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24 results

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  • ESPINOZA, GOVERNMENT FUNDING, AND RELIGIOUS CHOICE

  • Thomas C. Berg, Douglas Laycock
  • Journal: Journal of Law and Religion / Volume 35 / Issue 3 / December 2020
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2020, pp. 361-379
  • Print publication: December 2020

  • The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, holding that religious schools cannot be excluded from a state program of financial aid to private schools, is another incremental step in the Court's long-running project to reform the constitutional law of financial aid to religious institutions. There was nothing surprising about the decision, and it changed little; it was the inevitable next link in a long chain of decisions. To those observers still attached to the most expansive rhetoric of no-aid separationism, it is the world turned upside down. But the Court has been steadily marching away from that rhetoric for thirty-five years now. The more recent decisions, including Espinoza, do a far better job than no-aid separationism of separating the religious choices and commitments of the American people from the coercive power of the government. And that is the separation that is and should be the ultimate concern of the Religion Clauses—to minimize the government's interference with or influence on religion, and to leave each American free to exercise or reject religion in his or her own way, neither encouraged by the government nor discouraged or penalized by the government.

  • 16 - Life Patents, Religion, and Justice: A Summary of Themes

  • from Closing
  • Edited by Thomas C. Berg, Roman Cholij, St Edmund's College, Cambridge, Simon Ravenscroft, Magdalene College, Cambridge
  • Book: Patents on Life
  • Published online: 28 September 2019
  • Print publication: 24 October 2019, pp 291-306

  • Summary

    This closing chapter summarizes the book’s themes. By gathering religious, secular moral, legal, and sociopolitical perspectives in one place, the book aims to be a resource so lawyers, policy activists, and policymakers in patent debates might better understand what religious perspectives have to offer, and so religious thinkers and leaders might better understand biotech patents and thus have more to offer. Three themes emerge from the balance of the chapters. First, patents on life call for evaluation under criteria of morality and social justice. Second, religious thought can contribute to–not dominate, but contribute to–such moral and social evaluation. Finally, however, for religious thought to contribute effectively, it must be better informed and sophisticated than it has been, about both patent law and biotechnology.

Patents on Life
  • Religious, Moral, and Social Justice Aspects of Biotechnology and Intellectual Property
  • Edited by Thomas C. Berg, Roman Cholij, Simon Ravenscroft
  • Published online: 28 September 2019
  • Print publication: 24 October 2019
  • This volume brings together a unique collection of legal, religious, ethical, and political perspectives to bear on debates concerning biotechnology patents, or 'patents on life'. The ever-increasing importance of biotechnologies has generated continual questions about how intellectual property law should treat such technologies, especially those raising ethical or social-justice concerns. Even after many years and court decisions, important contested issues remain concerning ownership of and rewards from biotechnology - from human genetic material to genetically engineered plants – and regarding the scope of moral or social-justice limitations on patents or licensing practices. This book explores a range of related issues, including questions concerning morality and patentability, biotechnology and human dignity, and what constitute fair rewards from genetic resources. It features high-level international, interfaith, and cross-disciplinary contributions from experts in law, religion, and ethics, including academics and practitioners, placing religious and secular perspectives into dialogue to examine the full implications of patenting life.

  • 14 - Antonin Scalia: Devout Christian; Worldly Judge?

  • Edited by Daniel L. Dreisbach, American University, Washington DC, Mark David Hall
  • Book: Great Christian Jurists in American History
  • Published online: 24 June 2019
  • Print publication: 04 July 2019, pp 245-264

  • Summary

    Justice Antonin Scalia was a towering figure in jurisprudence and legal culture. Among other things, he was the most eloquent and prominent proponent of the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted according to its “original meaning.” Scalia was also a devout Christian: a traditional Catholic who set forth his Christian beliefs with honesty, pungency, and wit. He frequently told the story how during his college oral examinations, he was asked the most significant event in history; he answered, the Battle of Waterloo, whereupon the professor “shook his head sadly and said, ‘No, Mr. Scalia. The Incarnation.’” The lesson for the young Scalia: “[Never] separate your religious life from your intellectual life.” Yet this most publicly devout justice also frequently made clear that his beliefs had nothing to do with his judicial role. His job, he emphasized, was merely to apply the meaning of the text without regard to policy considerations or moral values, including religious values. “I’m a worldly judge,” he often said. This presents a puzzle: did Scalia end up separating his religious life from his jurisprudence, the core of his intellectual life? Or was he still somehow a distinctively Christian judge? The solution, I suggest, lies in distinguishing his first-order legal conclusions, which were driven largely (although not solely) by his positivist judicial method, from his second-order choice of that method, which may well have reflected aspects of his personal outlook on the world, including his faith.

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