The EEC was originally founded with the aim of fostering cooperation between Member States and harmonizing their laws across economic and political sectors. The necessary legislation at the EEC level required the delegation of competences to the EEC, under the TEEC. However, no such provision regarding the harmonization of intellectual property law was included in the original TEEC. Regardless, this has not hindered the development of the law in this area. The articles of the TEEC on the freedom of movement of persons, services, and capital,1 the prohibition of discrimination or ban on export/import customs, and limitations and other equivalent measures,2 as well as the right of establishment,3 have all served as the foundation for harmonization in this field.4

The previous chapters have introduced the development, the values, and the policy considerations of the doctrine of exhaustion. In short, the doctrine was developed into a balancing mechanism of analog copyright law. The rapid technological changes necessitated international and domestic legislative modifications. Many of these rules (e.g., TRIPS, WCT, EU directives, and the amendments of the USCA) had direct relevance for the doctrine, too. The introduction of these provisions has, however, preceded the age of platforms. On the one hand, the economic rights continue to be applied in a technologically neutral way and are interpreted broadly. Hence, rightholders are granted a high level of protection. On the other hand, limitations and exceptions are treated in a technologically dependent way (tending toward the exclusion of many digital uses from the scope of permitted uses) and are interpreted narrowly. The adequacy of the doctrine’s balancing role has been seriously questioned in the digital age.

Law is a fiction.1 Copyright law is an excellent example of legal fictions. All its norms, definitions, doctrines – e.g., creativity, originality, personality, economic and moral rights, limitations, and exceptions, to name a few – are created and regularly re-created by human minds to serve metaphorical purposes.2 At the same time, copyright law is not a limitless fiction. It has its historical roots, development, subjects, objects, purposes, and limits. The ultimate question of copyright law, then, is nothing else than why, to whom, and to what extent do laws assign copyright protection?3

Are there differences between the sale of an unopened Super Mario Bros. computer game and of the digital collage of 5,000 images? Viewed from the perspective of the doctrine of exhaustion, we can easily conclude that the two transfers have significant differences. The auction of the tangible data carrier of the Super Mario’s 1986 edition (for $660,000)1 fits well into the doctrine. The auction of the NFT (non-fungible token) representing Beeple’s “Everdays: the First 5000 Days” (for an equivalent of an astounding $69.3 million)2 seems to be hype with a snowball effect rather than a modern encapsulation of digital exhaustion. Some commentators,3 including the present author in collaboration with Alexandra Giannapoulou, João Pedro Quintais, and Balázs Bodó,4 have thoroughly introduced the incompatibility of the NFT mania with the existing copyright status quo, and so – in connection with the present book’s topic – the sale of tokenized information, which is capable of representing information related to digital artworks, is practically excluded from the scope of the exhaustion of the right of distribution. At the same time, NFTs de facto offer a “code-based digital ecosystem that has practical consequences for the copyright-relevant fields of creativeness.”5 The sale and resale of NFTs is possible; an exchange of information and title to “own” and “trade” information related to copyrightable subject matter is technologically guaranteed. In line with that, a quasi-exhaustion regime has also emerged. As such, the NFT mania can practically evidence the need for and modern technology’s capability of offering digital marketplaces for artworks as well.

The US legal system varies markedly from its European counterpart and one area where these differences have a direct impact is on the first-sale doctrine. The TEEC and the consolidated version of the TFEU indirectly allow for the regulation of intellectual property. EU copyright law originates from the jurisprudence of the ECJ and more recently has been crystallized through several directives. Although cultural policy considerations were followed in the creation of the acquis communautaire, the prevailing aim of the EU has always been the proper functioning of the internal market. EU directives allow each individual Member State to implement the directive as they see fit, as long as the requirements of the directive are met, and thus significant differences may exist among domestic copyright provisions.

On September 8, 2020, Omega Auctions, a top auction house for music memorabilia and vinyl records, offered for sale a rare CD copy of Ed Sheeran’s first ever, unreleased album, Spinning Man. While the CD’s opening price was £10,000, it ultimately sold for £61,500 including the buyer’s premium. Mr. Sheeran had given away said copy to a relative’s friend when he stayed and slept at his relative’s house during his busking days. Over a decade later, the brother of that friend found the demo in a drawer and subsequently sold it at the auction. In his 2014 book, Mr. Sheeran wrote that he had produced twenty copies of the album himself and created the cover art, too. Nevertheless, he was unwilling to allow “anyone else to get hold of a copy,” and he therefore kept the remaining nineteen CDs.1

The present article discusses whether the European Union, and especially Hungary, can successfully deal with the copyright problematic of the cultural/book heritage in a landscape that is colored by digital technologies, the Internet, and the ever growing number of services related to digitization and preservation. The paper introduces the key issues relevant to the copyright problematic of “digital world friendly” preservation and dissemination of our cultural heritage. It highlights that almost none of these matters is addressed by European Union law, which acts as an obstacle to effective cultural preservation in the digital age. The article also notes that the constant development of digital technologies has led to the appearance of new market players, new business models, and, consequently, new economic interests in the book industry. The chapter compares the present and future of book digitization by cultural institutions from a copyright perspective. It introduces the current framework of limitations and exceptions granted by the European Union – with a special focus on Hungary – for cultural preservation purposes.

This study attempts to outline the development of Hungarian copyright law from 1793 until the enactment of Act XVI of 1884. It focuses primarily on Hungarian events; however, it is inevitable to set our sights beyond borders at points and evoke, especially, German, Austrian, and French events, to which the Hungarians were paying undivided attention, as well. The chapters of the paper introduce the emergence of the concept of copyright law in the early nineteenth century, as well as the legislative proposals from the middle of the nineteenth century. Finally, the most important elements of the first copyright act of Hungary are also outlined.