To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure email@example.com
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter explains the basis of the access to justice obligations placed on international organisations (IOs) under international law. One foundational issue is whether or not IOs are capable of being placed under international obligations in general. The answer to this question, as this chapter will show, is most certainly in the affirmative. IOs are international legal persons or ‘subjects’ of international law that possess their own legal personality. This means that international law can bind IOs directly and impose obligations that ought to be implemented by the IO. After showing how international law can directly place IOs under international obligations in general, the focus shifts to whether IOs can be placed under access to justice obligations in particular. The chapter discusses what is meant by access to justice as a value, and how that value has translated into legal rights in the form of the right to a fair trial. The discussion then clarifies how IOs specifically are put under access to justice obligations, including demonstrating the rationale behind doing so. It is argued that IOs are required to provide justice consistently with fair trial guarantees to private persons whenever IO actions adversely impact them.
If IOs comply with their international legal obligation to provide an appropriate mode of dispute resolution to private persons they impact, there will be little need for national courts to take jurisdiction in claims against IOs. An appropriate DRM must deliver justice independently, impartially and fairly. What precisely these key component fair trial guarantees require was set out in Chapter 2. That discussion can prove of much benefit to IOs wishing to establish fair trial compliant internal justice systems, as well as to all those who may be required to assess the quality of justice delivered at an institutional DRM. In the end, whether a dispute is resolved at an institutional DRM, through an arbitral process or through another mode of dispute resolution, justice must be delivered consistently with the right to a fair trial as developed in IHRL. This book does not state a preference for what type of DRM IOs should establish.
This chapter assesses the compliance of institutional DRMs with the fair trial criteria developed. Three types of DRMs will be subjected to scrutiny. These are permanent judicial mechanisms, arbitration and non-judicialised DRMs. As judicial mechanisms are principally established to resolve employment disputes, the focus is on the leading international administrative tribunals, namely, the UN Dispute and Appeals Tribunals and the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation. Second, the chapter will focus on the role international arbitration plays in resolving claims against IOs. The chapter shows that little thought has been given to implement arbitration as a sustainable and viable option to resolve claims against IOs. Unless a specialised arbitral regime is created that takes into account the particularities of disputes involving IOs, the chances of arbitration providing for an appropriate DRM are dim. Finally, the chapter makes a brief comment on non-judicialised DRMs, such as ombudsperson processes. While such DRMs play an important complementing role, they cannot replace an independent and impartial forum empowered to render a binding judgment. Finally, the chapter highlights that alarmingly, in too many situations, private parties cannot access any DRM at the international level at all. Access to justice is thus comprehensively undermined.
This chapter focuses on how the application of an IO’s jurisdictional immunities prevent victims from accessing justice at the national level. The discussion first focuses on the basis of an IO’s domestic legal personality which allows suits to be brought against them at all. The chapter then identifies how IO immunities are applied today. Whereas IO immunities were intended to be functional, they have become by and large de facto absolute. This means that a claimant’s case is procedurally defeated and the merits do not get a chance to be ventilated. There are some indications that the tide might be shifting in favour of the claimant. Still, the way in which claims against IOs are addressed at the national level is unsustainable and requires a fundamental reframing.
We live in a ‘denial of justice age when it comes to the individual pursuit of justice against IOs. The victims of the cholera epidemic introduced in Haiti by UN peacekeepers in 2010 are still awaiting justice. They have not yet had an opportunity to access a court to realise their rights. The victims of the Srebrenica genocide for which the UN assumed moral responsibility have not received an effective remedy.
This chapter develops the criteria relevant to assess a dispute resolution mechanism or DRM’s compliance with fair trial standards. The discussion focuses on the three broad fair trial guarantees that an institutional DRM must incorporate if it is to be considered appropriate. These are independence, impartiality and fairness. First, the discussion shows that for a DRM to be considered independent, it must possess institutional, decisional and personal/individual independence. Those three aspects will be explained succinctly. The chapter then focuses on the concept of judicial impartiality. For a fair trial to be provided, impartiality in its objective and subjective sense is critical. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the right to a fair trial also demands that a claimant is treated fairly. Fairness is a broad guarantee and is explored through seven sub-component fair trial rights. Fairness cannot be achieved unless the right to equal access to the courts, the right to equality of arms, the right to an oral hearing, the right to appeal, the right to a reasoned judgment, the right to access justice without undue delay and the right to an effective remedy are provided for in the law, and importantly, practically realised.
