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Short-term peripheral venous catheter–related bloodstream infection (PVCR-BSI) rates have not been systematically studied in resource-limited countries, and data on their incidence by number of device days are not available.
Prospective, surveillance study on PVCR-BSI conducted from September 1, 2013, to May 31, 2019, in 727 intensive care units (ICUs), by members of the International Nosocomial Infection Control Consortium (INICC), from 268 hospitals in 141 cities of 42 countries of Africa, the Americas, Eastern Mediterranean, Europe, South East Asia, and Western Pacific regions. For this research, we applied definition and criteria of the CDC NHSN, methodology of the INICC, and software named INICC Surveillance Online System.
We followed 149,609 ICU patients for 731,135 bed days and 743,508 short-term peripheral venous catheter (PVC) days. We identified 1,789 PVCR-BSIs for an overall rate of 2.41 per 1,000 PVC days. Mortality in patients with PVC but without PVCR-BSI was 6.67%, and mortality was 18% in patients with PVC and PVCR-BSI. The length of stay of patients with PVC but without PVCR-BSI was 4.83 days, and the length of stay was 9.85 days in patients with PVC and PVCR-BSI. Among these infections, the microorganism profile showed 58% gram-negative bacteria: Escherichia coli (16%), Klebsiella spp (11%), Pseudomonas aeruginosa (6%), Enterobacter spp (4%), and others (20%) including Serratia marcescens. Staphylococcus aureus were the predominant gram-positive bacteria (12%).
PVCR-BSI rates in INICC ICUs were much higher than rates published from industrialized countries. Infection prevention programs must be implemented to reduce the incidence of PVCR-BSIs in resource-limited countries.
To investigate a Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) outbreak event involving multiple healthcare facilities in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; to characterize transmission; and to explore infection control implications.
Cases presented in 4 healthcare facilities in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: a tertiary-care hospital, a specialty pulmonary hospital, an outpatient clinic, and an outpatient dialysis unit.
Contact tracing and testing were performed following reports of cases at 2 hospitals. Laboratory results were confirmed by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) and/or genome sequencing. We assessed exposures and determined seropositivity among available healthcare personnel (HCP) cases and HCP contacts of cases.
In total, 48 cases were identified, involving patients, HCP, and family members across 2 hospitals, an outpatient clinic, and a dialysis clinic. At each hospital, transmission was linked to a unique index case. Moreover, 4 cases were associated with superspreading events (any interaction where a case patient transmitted to ≥5 subsequent case patients). All 4 of these patients were severely ill, were initially not recognized as MERS-CoV cases, and subsequently died. Genomic sequences clustered separately, suggesting 2 distinct outbreaks. Overall, 4 (24%) of 17 HCP cases and 3 (3%) of 114 HCP contacts of cases were seropositive.
We describe 2 distinct healthcare-associated outbreaks, each initiated by a unique index case and characterized by multiple superspreading events. Delays in recognition and in subsequent implementation of control measures contributed to secondary transmission. Prompt contact tracing, repeated testing, HCP furloughing, and implementation of recommended transmission-based precautions for suspected cases ultimately halted transmission.
Since the first isolation of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in Saudi Arabia in 2012, sporadic cases, clusters, and sometimes large outbreaks have been reported.
To describe the recent (2015) MERS-CoV outbreak at a large tertiary care hospital in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
We conducted an epidemiologic outbreak investigation, including case finding and contact tracing and screening. MERS-CoV cases were categorized as suspected, probable, and confirmed. A confirmed case was defined as positive reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction test for MERS-CoV.
Of the 130 suspected cases, 81 (62%) were confirmed and 49 (38%) were probable. These included 87 patients (67%) and 43 healthcare workers (33%). Older age (mean [SD], 64.4 [18.3] vs 40.1 [11.3] years, P<.001), symptoms (97% vs 58%, P<.001), and comorbidity (99% vs 42%, P<.001) were more common in patients than healthcare workers. Almost all patients (97%) were hospitalized whereas most healthcare workers (72%) were home isolated. Among 96 hospitalized cases, 63 (66%) required intensive care unit management and 60 (63%) required mechanical ventilation. Among all 130 cases, 51 (39%) died; all were patients (51 [59%]) with no deaths among healthcare workers. More than half (54%) of infections were believed to be caught at the emergency department. Strict infection control measures, including isolation and closure of the emergency department, were implemented to interrupt the chain of transmission and end the outbreak.
MERS-CoV remains a major healthcare threat. Early recognition of cases and rapid implementation of infection control measures are necessary.
Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2016;1–9
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