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This chapter canvasses coalitions for and against pluralism that emerged with the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. It shows that while the early nation-builders pursued a unitary, ethno-nationalist project, Kemalism also entailed an “embedded liberalism” inherited from late Ottoman modernization, including resources for eventual democratization. Throughout the twentieth century, political actors sought to mobilize these resources toward pluralizing the political system across a series of critical junctures (e.g., the 1920s’ cultural revolution; the 1950 transition to multiparty democracy; successive coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980; and a 1997 “postmodern coup.”) Across these junctures, the chapter argues, there were only two pronounced periods of secularist/Islamist cleavages. More often, conflict was driven by significant, cross-camp cooperation and intra-camp rivalry. Tracing when and why pluralizing and anti-pluralist alignments succeeded or failed, the chapter captures a key dynamic: the installation of an ethno(-religious nationalist project – the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS) – as national project, even as ideas and actors invested in pluralization continued to mobilize.
This chapter traces how, in an increasingly unstable domestic and regional context, the ruling coalition of religion and secular nationalists promoted a “Turkish-Islamist Synthesis 2.0” (TIS 2.0). This agenda infused the anti-pluralist, Turkish-Islamic synthesis of the 1980s with an attempt to Islamicize public life. Such efforts culminated in a major critical juncture: abandonment of Turkey’s 150-year-old parliamentary tradition for an executive presidency.
This chapter launches the contemporary section of the book. The overarching argument is that despite the binaries leveraged by leaders and analysts alike, political contestation in the twenty-first century, as in the nineteenth and twentieth, is not reducible to an “Islamist vs. secularist” cleavage. Instead, contestation and key outcomes are driven by shifting coalitions for and against pluralism, notably, an Islamo-liberal/secular liberal coalition that marked the sixth major, pluralizing alignment since the Tanzimat reforms. It would transform state and society, even though the coalition itself proved short-lived as democratization stalled against a backdrop of debates over Islamophobia, the headscarf, minority rights, freedom of expression, media freedoms, and sweeping show trials.
The burgeoning literature in comparative constitutional has not devoted sufficient attention to the constitutional functions of political parties, nor has it systematically explored the constitutional law of electoral design. This volume examines the constitutional treatment of parties and elections both as a matter of constitutional theory and from the perspective of historical and contemporary practice. To this end, it draws together a series of contributions from a diverse range of scholars working in distinct disciplines. Political scientists tend to treat political parties as their key object of study, while comparative constitutional lawyers have largely ignored them, preferring to focus on other institutional question. What follows brings each perspective into conversation with the other.
Recent decades have seen a sharp rise in constitutional provisions regulating core aspects of democracy, including the rules about parties, voting, and elections. The trend is apparent in both democracies and nondemocracies, although democracies tend to constitutionalize slightly more matters. Constitutionalization can help democracy by tying the hands of politicians. Looking at cross-national data, we find that constitutionalizing democracy is correlated with higher levels of democracy. Constitutionalization of democracy carries advantages as well as risks. We illustrate the dynamics with short case studies of Kenya and Thailand.
The cost of administering elections is an importantly understudied area in election science. This book reports election costs in 48 out of 50 states. It discusses the challenges and opportunities of collecting local election costs. The book then presents the wide variation in cost across the country with the lowest spending states spending a little over $2 per voter and the highest spending almost $20 per voter. The amounts being spent in the state are also examined over the election time period of 2008 – 2016. Economic events like the Great Recession had predictable effects on lowering spending on elections but the patterns are not the same across the different regions of the country. The relationship between spending and election administration outcomes is also explored and finds that the voters' confidence and perceptions of fraud in elections is associated with the amount spent on election administration.
This article uses an original dataset to sketch a portrait of women mayoral candidates and women elected as mayors in Italy in the period 1993–2021. The analysis highlights several significant findings. Women must compensate for their political marginality by deploying other resources, such as higher levels of education. Nevertheless, women are penalised not only by the reluctance of parties to put them forward as candidates, but also by the elections themselves. More specifically, the electoral presence and strength of women decreases when the population size of the municipality grows, except for municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Moreover, women candidates are most disadvantaged in geographical areas where the socioeconomic condition of women is more marginal. However, women mayors running for a second mandate have the same chance of winning as men. Finally, it is the protest parties, rather than the left-wing parties, that are revealed as doing the most to promote women.
In June 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Dobbs ruling overturned Roe v. Wade, reversing the nearly 50-year-old landmark decision that affirmed a woman’s constitutional right to abortion. Several months later, voters turned out in record numbers for the 2022 midterms, though a widely predicted “Red Wave” vote did not materialize. There has since been speculation that overturning Roe v. Wade played a crucial role in the midterms, generating a “Blue Tsunami” or “Roevember” driven largely by young, pro-choice women voting out of self-interest. We posit instead that group empathy was the key motivational mechanism in the link between opposition to Dobbs and voter mobilization in that election. Analyzing data from an original national survey, we find that opposition to overturning Roe v. Wade did not directly affect one’s likelihood to vote unless one is empathic toward groups in distress. Such opposition was actually demobilizing for those low in empathy. The findings indicate group empathy serves as a catalyst for people to act on their opposition to policies that harm disadvantaged groups, in this case women as a marginalized political minority losing their constitutional right to bodily autonomy and access to reproductive care.
