This Introduction begins by outlining what is meant by international relations. It then tells the story of how and why the academic study of international relations emerged in the early twentieth century before considering the need to ‘globalise’ the study of international relations – to make it an academic discipline more open to non-Western perspectives. It sketches the changing agenda of international relations, a shift that some scholars describe as a transition from international relations to world politics or from the ‘traditional’ to the ‘new’ agenda. Although there is little doubt that, as political reality has changed, new theoretical tools have become necessary to grasp it, we should not assume that the myriad changes in our world have rendered the ‘traditional’ agenda obsolete. As we shall see, the ‘new’ agenda supplements, but does not supplant, the ‘traditional’ agenda. It is now more important than ever to consider the relationships between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ agendas, and to globalise IR.

This chapter makes three main arguments. First, ideas and practices of diplomacy have a multi-millennial history – much longer than is generally thought. Second, this long history has been characterised by both continuity and change. As a result, diplomacy has been as much adaptive as resistant to change. And third, that diplomacy is not diminishing in importance. To assess these claims, the chapter first addresses the issue of defining diplomacy, before examining the evolution of diplomacy in terms that may be characterised broadly as pre-modern, modern and postmodern. Finally, the chapter evaluates the relationship between diplomacy and the study of international relations.

Kabul fell to the Taliban in August 2021 despite peace talk efforts in late 2020 and early 2021. International pundits had been predicting that Ashraf Ghani’s government might need to share power with a resurgent Taliban, but none had expected such a swift and complete takeover as the Americans readied to leave for good. Two decades of international intervention in Afghanistan were erased. The efficacy and desirability of intervention has been thrown into serious doubt, and with it the prospects for post-conflict state-building. This chapter introduces the rise, and possible fall, of the post-conflict state-building agenda. It introduces the reader to important concepts, noting the relationships between state-building, peace-building and nation-building, as well as underscoring the role of liberal ideology in shaping post-conflict state-building efforts, asking readers to reflect on what they believe external actors should, or should not, do.

From the nineteenth century to the twenty-first century, British espionage fiction documents relations between the UK and its European neighbours. In many countries, spying was conducted under the auspices of the Foreign Office, albeit at arm’s length. From the 1920s until 1968, British spies often worked in Passport Control Offices, which were attached to consulates in Europe and around the world. These spies, however, did not hold diplomatic status. In novels such as The Riddle of the Sands (1903), The Secret Agent (1907), The Thirty-Nine Steps (1915), A Small Town in Germany (1968), and A Perfect Spy (1986), amateur and professional spies take diplomatic cover or work in tandem with government officials. More often than not, early spy fiction presumes that European interests are inimical to British sovereignty and security. In The Riddle of the Sands, Germans plan to invade England. In The Thirty-Nine Steps, continental Europeans foment an assassination plot against the Greek Prime Minister to instigate a war. Although Cold War alignments and membership in the European Union change this dynamic, Britons remain suspicious of European motives. In this regard, British spy fiction asks the same question in different historical contexts: in what ways are Britons European, or not?

This chapter examines the sense of uncertainty fostered by postwar geopolitics. It looks at how the political orientations shaped during the interwar period were dislocated from postwar Italo-Egyptian relations and from emergent Mediterranean constellations. The fall of the fascist government in Rome in 1943 and the creation of the Egyptian republic in 1953 made uncertainty a defining condition of life for Italian residents in Egypt after the war. Their experiences no longer resonated with the political aspirations of the post-fascist state, nor did they align with Egypt’s accelerating movement towards national sovereignty. The material and symbolic exchange of two deposed kings – Vittorio Emanuele III in 1946 and Faruk in 1953 – and the establishment of the Italian and Egyptian Republics paved the way for new industrial and economic ties. Political-economic relations tightened around this kinship of exchange, and the Italian state sought to reinforce Egypt’s military government. Yet, as this chapter demonstrates, many Italian residents fell into greater duress, coming to understand departure as their only possible future.

Chapter 4 surveys a wide range of friendly and hostile interstate relations in ancient societies, where war was often the normal state of affairs. Notwithstanding the numerous conflicts, polities tried in the end, through alliances and diplomatic relations, to establish peaceful relations in view of political stability and economic prosperity. The chapter analyses hospitality rules regarding foreigners, treaties between polities and the establishment of diplomatic relations, which emerged as an international system in the ancient Near East during the mid-fourteenth century bce. An alternative to diplomacy in conflict management, typical of the Greek world, was arbitration and mediation with the help of a third party. In a final section, the chapter outlines how states, when diplomacy failed, started a war procedurally. In conclusion, the chapter argues that, in the absence of an international court, the enforcement of diplomatic rules and treaties was in many ancient societies ensured by the supranational authority of the gods.

