Article 32(3) of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) establishes the Equal Opportunities Commission; section 14 of the Equal Opportunities Commission Act provides for the functions of the Commission. These include ensuring that the laws, policies and customs of both public and private entities are not discriminatory and do not marginalize any person or deny him / her equal opportunities. The Commission has handled a few complaints dealing with discrimination, affirmative action, marginalization and impairment of equal opportunities. I rely on the drafting history of the Act, among other sources, to argue, inter alia, that the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination under the Act is exhaustive and that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to deal with complaints alleging discrimination on some grounds. I demonstrate that the Commission has been inconsistent in its definition of discrimination and in dealing with remedies where it has found instances of discrimination, marginalization or denial of opportunities. In some cases, the Commission has blurred the distinction between discrimination and marginalization.

Despite more than half a century of reform efforts, access to civil justice is still understood to be in a state of crisis. Part of the reason for this is because there is no consensus among the legal community on the meaning of justice in this context. This paper seeks to provide a much-needed theoretical underpinning to the access-to-civil-justice movement. It advances ‘justice as fairness,’ as articulated by the American philosopher John Rawls, in conjunction with Lesley Jacobs’ model of equal opportunities, as a suitable theory in which to frame the access-to-civil-justice movement. I explain why this framework is appropriate for pluralistic democracies like Canada and how it can be used to define measures of justice. This exercise is thus not simply a theoretical discussion, but rather is intended to be used as a practical framework to assess current and proposed policy initiatives.

The purpose of this article is to draw on Le Grand's (2007) model of service provision of ends and means (trust, targets, voice and choice) to critique the accepted frameworks for conceptualising the chronology of equal opportunities and diversity (EO&D) in the UK. We do this by reviewing the attempts to provide a chronological analysis before outlining and applying Le Grand's (2007) model. We find that the ‘eras’ of the chronologies give way to a much more complex and fluid picture. Moreover, focusing on ends and means highlights some major issues in the development of EO&D policy that needs to be addressed.