Giving people a great deal of freedom over how they live their lives, in and of itself, lends much scope for the egoistically inclined to act upon their instincts and to seek advantage at the expense of others. One way in which they might do this is by using the findings of behavioural science in order to manipulate others in an exchange relationship. In such circumstances, harms – or negative externalities – will be imposed upon the manipulated. I argue in this chapter that where people or organisations use the behavioural influences to further their aims, or indeed where the behavioural influences cause others to forgo what could be easily won benefits, there exists an intellectual justification for behavioural-informed regulation – or, in other words, for budge interventions. In this chapter, I further discuss some of the relevant trade-offs that must be considered when deciding whether or not to regulate, and outline the parameters of the budge framework with a few illustrative examples.

This book is the third of a trilogy of books that I wrote on the past, present and my preferred conception of the future of the field of behavioural public policy. The first book was titled ’The Origins of Behavioural Public Policy’, and the second ’Reciprocity and the Art of Behavioural Public Policy’. This Introduction summarises the content of those two books to remind the reader where I have got to in the trilogy, and then briefly details some of the main arguments in the current book, to signpost to the reader where I am about to go.

This chapter concludes the book. In it, I summarise the principal arguments I made in all of the other chapters, before offering some final words as food for thought. Ultimately, I conclude that there are two arms to my political economy of behavioural public policy. The first arm is for policy makers to allow people a great deal of individual autonomy, while at the same time shaping the general institutional environment so as to nurture people’s almost intrinsic desire to cooperate and reciprocate with others. The second arm recognises that some people will act on their selfish, egoistic inclinitations when afforded a great deal of freedom, and thus in those circumstances where people implicitly or explicitly use the behavioural influences to serve themselves and to harm others, the policy maker has an intellectual justification to intervene in their actions and behaviours.

Vulnerability is widely accepted as a relevant concept in human research regulation. Reflecting this, influential international research ethics guidelines require identification of, and protections for, participants who are deemed vulnerable. Nonetheless, vulnerability is challenging to conceptualise and define, with ongoing disputes about the nature and extent of moral obligations to the vulnerable. This chapter maps the history of vulnerability in human research ethics guidelines and explores current debates regarding the role of vulnerability in guiding ethical deliberations about research participation.

Between December 2009 and March 2010, members of xenophobic groups attacked Kyoto Korean Daiichi Elementary School, organizing a series of three discriminatory rallies. When the school and the parents sought to fight back in the criminal and civil courts, they were met with obstacles: the undefined nature of hate speech, the legal system’s incapacity to deal with hate crime, and the Japanese majority’s lack of understanding of ethnic education, rooted in Zainichi Korean resistance against colonialism and assimilation. Charged under existing laws, four attackers were convicted in criminal court. The school’s persistence also paid off in victory in the civil courts. Inevitably, discussion of anti-discrimination legislation ensued, resulting in the Hate Speech Elimination Act of 2016 (the first anti-racism Act in Japan) and Kawasaki City’s anti-hate speech ordinance of 2019 (the first to stipulate criminal penalties). Nevertheless, many issues remain. This chapter reports the pain suffered by those subjected to the discriminatory attacks. It also discusses what it means for minorities to fight a legal fight and what issues persist even after victory.

Chapter 7 explores other reforms implemented, ostensibly in response to the crisis, suggesting that the federal government’s efforts to protect homeowners were well intentioned but ineffective for millions of borrowers. The post-crisis reforms aimed ostensibly at relieving hardship for home borrowers created a new set of incentives for lenders and brokers to exploit mortgage holders. Ultimately, consumer mortgage borrowers paid dearly - financially, socially, emotionally, and physically for the decision by legislators to bail out banks and other financial institutions rather than direct some of those substantial resources to millions of borrowers whose homes were lost. Regulators allowed the programs to be administered by the very predatory lenders that had created the problems. The statute that was ultimately enacted did not assist families in saving their homes. It encouraged, but did not require, lenders to modify loan terms, and did not require them to reduce any principal owing.

This chapter reviews the predominant normative direction in the relatively new field of behavioural public policy - i.e. that we ought to be aiming to improve internalities so as to increase utility. The chapter critiques this approach, and highlights where reciprocity sits in a suggested alternative political economy of behavioural public policy. It is postulated that conditions be created to nurture reciprocal behaviours, to help people to flourish in both meeting the already predetermined broadly defined objectives of public sector services and in relation to their meeting their privately held goals, where they may find fulfilment in any way they wish. In any way they wish, that is, so long as they are not imposing harms on others. The second arm of the proposed framework is that any harms that are consequent on behaviourally informed actions are potentially fair game for regulatory control. So, in short, it is proposed that the political economy of behavioural public policy be focused upon promoting flourishing and curtailing harms.

This final chapter summarises the arguments and evidence presented in the previous nine chapters - it is thus, in the main, a collection of short summaries of those chapters. The chapter finishes off by contending that the notion that we ought to, and often do, reciprocate is one that most people can accept. It is acknowledged once again that there are many possible dark sides to reciprocity, but that it more often than not serves the better angels of our nature, and in the process generates significant group and, by extension, individual benefits. Consequently, it is advised that policies, institutions, organisations and sectors should be designed to encourage and sustain this most fundamental motivator of human behaviour.

This chapter reviews some of the many possible harmful consequences of reciprocal actions. For example, people acting reciprocally for mutual interest can sometimes impose harms on third parties. Moreover, strengthening reciprocity and cooperation within a group may intensify their animosity towards outsiders, a possibility that is associated with nationalism, fundamentalism and many other harmful 'isms'. Indeed, there is even the potential for mutually reinforcing cliques to treat others who are ostensibly within the same broader group as outsiders, which may damage the collective. Reciprocal motivations can also be used as an attempt to obligate people against their wishes, which is particularly obnoxious when there are differential power relationships between those involved, and potentially undermines the very notion of a fair exchange. Furthermore, in relation to negative reciprocity, injustice may be felt if it is believed that the punishment is arbitrary or excessive, which can lead to spiralling retaliation and retribution, a spiral that is often very difficult to break.