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12 results

  • THE VIRTUE OF RUNNING A MARATHON
  • Simone Gozzano
  • Journal: Think / Volume 18 / Issue 52 / Summer 2019
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 June 2019, pp. 69-74
  • Print publication: Summer 2019
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  • View abstract

    Running a marathon is not solely a personal achievement; rather it sets an example. Because of the nature of this example, it constitutes an achievement that deserves our praise (contrary to what has recently been argued in this Journal).

  • Chapter 5 - Type-identity conditions for phenomenal properties
  • Edited by Simone Gozzano, Università degli Studi dell'Aquila, Italy, Christopher S. Hill, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book: New Perspectives on Type Identity
  • Published online: 05 April 2012
  • Print publication: 08 March 2012, pp 111-126
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    Summary

    This chapter argues that the crucial assumptions of Saul Kripke's argument, an objective principle of identity for mental-state types. This principle is actually compatible with both the type-identity theory of the mind and Kripke's semantics and metaphysics. The chapter presents a version of the type identity theory. The viability of the identity theory focuses on bodily sensations, such as pain and other states characterized by their phenomenal properties. According to Kripke, there is nothing in, for instance, pain which is not in apparently feeling pain. This argument has had a strong impact on the identity theory of the mind, both of the type and of the token versions. The gist of Kripke's argument has often been expressed as the idea that when it comes to pain and other bodily sensations, appearance and reality coincide. Kripke stresses that possible worlds are like stipulated situations.
New Perspectives on Type Identity
  • New Perspectives on Type Identity
  • The Mental and the Physical
  • Edited by Simone Gozzano, Christopher S. Hill
  • Published online: 05 April 2012
  • Print publication: 08 March 2012
  • View description
    The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This volume brings together leading philosophers of mind, whose essays challenge in new ways the standard objections to type identity theory, such as the multiple realizability objection and the modal argument. Other essays show how cognitive science and neuroscience are lending new support to type identity theory and still others provide, extend and improve traditional arguments concerning the theory's explanatory power.