Since Barack Obama's historic and unprecedented field operations in 2008 and 2012, campaigns have centralized their voter contact operations within field offices: storefronts rented in strategically chosen communities. That model was upended in 2020: Joe Biden won the election without any offices (due to COVID-19), while Donald Trump's campaign opened over 300. Using two decades of data on office locations and interviews with campaign staffers, we show how the strategic placement and electoral impact of local field offices changed over the past twenty years, including differences in partisan strategy and effectiveness. We find that offices are somewhat more effective for Democrats than Republicans, but Democratic field operations are declining while Republicans' are increasing. We conclude by assessing whether future campaigns will invest in offices again – or if the rebirth of storefront campaigning is over and the future of political campaigning is purely digital.
We investigate voter preferences for changes in voting rules, focusing specifically on the creation of citizen-initiative processes that were originally adopted in South Dakota in 1898 and eventually enacted by half of the states. Various claims have been advanced about why the process was adopted and who supported or opposed it, but without presenting evidence from referenda where voters approved the creation of the process. We test these claims by examining county-level election returns from South Dakota’s 1898 referendum that created the first statewide initiative process in the United States. We find that support for the initiative process was generally higher among groups that are disadvantaged in various ways by existing representative institutions and perceive advantages in creating direct democratic institutions capable of bypassing representative processes. These findings stand in contrast to the notion that the adoption of constitutional rules will be relatively free from calculations rooted in self-interest and perceived advantage from the rules changes.
This concluding chapter looks back at the main findings that emerged from this research and shows how they explain the transformation of long-distance Tunisian politics in the aftermath of the 2011 Revolution. It asks how the anti- and pro-regime struggles evolved following the demise of the central purpose of these struggles and the movements they inspired, and looks at the ways in which boundaries were redefined through different fields of action and the growth of new divisions. The emergence of new actors, the political reconversion of those who had shifted to Tunisian-centred politics, new rules of the game and the various possibilities of return to Tunisia each played a role in redefining the modalities of long-distance Tunisian politics. However, decades of activism had regulated the practice of activists from afar and reinforced the informal rules of the trans-state space of mobilisation. The 2011 Revolution simultaneously represented a decisive rupture and a continuity, reshaping and continuing to reshape the dynamics of the trans-state space of mobilisation.
Modern democracies, including the United States, rely upon three normative elements: (1) rights expressing the dignity of the citizen; (2) law expressing a commitment to public reason; (3) elections as the method of selecting representatives. In each dimension, citizens are to see a representation of themselves as popular sovereign. Morality and law are not matters to be resolved at the polls. Yet, popular opinion, supported by contemporary social sciences, tends to reduce democracy to the third element. On this view, the higher the voter turnout, the better the democracy. In an age in which we worry as much about majority, as minority, tyranny, this view is not credible. A mob at the polls is still a mob even if it is a majority. An exclusive focus on quantification represents a profound misunderstanding of the meaning of democracy. Democratic politics includes an interpretive practice across the moral and the legal dimensions. It relies as much on persuasion as on proof. Recovery of a vibrant democratic life requires a renewed appreciation of a public humanities, not as a pastime but as way of living.
The idea that democracy is in crisis is nothing new; ancient Greek commentators like Plato and Thucydides argued that political instability was baked into democracy as a regime type. Can examples drawn from classical Athens make a useful contribution to discussions of the failings of contemporary democracy? This article considers a range of interventions from the past decade in the United States and the United Kingdom, carried out at different scales and through different methods. It considers the strengths of working with material from the distant past – its non-partisan nature offering a safe space to discuss political conflict without engaging in it – and also the weaknesses, such as the limited franchise of ancient democracies like classical Athens, and the need to consider specific historical issues in their own context. It also considers the unfamiliarity of ancient history and the way in which knowledge of the classical past can itself be perceived as class-bound and exclusionary.
Despite increasing scholarly attention to backlash against feminism, little is known about anti-feminist movements in East Asia. This study examines the 2022 South Korean presidential election campaign, in which the political parties sought to capitalize on political resistance to the perceived advance of feminism. This embrace of male grievance as a political force was arguably led by former People Power Party (PPP) chairman Lee Jun-seok, leading commenters to argue that support for Lee is rooted in misogyny. We examine this claim empirically by drawing on a novel survey to estimate the association between misogynistic attitudes, measured through devaluation, perception of women as manipulative, and distrust, and support for Lee. We find that misogynistic attitudes are positively correlated with support for Lee, but not with presidential vote choice. We interpret this as suggesting that the association between misogyny and support for Lee is a manifestation of the desire for symbolic representation. We discuss the implications of how this association can further influence the gender divide, both in Korea and beyond, and conclude with recommendations for further research.
