The focus on supply shocks may have obscured the importance of such other factors as institutions, ideas, culture, leaders, and human agency. Certainly these can lead to bad outcomes – bad leaders usually produce bad outcomes – but with rare exceptions they matter only at the margins. Elites will use established institutions to maintain their position against an adverse shock, but those institutions will yield to a big enough shock. Institutions, then, are endogenous, as are leaders (bad ones are overthrown or defeated) and human agency (although crowds, especially acting through markets, are usually wiser than individuals). The salient exceptions are culture and systemic ideas. We have convincing examples of how initially adaptive cultural traits – e.g., of male supremacy or interpersonal distrust – can persist over generations and affect how societies respond to shocks. And systemic ideas about how the world works can prescribe bad or good ways of responding to a crisis such as the Great Depression. Institutions, ideas, culture, leaders, or human agency clearly matter, but supply shocks almost always matter more.

How did the new kind of deterritorialized, dematerialized, and individualized warfare ‒ extensive in both time and space ‒ become durable? To what extent can it be considered as part of the normal functioning of the states that use drones? This chapter finds that the development of the use of drones in the US, in comparison with the use of France in the UK and France, is best described as one of institutionalization. The institutionalization of drone programs is defined as the process whereby drone practices become stable and durable activities embedded in the normative fabric of the state. This process derives from a combination of factors, from the formation of a bureaucracy – narrowly defined as the structured, harmonized, and depersonalized interaction of agents – to the formulation of legitimizing legal rationales, and the stabilizing force of the technology itself. The US drone program was stabilized through the creation of structures and bureaucratic interactions, a highly legalistic mode of justification, and narratives about drones being tailor-made to fight a transnational and polymorphous enemy.

Technological solutions to sudden factor shortages are difficult and costly, hence unlikely to be sought if such easier solutions as factor substitution or factor mobility are available. When the demand does arise, a technological innovation is likelier: (a) the more intense the demand; (b) the less daunting the leap from existing technologies; and (c) the larger the pool of potential innovators. The size of that pool is restricted by language barriers but expanded by vehicles that transmit new ideas. Governments can do little to stimulate creation of a new technology but can adopt or reject the institutional changes that the new technology requires. Military technology is often seen as causative of political change, but the supporting evidence is weak. New techniques of warfare more often arise in response to changed availability of factors. A positive supply shock renders all other factors newly scarce. Thus the “China shock” of increased availability of low-skill labor has created incentives in advanced economies to develop technologies that economize on scarce human and physical capital.

Chapter 18 opens by asking readers to list places in their communities where people go to learn new things. The chapter describes types of places that support public engagement, offers resources for finding specific places or events, and addresses practical considerations. Zoos, libraries, and different types of museums, as well as event-based opportunities such as different types of festivals, are addressed. Suggestions are also given for using one’s own institution. For example, many universities host programs for school-aged children or participate in local events such as cultural celebrations. Practical considerations related to such places and events include timing (once or recurring); registration, rules, and fees; specific space and resources (booth, table, electricity, internet access); audience typical at the venue; and individual and team logistics. The chapter includes resource lists related to these various suggestions. Its Closing Worksheet asks readers to find three places or events where they might take the demonstrations they have developed and to note about each one specifics such as dates and contacts, as well as some of their demonstration’s logistical needs.

Latin America and the Caribbean is the most violent region on earth. However, implementation of evidence-based policing (EBP) lags due to institutional, cultural, political, and skills barriers. This chapter analyzes the context in which EBP is implemented and the challenges encountered and identifies actions to further promote EBP in the region. Challenges to adopt EBP include those present in advanced countries such as the need to institutionalize EBP and to build academic-practitioner partnerships, and also some challenges more prominent in the region including lack of reliable data, instability of political institutions and lack of trust in the police

This opening chapter outlines the book’s central argument, evidence, and political economy approach. The book argues Muslim societies tend to be less democratic and more conflict prone on average. However, there is considerable variation within the Muslim world depending on how Islam was spread. Territories where Islam spread via military conquest developed institutions and practices that led to political regimes that made them more impervious to democracy and, in response to declines in rents, more prone to civil war. In contrast, societies in non-conquered territories – including some Muslim societies, such as Indonesia and Malaysia – developed governance structures that made them more susceptible to political (democratic) development; and where declines in rents provided opportunities for transitions to democracy. A central takeaway from this book is that neither Islam nor aspects of Muslim culture are the root causes of political violence in many contemporary Muslim societies. Rather, it is due to the institutional legacy of Muslim conquest and contemporary rent streams. By linking these two independent variables – conquest and rents – to patterns of political violence, the theory and empirics advanced contributes to rich literatures in institutional economics, historical legacies, international relations, and the resource curse.