This chapter examines Lakhdar Brahimi’s agency as a mediator in Syria, while also clarifying how his strategic perceptions affected his mediation behavior. Adopting a slightly different structure than its predecessor, it consists of two sections. The first assesses the mediator’s agency in determining the main mediation policies and responses from his appointment on August 17, 2012 till his resignation on May 13, 2014. During this period, five policy responses stand out—the Eid al Adha Ceasefire, the May 7 Communiqué, responding to the use of chemical weapons, Geneva II, and the mediator’s resignation. A first-level analysis is applied to clarify the mediator’s input on each. The second section moves to explain the dynamics behind his decision-making. To do so, it focuses on the mediator’s perceptions regarding the four categories outlined in the contingency model—the identity of the mediator, the context of mediation, the parties, and the process of mediation. Such analysis helps shed light on the links between the mediator’s perceptions on these four categories and his decision-making in Syria as well as the formulation of more generalizable principles.

This chapter brings to light the main conclusions of this work, while also presenting generalizable principles for future research to expand on. This part of the book contributes to the theoretical study of mediation and aims to encourage further first-level analysis approaches to the study of mediation and mediators. Most importantly, it clarifies the actual input of Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi, and Staffan de Mistura to the mediation efforts in Syria. It leaves readers with a detailed record of what Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi, and Staffan de Mistura have done in their roles as mediators in Syria and presents a comprehensive analysis of the dynamics that shaped their decision-making. Outside the cases of these three mediators, it introduces a method by which to forensically identify a mediator’s fingerprints on the mediation process and charts a map to guide investigations into the decision-making processes of mediators. In doing so, it hopefully serves to encourage steps toward developing institutional mechanisms to evaluate the performance of these mediators – to hold them accountable for their successes and their failures.

The Introduction outlines the main objectives of the book: to pinpoint the agency of UN mediators as decision-makers and explain the strategic-thinking behind their decision-making. To do so, it bridges the literature surrounding levels of analysis in international relations and foreign policy analysis with scholarship focused on mediation. By bridging knowledge from scholars who have focused on first-level analysis, or the role of the individual in shaping policy, this chapter finds that mediators are an opportune case-study for such a method. Ultimately, by exploring the world of the mediator, with the tools developed in foreign policy analysis, the political behavior of these individuals and the phenomena of mediation can be better explained. Given the focus on UN mediators and the Syrian conflict, the chapter ends with an institutional analysis of the margin of maneuver UN mediators have as well as a detailed discussion on why the UN’s mediation process in Syria is linked to its raison d’être.

This chapter presents an analysis on Kofi Annan’s mediation efforts in Syria and focuses on his agency when overseeing the UN’s entry into the Syrian conflict. The chapter is divided in three main sections. The first offers a concise background of the main mediation initiatives pursued during Annan’s time as mediator. Of which there were five main mediation policies and responses – the mediator’s entry into the conflict, the Six-Point Plan, the nationwide ceasefire and deployment of UNSMIS, the Geneva I process, and the mediator’s resignation. Using a first-level analysis, the second section continues to elucidate the agency of the mediator in shaping each of these mediation outcomes. Finally, the third section explores the dynamics behind the mediator’s decision-making. Specifically, it examines how the mediator’s key strategic perceptions influenced his decision-making. Drawing on the contingency model, four categories of perceptions are studied – the identity of the mediator, the context of mediation, the parties, and the process of mediation. Building off this analysis, the chapter proposes general links between each category of perceptions and specific mediation behaviors.

This chapter turns to the third UN mediator in Syria, Staffan de Mistura, and has the same two objectives as the preceding case studies in this book – to delineate the mediator’s agency as a decision-maker and to elucidate the strategic dynamics behind his decision-making. It is split into two sections dedicated to each objective. The first section investigates the mediator’s input to the main mediation policies during the period studied. Of which there are six – the Aleppo Freeze, sanctioning military action against ISIS, the Geneva Consultations, the intra-Syrian Talks, the Astana Process, and the mediator’s resignation. Building on these findings, the section uncovers the dynamics behind the mediator’s decision-making using the categories of perceptions drawn from the contingency model. This analysis also helps produce more generalizable knowledge concerning associations between mediation perceptions and behaviors.

