia, even in volatile places like the Persian Gulf. By the early 1990s, however, American and Russian policymakers recognized that the Cold War was more likely to be followed by ethnic and religious conflict than by global peace and prosperity. In late 1991, Gorbachev lost his battle to reform the Soviet Union. Muslims in Chechnya and other non-Russian minorities sought independence. Elsewhere, the multiethnic regime in Yugoslavia disintegrated, with Christian Serbs slaughtering Bosnian Muslims; Islamists won elections in Algeria' and Islamic radicals toppled the pro-Soviet junta in Afghanistan. By January 1993, both Bush and Gorbachev were gone and all the hope for a new world order had been replaced by the fear that the post-Cold War Muslim world was becoming the epicenter of a “clash of civilizations.”
This chapter tells the largely untold story of the political economy of international drug regulation in the 1950s. It will tell the story of producer country efforts, led by Turkey, Iran and India, to agree an international quota system for opium and thus to divide up the licit global market. It examines the simultaneous efforts to suppress the global illicit market and minimise the numbers of producers to a small select few who would enjoy an enforced oligopoly. It highlights the quiet diplomatic pressure placed on countries viewed as epicentres of the global trade and a conscious ignorance of strategically important states – for example the US State Department refusing to criticise French Indochina and Mexico. Further, it tells the story of Harry Anslinger’s efforts to incorrectly portray Communist China as the world’s leading narcostate. It concludes with a look at the breakdown of multilateralism over the 1953 Opium Protocol, a treaty which few accepted but was rammed through by the US and some select allies. It was this Protocol which ultimately galvanised moderates and producer states around the need for a Single Convention to roll back the excesses of the 1953 Protocol.
This chapter outlines the early development of UN CND and how it progressed towards its first new international treaty in 1948. Emerging from the tense post-war negotiations the key uncertainties for CND were: how it would operate in practice; how it would fit into broader UN and geopolitical streams; and whether it would function as a talking-shop or, as per the US vision, a tool to enforce regulations and publicly bludgeon member states as needed. The first three meetings of CND in 1946– 1948 would be pivotal. The first two served to sound out the political context within which CND would operate and how the structures would function in practice. Following this, a major political push occurred around the Third Session, first concluding a new Protocol and then spring boarding into discussions on a new production limitation convention and even advocating a new ‘single convention’ to unify all previous drug treaties.
At the outbreak of War in 1939 the drug control system stood as a mixture of contradictions and uncertainty. On the one side were the strict control advocates, led by the United States. On the other side were producing states, agrarian countries whose economic, cultural and political systems were entwined with the very drugs the system sought to limit. In the middle were the old colonial powers, recognised the role opium played within many their colonies. The outbreak of war would fundamentally reshape international drug control. Moreover, it was driven by US-led bilateral efforts, utilising its wartime leverage, while other states were confined to rear-guard defensive actions. The reshaping of control during wartime was in many ways the result of aggressive wartime diplomatic manoeuvring by Harry Anslinger and key members of the Washington drug control lobby. The most radical wartime departure occurred in 1943 when Britain and Holland promised to adopt a policy of total prohibition of opium smoking and monopolies in many of their colonial territories. This shift, enabled Anslinger to bring new pressure to bear on the traditionally recalcitrant states such as Iran and Afghanistan to impose stricter controls and prohibitions.
This chapter examines the creation of the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. It was also a period when transatlantic relations reached a new low in drug diplomacy. Minor cooperation in the aftermath of the 1953 Opium Conference gave way to divisions leading to an eventual rupture over the Single Convention, particularly between Britain and the US. This breakdown was ultimately was the result of failures of US leadership as well as deep divisions over policy and economic interests. The US found itself increasingly alone in negotiations. State Department leadership sought a more conciliatory approach towards producers like Iran and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, with Anslinger increasingly absent and with a lack of institutional knowledge within the State Department US delegations struggled to develop a US grand strategy. Britain, continuing to carve out a role of quiet, consensual and self-interested drug diplomacy, found the new environment conducive and became increasingly assertive. London pragmatically worked with shifting coalitions, while building a moderate bloc of manufacturing states in Europe to help protect British domestic interests via the Single Convention. The result was a consensus-based treaty and one largely rejected by the US, which tried and failed to torpedo the treaty.