Chapter 3 summarizes existing theories of election-related violence and introduces a theory of violence as a result of elite misperception. Existing theories rely upon the assumption that politicians choice of violence as an electoral tactic is based on an accurate assessment its relative costs and benefits. The theory of elite misperception, on the other hand, builds on two insights: (1) that voter backlash against violence is substantial and can cost politicians votes and (2) politicians frequently misjudge voter preferences – including with respect to violence – which can lead them to overestimate its benefits as an electoral tactic. The theory points to the difficulties politicians face in accurately assessing the impact of electoral tactics, as well as to the prevalence of cognitive biases that can cause them to misinterpret what information they have. It also highlights the importance of founding elections in determining which electoral tactics – violence included – are considered effective and worthy of emulation. With these insights in mind, the theory explains the incidence and persistence of election-related violence as a result of politicians misperceptions about voter preferences and the effects of violence on voting rather than the objective electoral benefits that violence provides.

This chapter is concerned about the role of elites in autocratic regimes. It focuses mainly on business and military elites and asks how autocracies can bind these actors to their inner sanctum. It reviews previous decades of research, highlighting the recent institutionalist turn in comparative authoritarianism, but also traces back debates about neo-patrimonialism, clientelism, patronage, and corruption. The chapter introduces the conceptual distinction between co-optation in formalized arenas like political parties and parliaments as well as in the shadowland of informality. It argues that intra-elite cohesion can be secured via reactive and preventive measures as well as by absorbing new members (widening) or by interweaving interests and instilling a feeling of reciprocity (deepening) among the elite members. The chapter ends by explicating concrete operationalization advice for empirical research.

There is a connection between the habits of thinking in science, economics and diplomacy that are hindering our response to climate change. Western science since the Enlightenment has built its success on reductionism. This has left us less good than we need to be at thinking holistically, and at understanding the potential for systemic change in our environment, economy, and international relations. New ways of thinking can take generations to spread through society and displace their predecessors. In our present crisis, we must accelerate this process deliberately – we cannot afford to wait.

People often assume that to give ourselves a fighting chance of avoiding catastrophic climate change, we need either inspired political leadership, or a moral revolution in society. Both would be nice to have, but there are more plausible ways to make faster progress. They involve thinking differently. We need science that gives us risk assessment instead of prediction; economics that understands change instead of assuming stability; and diplomacy that focusses on international collaboration instead of unilateral national action.

Chapter 6 reviews urban institutions and their role as top-down forces shaping life in early cities. The chapter focuses on social class and wealth inequality, the royal palace, and the relationship between people and urban government.

The book concludes by drawing out the implications of the overarching theory and findings for the future of democracy. The chapter argues that laissez-faire extremism and genuine democracy cannot coexist indefinitely. The lack of security and stability of the former will continually generate cultural and democratic discontent, intensifying social conflict and creating ideal conditions for charismatic leaders to emerge. We discuss various alternatives to neoliberalism, including the internationalization of tax and social welfare policy and economic democratization. This leads to our second argument: that democracy can best save itself by making itself worth saving. Democracies should answer the challenges of populism and other forms of discontent by ignoring calls for greater democratic elitism (which would only validate discontented narratives). Instead, democratic institutions and actors, especially political parties, should reform and recommit themselves to their role as channels for citizens’ voices.

On 29 March 2008, Zimbabwe’s ninth poll took place. Zanu PF felt insecure being in power, legitimised by only 47 and 19.5 per cent in the 2005 parliamentary and senate election, respectively. Following changes to the Constitution of Zimbabwe in September 2007, the electorate was asked to vote for a set of four political representatives for: president, parliament, senate and local government council. The 2008 socio-economic contexts showed that the electoral playing field and election processes and outcomes echoed excesses of previous flawed elections. The 29 March and 27 June 2008 elections were critical watershed moments in that while the March elections were the most peaceful (and even enjoyable) since the genesis of Zimbabwe’s mega-crisis in 2000, the June run-off will go down in history as the bloodiest since independence. The pre-poll arena for the harmonised elections had hallmarks of a rigged election, especially the use of state-financed patronage, poor voter education, the decrepit state of the voters’ roll and the violent pronouncements by members of the military-security sector, all of which skewed the playing field in favour of the incumbent regime.