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23 results

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  • 5 - Animals as Property and as Objects
  • from Part II - The Protection of Animals in International and Non-international Armed Conflicts
  • Edited by Anne Peters, Jérôme de Hemptinne, Robert Kolb, Université de Genève
  • Book: Animals in the International Law of Armed Conflict
  • Published online: 06 October 2022
  • Print publication: 06 October 2022, pp 73-91
  • View extract

    Summary

    This chapter explores whether animals can be considered as ‘property’ and ‘objects’ under the law of armed conflict, in particular under Article 23(g) of the 1899/1907 Hague Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on Land and under the law of targeting codified in Additional Protocol I. The chapter concludes that Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations and the law of targeting apply to animals which are considered as ‘property’ and as ‘objects’. Upon such classification, animals fall in the scope of the relevant rules. The legal consequence is that animals may only be lawfully attacked when they qualify as military objectives or when the harm done to them is proportionate incidental damage resulting from an attack on a military objective. In military operations short of attack, animals may only be destroyed or seized if military necessity ‘imperatively’ dictates it. The violation of these rules triggers not only state responsibility but also the criminal liability of the responsible individual(s).

Non-Proliferation Law as a Special Regime
  • Non-Proliferation Law as a Special Regime
  • A Contribution to Fragmentation Theory in International Law
  • Edited by Daniel H. Joyner, Marco Roscini
  • Published online: 05 October 2012
  • Print publication: 20 September 2012
  • View description
    The fragmentation of international law is an undeniable phenomenon and one that has met with increasing academic interest. This fragmentation is the result of the progressive expansion of both international legal activity and the subject-matter of international law. This expansion brings with it the risk of conflicting rules, principles and institutions. Non-Proliferation Law as a Special Regime focuses on weapons of mass destruction and aims to identify whether there are specific rules applying to this field that depart from the general rules of international law and the rules of other special regimes, in particular with regard to the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility. In providing a systematic analysis of a substantive area of international law and applying the theory of fragmentation and special regimes, the book contributes to the ongoing debate concerning one of the most topical issues in international law.
  • The United Nations Security Council and the Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law
  • Marco Roscini
  • Journal: Israel Law Review / Volume 43 / Issue 2 / 2010
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 March 2012, pp. 330-359
  • Print publication: 2010
  • View abstract

    This Article discusses the competences and powers of the UN Security Council in securing compliance with international humanitarian law, in particular through the adoption of the measures provided in Chapter VII of the Charter: The competence of the Council in this field can be founded on several legal grounds: on a broad interpretation of the notion of “threat to the peace” (Article 39 of the Charter), on Article 94(2) with regard to the International Court of Justice's judgments establishing violations of the jus in bello and also on the customary duty to ensure respect for international humanitarian law as reflected in Article 1 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of the Victims of War. In particular, such customary provision empowers the Security Council to react to any violation of international humanitarian law regardless of a nexus with concerns of international stability. Although the Council has adopted a variety of measures in relation to violations of the laws of war, the most incisive ones are those provided in Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII, which however are not without problems. The role the Security Council has played in the enforcement of international humanitarian law has been criticized because of its selective and opportunistic approach, which is due to the political nature of the organ. Also, in several instances the Council, far from securing compliance with the jus in bello, has instead interfered with its application. However selective and imperfect the Council's approach might be, though, its power to adopt decisions binding on UN members and its competence to take or authorize coercive measures involving the use of force make it potentially a formidable instrument against serious violations of international humanitarian law, partly remedying the lack of enforcing mechanisms in the treaties on the laws of war.

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