Mr. Mackeigan has done me the honour of contributing, in the November issue of this Journal, full-length “Notes” in answer to my article on “Patents in Relation to Monopoly,” published in the August issue. If I now appear for the purpose of making the usual rejoinder it is not to be taken that I do so in any controversial spirit but only in an endeavour to answer his allegations and, if I can, to restore the patent system to the position it was in before it suffered the not inconsiderable knocking about which it has received at his hands. In doing so, I hope that I may make my points as temperately and as gracefully as has my learned friend, whose treatment of the subject from his point of view has been, if I may say so without impertinence, wholly admirable.
I must begin by taking sharp issue with Mr. MacKeigan on one point. I did not, as he says, extol the “theoretical adequacy of the Canadian Patent Act as an instrument to prevent abuses of patents.” I did and I do extol its practical adequacy for such purpose by reason of the provisions regarding compulsory licensing and revocation in case of abuse. And in this I interpose no mere ipse dixit. It would be a simple matter to append quotations from a multitude of sources which would build up an impressive body of opinion confirmatory of my statement. But I shall content myself with two extracts: The first of these is from an author in the United States who, in discussing cartels and the patent system, observes: “The most concrete and constructive suggestion for patent reform as a solution of the cartel problem calls for the compulsory licensing of patents when they have been used to foster international cartels, e.g. by the allocation of markets. … Compulsory licensing would be expected to remove the most serious obstacles which our patent laws at present interpose to the solution of the cartel problem.”