This chapter examines regional efforts to secure drug markets and re-regulate industries. As peace arrived, and the creation of a UN drug control system looked certain, questions of national and regional controls loomed large. First was the question of re-establishing regulatory frameworks in post-war Europe. Germany was key given its historical centrality to licit manufacturing as well as its geopolitical lynchpin status. However, it was unclear whether the Allies could bridge widening geopolitical fault lines to re-establish drug control. In the case of Japan the US had a potential prohibitionist and regulatory beacon for the rest of Asia. With the strong support of the General Douglas MacArthur Administration US goals would be far easier to achieve. Next was the re-resettling of political frontiers of international drug policy reform. Momentum towards a production limitation convention had stalled prior to the war. The future role of China, the world’s largest opium producer, was rendered insoluble by its internal collapse. The US initially focused on creating a tripartite Turkish-Yugoslav-Iranian producer agreement. Further, the question of ‘quasi-medical’ opium use in British and other European colonies remained a transatlantic dividing line. If Britain could continue a non-smoking form of opiate consumption in Malaya, Hong Kong, Borneo and Burma it would provide an alternative to the US model of outright prohibition.
This article examines the development of a Marxian frame for the critique of religion in twentieth century Iranian political thought by Taqi Erāni and Bizhan Jazani. It argues that, following Marx, Erāni and Jazani understand religion to be a superstructural relic from an earlier stage of human development which will gradually and inevitably withdraw from collective human life as a consequence of the material dialectics of history. It further shows that Erāni and Jazani consider religion to be instrumental in sustaining relations of oppression, and they view with skepticism attempts to reform religion or to use religious faith as an instrument for mass mobilization in revolutionary struggles.
'Poetic speech is a pearl, connected to the king's ear.' This statement gestures to words as objects of material value sought by those with power and resources. I provide a sense for the texture of the Persian world by discussing what made poetry precious. By focusing on reports on poets' lives, I illuminate the social scene in which poetry was produced and consumed. The discussion elicits poetry's close connections to political and religious authority, economic exchange, and the articulation of gender. At the broadest level, the study substantiates the interdependency between cultural and material reproduction of society.
Chapter 9 takes a closer look at one of the book’s overarching themes, the relationship between faith and firepower. In the existing literature and the news media alike, much weight is given to the rhetoric Iranian leaders used during (and since) the Iran-Iraq War and the importance of faith and revolutionary fervor in understanding the Islamic Republic and its prosecution of the conflict. As this chapter demonstrates, the IRGC sources and Iran’s actions reveal a different story. By taking those as the basis of analysis, here the book illustrates that Iranian leaders prosecuted the war by relying on all the tools at their disposal, which included both faith—religious commitment, revolutionary ideology, and popular morale—and firepower—military professionalism, strategy, and weapons. In the second half of the chapter the theme of faith and firepower is utilized in another way, to examine how the Guards conceptualized the war in relation to Islam and the Iranian Revolution, and to demonstrate that they did so in order to expound the significance of the conflict.
Chapter 2 traces the development of the IRGC’s efforts to document the Iran-Iraq War, including the people, activities, and publications that make up that enterprise. It focuses on the project’s origins and foundations, the work undertaken to record the history of the war as the conflict was ongoing, the methodology and approach applied to those efforts, and the publications that have resulted therefrom and on which the present book is based. In doing so, it demonstrates that the development of the IRGC’s documentation of the war mirrors the evolution of both the Iran-Iraq War and the IRGC as a whole, which highlights how the project emblematizes the organization and the war’s centrality to its legitimacy and identity. It argues, in other words, that in order to understand the IRGC, we must understand its members not just as Guards but also as historians.
Chapter 3 begins the analysis of the IRGC’s history of the Iran-Iraq War. It examines how the IRGC authors explain the war’s outbreak and the lead-up to the Iraqi invasion. Like other historians of the conflict within and outside Iran, the IRGC authors strive to tease out the variety of causes that led to the war and, in particular, to understand the role of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution in the war’s onset. These connections between the war and the revolution constitute both a prime concern for the Revolutionary Guards and a main theme of the present book. According to the Guards, the success of the revolution was the most important catalyst for the Iraqi invasion. Further, Iraq made the strategic decision to strike while the revolution was still hot—to attack the Islamic Republic in the midst of its revolutionary transition, when the new regime’s power was tenuous and its readiness for war diminished.
