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23 results

Page 1 of 2

  • Service evaluation of a sole-session psychoeducational intervention to improve caregivers’ key illness beliefs after first episode psychosis (FEP)

  • Cassie M. Hazell, Natasha Lyons, Juliana Onwumere, Joerg Schulz, Naomi Glover, Sarah Whittaker, Lai Chu Man, Caroline Floyd, Lucy Brown, Gareth James, Roya Afshardazegan, Saal Seneviratne, Shireen Rahim, Jonathan Souray, David Raune
  • Journal:
    The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist / Volume 13 / 2020
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    28 July 2020, e28

  • Carers of people experiencing a first episode of psychosis are at an increased risk of developing their own physical and mental health problems. Psychoeducation has been found to improve carer wellbeing and reduce distress. However, few psychoeducation interventions have considered the resource constraints on mental health services and the impact that these can have on the implementation of any such interventions. The present service evaluation aimed to evaluate an abbreviated version (sole session) of a previously tested psychoeducation intervention (three sessions) that targets less adaptive illness beliefs (n = 17). Pre–post effect sizes reveal that all of the carers’ illness beliefs changed in the desired direction, with four out of the 10 illness beliefs associated with large to moderate improvements. When compared with the outcomes obtained in our evaluation of the more intensive, three-session version of the intervention, the between-group effects largely favoured the three-session version but were mostly small. Moderate to large effects in favour of the three-session version were found for two of the 10 illness beliefs. These findings support the further investigation of the sole session psychoeducation intervention as part of a randomised controlled trial.

    Key learning aims

    1. (1) To evaluate the impact of a sole-session psychoeducation intervention on illness beliefs.

    2. (2) To compare the outcomes of the sole-session psychoeducation intervention to the previous, more intensive (three-session) version of the same intervention.

    3. (3) To consider the value of research approaches to evaluating psychoeducation interventions for carers of people with psychosis.

Is Political Philosophy Impossible?
  • Thoughts and Behaviour in Normative Political Theory
  • Jonathan Floyd
  • Published online:
    19 September 2017
    Print publication:
    07 September 2017
  • Political philosophy seems both impossible to do and impossible to avoid. Impossible to do, because we cannot agree on a single set of political principles. Impossible to avoid, because we're always living with some kind of political system, and thus some set of principles. So, if we can't do the philosophy, but can't escape the politics, what are we to do? Jonathan Floyd argues that the answer lies in political philosophy's deepest methodological commitments. First, he shows how political philosophy is practiced as a kind of 'thinking about thinking'. Second, he unpicks the different types of thought we think about, such as considered judgements, or intuitive responses to moral dilemmas, and assesses whether any are fit for purpose. Third, he offers an alternative approach - 'normative behaviourism' - which holds that rather than studying our thinking, we should study our behaviour. Perhaps, just sometimes, actions speak louder than thoughts.

  • Relative value and assorted historical lessons : an afterword

  • from Part II - The challenge of realism
  • Edited by Jonathan Floyd, University of Oxford, Marc Stears, University of Oxford
  • Book:
    Political Philosophy versus History?
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    04 August 2011, pp 206-225

  • Summary

    In this final contribution to our volume I should like to do two things: first, to introduce a concept which seems to me an implied requirement of many of the arguments developed by our gathered authors; second, to briefly reflect upon what further lessons might be drawn from their chapters, especially once those chapters are viewed alongside each other, with common trends and patterns thereby coming to the fore. The two parts are relatively independent of each other, so readers who find themselves uninterested in the first should feel free to jump ahead to the section entitled ‘Further thoughts and assorted historical lessons’.

    Relative value and the ranking problem

    In our introduction to this volume, we pointed out that, judging from the contents of our collected chapters, what emerges more than anything else from consideration of the significance of history for political philosophy is the need to orientate work in our subject between, on the one hand, universalistic and contextualist positions on the nature of political morality, and, on the other, idealistic and pessimistic positions on the nature of political possibility.

  • 2 - From historical contextualism, to mentalism, to behaviourism

  • from Part I - The challenge of contextualism
  • Edited by Jonathan Floyd, University of Oxford, Marc Stears, University of Oxford
  • Book:
    Political Philosophy versus History?
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    04 August 2011, pp 38-64

  • Summary

    What is the significance of history for political philosophy? Or, what do political philosophers need to know of history, if they are to do their work as it ought to be done? Or, as a third formulation, what do we need to know of how societies have thought and lived in the past, in order to decide how they ought to be governed in the future? Whichever way one puts it, it is an unusually tricky question to answer, and not just because it admits of numerous plausible answers, most of which are perfectly compatible with at least one of the others, but also because it requires an unusual degree of clarity regarding the answer we give to a still further question, namely, what is political philosophy? What I should like to do here, therefore, is to begin by saying something about both what I take political philosophy to be and what I take political philosophers to do (and just why I treat these as two distinct questions will be clear from the answers I give to them). Following that, I shall then examine just one particularly plausible account of the significance of history for this subject – an account which I am going to call ‘historical contextualism’ – and then, following that, examine two alternative suggestions regarding just what we might learn when we consider not just the significance of history in general to political philosophy, but also the significance of ‘historical context’ in particular. My conclusion, ultimately, will be that whilst historical contextualism as a form of political philosophy fails to deliver the goods, adopting a historical perspective on the method our subject employs may well prove invaluable.

Political Philosophy versus History?
  • Contextualism and Real Politics in Contemporary Political Thought
  • Edited by Jonathan Floyd, Marc Stears
  • Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    04 August 2011
  • Is the way in which political philosophy is conducted today too ahistorical? Does such ahistoricism render political philosophy too abstract? Is political philosophy thus incapable of dealing with the realities of political life? This volume brings together some of the world's leading political philosophers to address these crucial questions. The contributors focus especially on political philosophy's pretensions to universality and on its strained relationship with the world of real politics. Some chapters argue that political philosophers should not be cowed by the accusations levied against them from outside of their own field. Others insist that these accusations require a dramatic reshaping of normative political thought. The volume will spark controversy across political philosophy and beyond.

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