Kim Quaile Hill (PS: Political Science and Politics, July 2004) makes a
somewhat nuanced contribution to the appraisal of epistemic controversies in the discipline
of political science. His primary concern is for the manner in which erroneous presumptions
about the nature of the scientific method in fields such as chemistry or physics have
encumbered the effort to instill students with the habit of applying similar approaches in
the study of politics. At first, the argument seems directed at uninformed students who do
not recognize the social sciences as legitimately “scientific.” Upon further reading, it
quickly becomes clear in her elaboration of five common “myths” about science that the more
implicit intention of this piece is to challenge the assertion of some in the field that the
abstract, variant qualities of political phenomena make these applications somehow
inappropriate. The point that he proffers—that the physical sciences are hardly as rigid,
finite or objective as some may assume—is certainly a valid one.