To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
In addition to the health burden caused by mental illnesses, these
conditions contribute to economic disadvantage because of their impact on
labour force participation.
To quantify the cost of lost savings and wealth to Australians aged 45–64
who retire from the labour force early because of depression or other
Cross-sectional analysis of the base population of Health&WealthMOD,
a microsimulation model built on data from the Australian Bureau of
Statistics' Survey of Disability, Ageing and Carers and STINMOD, an
income and savings microsimulation model.
People who are not part of the labour force because of depression or
other mental illness have 78% (95% CI 92.2–37.1) and 93% (95% CI
98.4–70.5) less wealth accumulated respectively, compared with people of
the same age, gender and education who are in the labour force with no
chronic health condition. People who are out of the labour force as a
result of depression or other mental illness are also more likely to have
the wealth that they do have in cash assets, rather than higher-growth
assets such as superannuation, home equity and other financial
This lower accumulated wealth is likely to result in lower living
standards for these individuals in the future. This will compound the
impact of their condition on their health and quality of life, and put a
large financial burden on the state as a result of the need to provide
financial assistance for these individuals.
Richard Calland, He is currently Director of the Economic Governance programme at Idasa – Africa's leading democracy institute.,
Chris Oxtoby, associate in the Democratic Governance and Rights Unit in the Department of Public Law of the University of Cape Town
On an occasion such as this, we should, perhaps, start from the beginning. So, let me begin. I am an African. I owe my being to the hills and the valleys, the mountains and the glades, the rivers, the deserts, the trees, the flowers, the seas and the ever-changing seasons that define the face of our native land … The Constitution whose adoption we celebrate constitutes an unequivocal statement that we refuse to accept that our Africanness shall be defined by our race, colour, gender or historical origins. It is a firm assertion made by ourselves that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white. It gives concrete expression to the sentiment we share as Africans, and will defend to the death, that the people shall govern. It recognises the fact that the dignity of the individual is both an objective which society must pursue, and is a goal which cannot be separated from the material well-being of that individual. It seeks to create the situation in which all our people shall be free from fear, including the fear of the oppression of one national group by another, the fear of the disempowerment of one social echelon by another, the fear of the use of state power to deny anybody their fundamental human rights and the fear of tyranny … It creates a law-governed society which shall be inimical to arbitrary rule.
Extract from Thabo Mbeki's ‘I am an African’ speech, delivered on 8 May 1996, Constitutional Assembly, Cape Town
‘I am an African’. It was his finest speech, perhaps even his finest hour. The day that South Africa's draft final Constitution came before the combined houses of Parliament – the Constitutional Assembly – for approval. ‘I am an African’ – such a simple phrase, but with such deep resonance. It seemed to sum up Mbeki and his vision so neatly. The obscurity and complexity of Mbeki the man and the politician suspended for one brief yet potent moment, as he brought poetry to bear on the letter of the law of democratic South Africa's founding document.
For nearly ten years – indeed more if we include his period of influence under Mandela’s presidency – Thabo Mbeki bestrode South Africa’s political stage. Despite attempts by some in the new ANC leadership to airbrush out his role, there can be little doubt that Mbeki was a seminal figure in South Africa’s new democracy, one who left a huge mark in many fields, perhaps most controversially in state and party management, economic policy, public health intervention, foreign affairs and race relations. If we wish to understand the character and fate of post-1994 South Africa, we must therefore ask: What kind of political system, economy and society has the former President bequeathed to the government of Jacob Zuma and to the citizens of South Africa generally? This question is addressed head-on here by a diverse range of analysts, commentators and participants in the political process. Amongst the specific questions they seek to answer: What is Mbeki’s legacy for patterns of inclusion and exclusion based on race, class and gender? How, if at all, did his presidency reshape relations within the state, between the state and the ruling party and between the state and society? How did he reposition South Africa on the continent and in the world? This book will be of interest to anyone wishing to understand the current political landscape in South Africa, and Mbeki’s role in shaping it.
The notion of ‘multi-stakeholdism’ is a fashionable one. ‘Partnership’ is a new mantra in the vocabulary of global politics. In the past ten years, a fast-growing array of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) was created as a ‘means of filling “governance gaps” where existing national legislation and/or enforcement were not enough to prevent corruption or human rights abuses’. At their high water mark, MSIs represent an alternative governance model and a possible platform for building democratic accountability in places where traditional democratic institutions and processes are weak. The trend reflects both frustration with progress at intergovernmental level and, perhaps, a more pragmatic approach on the part of some of the key actors, especially in the private and non-governmental sectors. It seems that ‘multi-stakeholdism’ has a ‘feel-good’ aspect to it. But do MSIs do any good? And, in order to evaluate the question of whether MSIs deliver on their promise, how does one go about measuring their performance? Given the apparently enduring support for the idea of MSIs, it would be valuable for policy makers, activists and academics alike to establish a model for evaluating their efficacy and impact.
The spectrum of so-called multi-stakeholder processes is extremely broad, given the wide range of functions and forms operating in very different contexts. Some of the best-known ones have become increasingly present and visible in areas of weak and complex governance, addressing regulatory problems that are beyond the capacity of the individual governments to develop or enforce, such as ecological regimes or resource management.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.