The Introduction begins with a look at how the contested legacies of the Iran-Iraq War have permeated the debate concerning Iran’s relations with the United States, which draws the reader into the story by demonstrating that the IRGC’s efforts to construct the history of the war represent an important front in the struggle for Iran’s future. After setting out the book’s main subjects and arguments, the first chapter then provides a brief overview of the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and the IRGC. The following section discusses the existing literature on those topics, the book’s contributions thereto, and the approach to the subject and methodology. The Introduction concludes with a narrative outline of the rest of the book.
Chapter 5 presents the story of how Iran finally turned the tide, of how the revolution progressed to the point that it could help instead of hinder the war effort. What the IRGC authors term “the epic of Khorramshahr”—Iran’s retaking of that city after months of Iraqi occupation—marked the culmination of the reversal. For the Guards, the liberation of Khorramshahr represents a case in which faith could be used effectively against firepower. Though the Iraqi forces retained their advantage in firepower, the Iranians’ faithful determination gave them the ultimate edge in their fight to retake the city. The liberation of Khorramshahr signified a turning point both in the war and for the Revolutionary Guards. The campaign marked the IRGC’s most substantial participation in the war to that point and initiated its transformation into the powerful and professional military that experience has allowed it to become.
Chapter 1 introduces the book’s main protagonists, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or Sepah, Corps. It examines the Sepah’s emergence, formal establishment, mission and duties, early institutionalization, and role in fighting counter-revolutionary and ethnic separatist groups. It traces how the Sepah formed from groups brought together by the shared goal of protecting what they saw as the revolution’s most important principles. It emerged in the days after Ayatollah Khomeini’s return to Iran on February 1, 1979 and in the midst of the Islamic Revolution’s turbulent and precarious transitory phase, which was characterized by political and violent struggles over the nature of the new regime. A particularly contentious issue, and one especially critical in the Sepah’s formation, was the fate of the Artesh, Iran’s regular military, and the nature of military power in the new regime.
Chapter 12 ties together the book’s central themes and highlights its main contributions. It argues that the Revolutionary Guards have endeavored to write the history of the Iran-Iraq War because of the way the Guards view the importance and meaning of the conflict in Iran today, the way they understand the nature and dynamism of history, and their commitment to what they view as the historical imperative of keeping the war alive.
Chapter 7 examines the numerous difficulties Iran faced following the invasion of Iraq. In its last six years, the Iran-Iraq War became more and more difficult for the Islamic Republic to prosecute, forcing Iranian political and military leaders to come up with ways to keep the war going. The liberation of Khorramshahr had greatly bolstered morale and popular support and had generated enough initiative to drive the war into Iraq. But that initiative began to run dry after the invasion, as successive Iranian operations failed to produce the desired results – a decisive victory that would force the acceptance of Iran’s ceasefire terms and ensure the security of the country. In addition to these military challenges, in the later stages of the conflict Iran was forced to confront the war’s pluralization as the parties to and the scope of the conflict expanded.
Chapter 8 completes the chronological analysis of the IRGC’s history of the Iran-Iraq War by examining how the Revolutionary Guards assess the conflict’s conclusion. As the indelible declaration from Supreme Leader Khomeini made clear, deciding to end the war was agonizing for Iran, akin to drinking from a poisoned chalice. The assessment of the IRGC sources presented in this chapter reveals why that was so and why the decision was finally made. Understanding the disquiet that surrounds Iran’s acceptance of the ceasefire also reveals the IRGC’s view of the conflict as unfinished, a view that represents one of the ways the Iran-Iraq War continues to have a profound impact on the Islamic Republic.
Chapter 10 examines some of the most important ways the Iran-Iraq War and its history impact the IRGC and the Islamic Republic today. These include efforts to derive political and strategic lessons from the conflict and how Iran’s experience in the war gave rise to a security doctrine that seeks above all to establish effective deterrence and ensure Iran’s independence, in part by integrating Iran into the wider region and utilizing asymmetric and soft power. Running through these and many other aspects of the war’s ongoing significance is the conception that the conflict has not ended, and therefore that the Holy Defense continues. Additionally, the chapter puts the IRGC’s published histories in the broader context of the IRGC, of Iran’s ruling establishment, and of how the war’s legacies and lessons shape Iranian policy.