This chapter proposes that a carefully crafted private international law-based framework allocates regulatory authority between the national and institutional orders so as to allow maintaining institutional independence without sacrificing access to justice. It is argued that the ideal approach to implement the proposed regime is through an international arrangement. Of course, international agreements can take time to negotiate. Given that private international law rules can be adjusted nationally without the need for action on the international plain, the proposed framework can be implemented even in the absence of immediate international action. It is submitted that private international law techniques can help bring to an end the denial of justice age for the victims of IO conduct. A conundrum that public international law has not been able to address for decades can readily be resolve using private international law.
We live in a denial of justice age when it comes to the individual pursuit of justice against international organisations (IOs). Victims of institutional conduct are generally not provided reasonable means of dispute settlement at the international level. They also have been unable to seek justice at the national level due to IO immunities, which aim to secure institutional independence. Access to justice and IO independence are equally important values and realising them both has so far proven elusive. Private international law techniques can help allocate regulatory authority between the national and institutional orders in a nuanced manner by maintaining IO independence without sacrificing access to justice. As private international law rules can be adjusted nationally without the need for international action, the solution proposed can be readily implemented, thereby resolving a conundrum that public international law has not been able to address for decades.
Comparing and contrasting the ICJ and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, I assess whether those international judicial mechanisms possess the basic degree of independence required for a court to be able to maintain its credibility so that it can continue to perform its core function of adjudicating interstate disputes. With those two interstate adjudicative bodies constituting the two leading international courts in terms of participation and the sheer number of cases decided, much may be learned from comparing them. I start by considering what the concept of judicial independence means in general and how it can specifically be assessed. The chapter then considers whether the ICJ and AB possess the basic degree of independence necessary to properly discharge the judicial function. In pointing out that real deficits exist, I argue there is a case for bolstering the independence of the ICJ; and without immediate reforms to the AB’s institutional design, its potential demise is likely to be hastened. I conclude that if a basic degree of judicial independence cannot be guaranteed, it is preferable to let a court vanish for a while than to maintain a significantly deficient one.
Differential attainment (DA) amongst Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) medical students and postgraduate trainees including Psychiatry trainees has been extensively documented in medical education, with non-white medical students being 2.5 times more likely to fail high-stake examinations compared to their White counterparts. The Equality Act 2010 places a responsibility on public bodies such as Royal Colleges to address discrimination in training and assessment. Understanding DA in undergraduate medical education can help understand DA in the postgraduate setting. Consequently, this systematic review aims to detect the processes that enable and impede DA in UK undergraduate medical education.
Seven online databases including PubMed, Scopus, PyschInfo, and ERIC were searched. A formal grey literature search was also conducted. Inclusion criteria comprised studies dated from January 1995 to present and included UK undergraduate medical students. We present the preliminary findings from 13 papers, analysed to create a conceptual framework for a further mixed methods analysis. The studies were critically appraised for methodological quality.
Five key themes emerged from the preliminary analysis of 13 papers. BAME students experienced:
Being ‘divergent’: Not feeling part of the current organisational learning milieu
Lack of social capital: Difficulty in being absorbed into existing ‘networks’ of relationships in a manner that is ‘approachable’ and not ‘intimidating’
Continuum of discrimination: ‘Indirect’ impact of subtle communication processes in the learning environment undermining individual ‘belief’ in own performance
Institutional discriminatory factors: Culture, rules, norms, and behavioural routines of educators that lead to differential outcomes for learners
Lack of external support: Relative lack of interventions tackling DA.
The key finding of this review is that British BAME undergraduate medical students experience discriminatory behaviours early in medical schools that impact on personal, educational, and professional outcomes. These factors may need to be borne in mind by postgraduate training organisations such as the Royal College of Psychiatrists as they commence the challenging task of addressing DA.