How do electoral manipulation and resulting anti-fraud protests influence political trust in non-democratic contexts? I leverage the plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of a series of original surveys fielded on nationally representative samples in Russia to understand the impact of political shocks – particularly allegations of electoral fraud and post-election protests – on the evolution of trust in political institutions and individuals. This study demonstrates that allegations of excessive, blatant electoral fraud decrease trust in the autocrat. However, trust rebounds following attendant post-election protests. Finally, I examine the conditional impacts of fraud and protest on trust, finding that updating occurs primarily among those with weak political affiliation.
Ecological inference is a statistical technique used to infer individual behavior from aggregate data. A particularly relevant instance of ecological inference involves the estimation of the inner cells of a set of R × C related contingency tables when only their aggregate margins are known. This problem spans multiple disciplines, including quantitative history, epidemiology, political science, marketing, and sociology. This paper proposes new models for solving the problem using the latent structure theory, and presents the ecolRxC package, an R implementation of this methodology. This article exemplifies, explains, and statistically documents the new extensions and, using real inner cell election data, shows how the new models in ecolRxC lead to significantly more accurate solutions than ecol and VTR, two Stata routines suggested within this framework. ecolRxC also holds its own against ei.MD.bayes and nslphom, the two algorithms currently identified in the literature as the most accurate to solve this problem. ecolRxC records accuracies as good as those reported for ei.MD.bayes and nslphom. Besides, from a theoretical perspective, ecolRxC stands up for modeling a causal theory of political behavior to build its algorithm. This distinguishes it from other procedures proposed from different frameworks (such as ei.MD.bayes and nslphom) which model expected behaviors, instead of modeling how voters make choices based on their underlying preferences as ecolRxC does.
Elected officials can often successfully increase voter support in their district by “bringing home the bacon,” yet theory suggests that the electoral effects of such efforts may depend on the legislator’s gender and whether the legislator delivered benefits in a stereotypically feminine (e.g., healthcare) or masculine (e.g., agriculture) issue area. Using both observational and experimental data in the United States, we find weak, limited evidence that issue area conditions the electoral impact of credit claiming for legislators of either gender. In addition, we show that men and women are rewarded comparably when they secure benefits for their district, regardless of issue area. Our findings suggest that women legislators — typically more effective than men at securing these benefits — can use distributive politics and credit claiming as an effective electoral strategy without concern that issue-based gender biases in the electorate will get in the way.
Presidential elections are arguably the most consequential recurring political event in the United States. Understanding the factors that determine their outcomes, therefore, is of substantial importance. One proposed factor pertains to presidential candidates' incumbency status, yet its nature is complex and difficult to study with observational data. In particular, the individual-level mechanisms underlying incumbency effects remain unclear. This study proposes many citizens generally believe that, ceteris paribus, presidents should be afforded two terms. Crucially, such a norm implies that incumbency status possesses an inherent effect, operating independent of other mechanisms that may stem from incumbency. A large, pre-registered survey experiment was therefore employed to isolate the effect of incumbency status on presidential vote choice. The experiment finds strong evidence that one-term incumbent candidates have an inherent advantage against their non-incumbent opponents. The results also clarify that the two-term disadvantage present in observational data is not inherent, and is perhaps better understood simply as the absence of the one-term advantage. The study thus points toward a micro-foundational mechanism underlying incumbent-party performance in presidential elections. Finally, analyses of panel data explore which voters may be systematically inclined to vote based upon the incumbency status of presidential candidates.
Forecasting elections is a high-risk, high-reward endeavor. Today’s polling rock star is tomorrow’s has-been. It is a high-pressure gig. Public opinion polls have been a staple of election forecasting for almost ninety years. But single source predictions are an imperfect means of forecasting, as we detailed in the preceding chapter. One of the most telling examples of this in recent years is the 2016 US presidential election. In this chapter, we will examine public opinion as an election forecast input. We organize election prediction into three broad buckets: (1) heuristics models, (2) poll-based models, and (3) fundamentals models.
Superficially, the period of Conservative rule since 2010 has been one of electoral stability. The Conservatives emerged as the largest party in four general elections in a row. As a result, the party has retained the reins of power for fourteen years. This represents the second longest period of government tenure for any one party in post-war British politics. Yet, in truth, it has been a period of unprecedented electoral instability and political change. Two of the four elections produced a hung parliament, an outcome that had only occurred once before in the post-war period, while a third only produced a small overall majority. After the first of these hung parliaments, in 2010, Britain was governed by a coalition for the first time since 1945, while in the second such parliament, between 2017 and 2019, a minority government entered into a ‘confidence and supply’ agreement with the Northern Irish Democratic Unionists. The right of prime ministers to call an election at a time of their own choosing was taken away, only to result in parliamentary tussles that, in the event, failed to stop two prime ministers from eventually holding an election well before the parliamentary term was due to come to an end.