In The Existence of God (1979), Richard Swinburne
gave formal expression to
his utilization of the cumulative case argument and his application of
the
probability calculus to the theistic arguments. It is generally agreed,
I
believe, that this work is meticulous in detail and rigorously argued;
it is
also, I believe, generally agreed that the conclusion is disappointingly
bland – particularly in light of the high-powered apparatus brought
to bear
on the question of God's existence. It is my intent to show that,
perhaps,
those disappointed by Swinburne's conclusion were justified in so
feeling and
that a stronger conclusion follows directly from Swinburne's own arguments
and methodologies. Let me state at the outset, however, that this paper
is not
intended to be either an endorsement or a rejection of cumulative case
arguments in general or of the employment of the probability calculus in
such applications as the question of God's existence. Rather, I merely
seek
to assess Swinburne's conclusions on the grounds he
lays out in The Existence of God.