We disagree with Almaatouq et al. that no realistic alternative exists to the “one-at-a-time” paradigm. Seventy years ago, Egon Brunswik introduced representative design, which offers a clear path to commensurability and generality. Almaatouq et al.'s integrative design cannot guarantee the external validity and generalizability of results which is sorely needed, while representative design tackles the problem head on.

Kenneth R. Hammond (1917–2015) made several major contributions to the science of human judgment and decision making. As a student of Egon Brunswik, he kept Brunswik’s legacy alive – advancing his theory of probabilistic functionalism and championing his method of representative design. Hammond pioneered the use of Brunswik’s lens model as a framework for studying how individuals use information from the task environment to make clinical judgments, which was the precursor to much ‘policy capturing’ and ‘judgment analysis’ research. Hammond introduced the lens model equation to the study of judgment processes, and used this to measure the utility of different forms of feedback in multiple-cue probability learning. He extended the scope of analysis to contexts in which individuals interact with one another – introducing the interpersonal learning and interpersonal conflict paradigms. Hammond developed social judgment theory which provided a comprehensive quantitative approach for describing and improving judgment processes. He proposed cognitive continuum theory which states that quasi-rationality is an important middle-ground between intuition and analysis and that cognitive performance is dictated by the match between task properties and mode of cognition. Throughout his career, Hammond moved easily from basic laboratory work to applied settings, where he resolved policy disputes, and in doing so, he pointed to the dichotomy between theories of correspondence and coherence. In this paper, we present Hammond’s legacy to a new generation of judgment and decision making scholars.

Using Brunswik’s (1952) lens model framework, Hammond (1965) proposed interpersonal conflict theory to explain the nature, source, and resolution of disagreement or “cognitive conflict” between parties performing judgment tasks. An early review by Brehmer (1976) highlighted the potential of this approach in, for example, understanding the structure of cognitive conflicts, and the effect of task and person variables on judgment policy change and conflict resolution. However, our bibliographic and content reviews from 1976 to the present day demonstrate that research on cognitive conflict using the lens model has declined sharply, while research on “task conflict” has grown dramatically. There has also been a shift to less theoretical precision and methodological rigor. We discuss possible reasons for these developments, and suggest ways in which lens model research on cognitive conflict can be revitalized by borrowing from recent theoretical and methodological advances in the field of judgment and decision making.

In jurisdictions with two or more tiers of criminal courts, some defendants can choose the type of trial court to be tried in. This may involve a trade-off between the probability of acquittal/conviction and the estimated severity of sentence if convicted. For instance, in England and Wales, the lower courts have a higher conviction rate but limited sentencing powers, whereas the higher courts have a higher acquittal rate but greater sentencing powers. We examined 255 offenders’ choice of trial court type using a hypothetical scenario where innocence and guilt was manipulated. Participants’ choices were better predicted by a lexicographic than utility maximization model. A greater proportion of “guilty” participants chose the lower court compared to their “innocent” counterparts, and estimated sentence length was more important to the former than latter group. The present findings provide further support for heuristic decision-making in the criminal justice domain, and have implications for legal policy-making.

A routine part of intelligence analysis is judging the probability of alternative hypotheses given available evidence. Intelligence organizations advise analysts to use intelligence-tradecraft methods such as Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) to improve judgment, but such methods have not been rigorously tested. We compared the evidence evaluation and judgment accuracy of a group of intelligence analysts who were recently trained in ACH and then used it on a probability judgment task to another group of analysts from the same cohort that were neither trained in ACH nor asked to use any specific method. Although the ACH group assessed information usefulness better than the control group, the control group was a little more accurate (and coherent) than the ACH group. Both groups, however, exhibited suboptimal judgment and were susceptible to unpacking effects. Although ACH failed to improve accuracy, we found that recalibration and aggregation methods substantially improved accuracy. Specifically, mean absolute error (MAE) in analysts’ probability judgments decreased by 61% after first coherentizing their judgments (a process that ensures judgments respect the unitarity axiom) and then aggregating their judgments. The findings cast doubt on the efficacy of ACH, and show the promise of statistical methods for boosting judgment quality in intelligence and other organizations that routinely produce expert judgments.

Understanding how people perceive the pros and cons of risky behaviors such as terrorism or violent extremism represents a first step in developing research testing rational choice theory aiming to explain and predict peoples’ intentions to engage in, or support, these behaviors. Accordingly, the present study provides a qualitative, exploratory analysis of a sample of 57 male youths’ perceptions of the benefits and drawbacks of: (a) accessing a violent extremist website, (b) joining a violent extremist group, and (c) leaving such a group. Youth perceived significantly more drawbacks than benefits of joining a violent extremist group (p = .001, d = .46) and accessing a violent extremist website (p = .001, d = .46). The perceived benefits of engagement referred to gaining knowledge/awareness, being part of a group/similar people, and fighting the enemy/for a cause. The drawbacks referred to being exposed to negative material and emotions, having violent/criminal beliefs and behaviors, and getting in trouble with the law. The perceived benefits of disengagement referred to no longer committing illegal acts, and regaining independence/not being manipulated. The drawbacks referred to exposing oneself to harm and reprisal. These findings provide an insight into how male youth think about (dis)engagement in violent extremism, and can inform future quantitative research designed to explain and predict (dis)engagement in violent extremism. Eventually, such research may inform the development of evidence-based prevention and intervention strategies.

We used an open-ended survey to elicit Spanish young adults' perceptions of the benefits and drawbacks of speeding and not wearing a seatbelt (or helmet).Around half of the sample reported past engagement in these two risky behaviors, although forecasted engagement was low. Past and forecasted risk taking were positively correlated. Participants provided more drawbacks than benefits of each risky behavior. Drawbacks typically referred to a combination of behavioral acts and social reactions (e.g., accident, punishment) that occurred during the journey. By contrast, benefits largely referred to personal effects (e.g., save time, comfort) that occurred after the journey had ended (speeding) or during the journey (not wearing a seatbelt/helmet). These findings contribute to our theoretical understanding of young adults' risk taking on the road, and to the development of road safety programs.