Compared with its relations with Asia, Australian engagement with the countries of the African continent was not extensive, and was defined even in the government’s view by a ’period of neglect’ by all sectors of government, including diplomacy, trade, aid and defence. That said, increased communication and involvement occurred in the period under reiew in this volume, as African immigration continued and as the Australian government sought African support in its bid for a United Nations Security Council seat for 2013–14. Formal government ties between Australia and the nations of Africa continued, however, to be limited. In this sense, there was little significant change in the period 2006–10 from previous periods.

In a remarkable article published in the official journal of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 1992, the Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau and one of the most senior figures in the Ministry, Kazuo Ogura, wrote in an analysis of Japan’s diplomacy that only Australia could fill the role of Japan’s real partner in an Asian-Pacific regional alliance: their similar democratic values, market economies and approach to free trade, and common interests in security and political matters, gave the two countries a firm basis for a continuing and closer partnership. This view was warmly endorsed by Australia’s Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, as echoing his own remarks about Australia being a natural ally of Japan, and was enthusiastically taken up by the Australian press in terms of the opportunity and challenge presented to Australia.

The Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815 delineated territorial settlements, coronated several newly independent monarchs and resulted in an official declaration on the abolition of the slave trade, but it did not treat the issue of piracy. This paradox is the key concern of this chapter. Vienna’s Final Acts were the end product of these talks, and though they did not mention ‘Barbary piracy’, their conclusion would nevertheless have a great impact on the international treatment of this newly perceived threat to security. The years 1814–1815 were an important turning point because they initiated a period of transition. The congress created an international context in which North African corsairing could be reconceived as a threat to security. This new perception of threat hinged upon misconceptions of the supposed fanaticism and irrationality that allegedly characterised North African privateering. It also disregarded the long history of diplomatic and commercial contact between both sides of the Mediterranean Sea.

Chapter 2 examines the ways in which French botanists obtained information about plant cultivation. It sheds light on the exploration and collection of plants and related knowledge about them, which was made possible with the assistance of local populations in Madagascar and East Asia. It develops an argument against the prevailing historical myth the eighteenth-century naturalists were only interested in classification. The focus of the chapter is on utility and especially how useful knowledge might be communicated to French naturalists. Mauritius’s intendant’s plan to domesticate staple crops could only be conducted because of multidirectional and multinational networks consisting of French, non-French, and above all non-European assistance. These actors used several types of plant knowledge, communication systems, languages, negotiation practices, often leading to cultural misunderstandings. The chapter highlights the significance of knowing a plant’s native/local name, so that Europeans could return and access that same plant again. Here, European naturalists followed a twofold strategy to document and interpret knowledge. Exploring these details neglected in grand narratives of colonial science challenges Eurocentric narratives, the presumed superiority of European science, and the centralisation on the Parisian acclimatisation garden in particular.

This chapter has a sociocultural approach to the quest for nutmeg and cloves. It analyses human, cross-cultural encounters in South East Asia, the native countries of numerous spices introduced in Mauritius over the course of the eighteenth century. As this chapter reveals, the French colonial spice project involved actors from different backgrounds for patronage, protection, and assistance. They used a mix of languages, promises, and informal relations mainly in South East Asian islands (the Maluku islands and the Philippines). The purpose of this chapter is to understand the movements of knowledge and people within cross-cultural interactions in the Indo-Pacific through the lens of plant exchange. These cross-cultural connections were essential for this project: Asian merchants and brokers were indispensable for acquiring spice plants and grains from Dutch colonial territory in today’s Indonesia. Insisting on the cross-cultural nature of the acquisition of spice plants, this chapter challenges existing narratives of the cultural components of the French empire.

Until the tragic events of 4 June 1989 in Beijing, the 1980s saw a substantial broadening and strengthening of Sino–Australian relations, building on the foundations that had been laid in the previous decade and responding to the economic changes taking place in both countries. It was a good working relationship which enjoyed bipartisan support in Australia. While its emphasis was on commercial and economic interests, it was diverse, multifaceted and broadly-based within a cooperative framework, the result of sustained efforts and single-mindedness on the part of successive Australian governments. These efforts, begun by the Whitlam administration in the 1970s, were made on the ground that building productive links with a developing socialist country like China required official initiatives, professionalism and a whole range of skills. Traditionally Australia relied on largely non-official entities to establish and foster its external relations in the economic, commercial and cultural spheres. In the case of China, it was considered necessary to engage Beijing at the official level and to develop strategies with the expectation that this would facilitate non-official contacts.