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Summary

Introduction

This chapter considers (potential) barriers hindering the inter-provincial establishment of companies in China. It elaborates the rules governing such establishment, examines their implementation in practice, explores existing solutions to tackle the obstacles to inter-provincial establishment, and investigates their enforcement effects. The objective of Chapter 2 is to demonstrate whether the obstacles stem from the legal provisions themselves or from the implementation of the rules on the inter-provincial establishment for companies.

Sections 2, 3 and 4 of this chapter discuss the rules on the establishment of a domestic company, the rules on the establishment of Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) and the rules on the inter-provincial establishment for companies in China, respectively. The elaboration of these provisions aims to examine whether the legal barriers for the establishment of companies in China can be erected according to law in the books.

Section 5 and section 6 study the actual situation of the inter-provincial establishment for domestic companies and FIEs in China, respectively. This chapter focuses only on the application of the rules on the inter-provincial establishment for companies. The aim is to analyse whether the execution of the rules can lead to barriers to the inter-provincial establishment of companies.

Section 7 interprets the laws coping with administrative monopolies in China. It is designed to evaluate whether such laws can ensure freedom in the interprovincial establishment of companies in China. The interpretation and enforcement of the rules governing this establishment are also studied in this section. This is because the research on the effectiveness of the anti-monopoly rules can certainly reveal the real situation whether companies can establish businesses in another province freely. Moreover, how the rules on the inter-provincial establishment for companies are applied in practice can be examined.

Based on the analysis in the preceding sections, section 8 provides original ideas on the possible causes for the occurrence of obstacles to the inter-provincial establishment of companies in China. The reasons are viewed from two perspectives: the provision and the implementation of national law in China.

Section 9 outlines the important changes in regulation of establishment brought by the reform measures of 2013. The social background of this amendment is also pointed out. Moreover, section 8 explains that (probably due to opposition from central regulators) such changes have been instituted in a pilot project rather than in the whole nation at once.

Summary

The Republic of Poland was the second post-communist country in the region to join the Council of Europe, on 26 November 1991. The European Convention on Human Rights (Convention or ECHR) was ratified by Poland on 19 January 1993 and entered into force on 1 May 1993. Thus, for more than twenty years the Convention, as an element of European public law, has been an instrument influencing and oft en shaping (next to other sources) the legal reality of the Republic of Poland. Poland has acceded to most of the Protocols that added rights (for the time being with the exception of Protocol no 12) and that changed procedural aspects. For years, Polish legislation has been highly criticised by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). However, in the last two years (until January 2015) the position of Poland in the statistics of the ECtHR improved, removing the country from the top list of Member States subject of claims and cases appearing in Strasbourg. The Polish cases before the ECtHR mainly concern two issues: length of judicial proceedings and excessive length of detention on remand.

The European Convention on Human Rights is perceived as one of the “external” constitutional sources of rights in Poland. According to Article 87 of the 1997 Constitution, the international agreements ratified with the agreement of Sejm (Lower Chamber of Polish Parliament) are binding sources of law. Although the Convention was ratified before the adoption of the 1997 Constitution, its content corresponds to those agreements that require this type of qualified ratification. According to Article 91 of the 1997 Constitution, such agreements form part of the internal legal order and prevail over statutes. If a statute cannot be reconciled with the Convention, the ECHR enjoys priority over it. According to the same Article of the 1997 Constitution, international agreements ratifi ed with the agreement of Sejm are directly applicable.

Even before the adoption of the 1997 Constitution, the Convention and ECtHR jurisprudence have been regularly invoked by all supreme courts of Poland (Sąd Najwyższy -Supreme Court, hereafter SN; Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny – Chief Administrative Court, hereafter NSA and Trybunał Konstytucyjny – Constitutional Tribunal, hereafter TK).

Summary

CRITICISM OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

DEVELOPMENT AND LOCUS OF THE DUTCH DEBATE ON THE ROLE OF THE COURT

The Netherlands is well-known for its advocacy of international human rights. For many it therefore came as a surprise that a critical debate about the Court emerged in the autumn of 2010. In November 2010, academic Thierry Baudet published an opinion in a national newspaper in which he criticised the Court for being overly intrusive and for violating national sovereignty. His opinion sparked a heated debate on the Court's role and legitimacy, which was partly conducted in the media and academia, and partly in the political arena. Several scholars contributed to the debate by publishing opinions and articles in national newspapers and in academic journals. Most of these opinions defended the Court and its work, but some stressed the Court's lack of legitimacy or at the least made critical remarks about its case law. The political criticism and the criticism expressed in scholarly opinions concentrated on the far-reaching character of the judgments of the ECtHR, the Court's position as an international court and the Court's inherently undemocratic character. The critics stressed that the Court had over-extended the scope of the Convention and that, as a result, it was deciding many cases that are not actually related to fundamental rights issues. In such cases, the critics stated, the Court was simply imposing its own view on national authorities, disrespecting both national sovereignty and the democratic legitimacy of national legislation. Thus the Court was presented as an antimajoritarian body; as an outsider meddling with national policy choices with a disregard for national traditions and opinions.

Several political parties, in particular the populist right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV) and the Liberal Party (VVD), took up such criticism of the Court. In particular in debates on matters of immigration and social security legislation, Members of Parliament (MPs) for these parties expressed themselves in negative terms about the interference of the ECtHR in such matters. The minority coalition Cabinet (a coalition of the VVD and the Christian Democrats (CDA), supported in Parliament by the PVV), initially appeared to support at least part of this criticism.

Summary

Recently, criticism of the ECtHR has taken on quite a drastic tone in Switzerland. The criticism is largely confined to the political sphere and the media. For example, some commentators called the practice or particular judgments of the ECtHR “bizarre” (concerning the interpretation of the right to a rejoinder), “unworldly” (relating to the judgment in the case of Hadri-Vionnet), or as being “at the limit of comprehensibility” (concerning the practice of the ECtHR in child abduction cases). In academic articles, criticism is sometimes couched in somewhat more subtle terms such as “human rights vs. legality” or “sacralisation of the law vs. primacy of politics”. In singular cases, criticism of individual ECtHR judgments against Switzerland even resorted to polemical language.

While the current political debate on Switzerland's relationship to the Convention system is characterised by a harsh tone, there is a consensus among the major political parties, the Swiss government as well as the majority of Swiss academics that the ECtHR performs a crucial function with regard to the protection of democracy, freedom and the rule of law. A recent attempt by a member of the Federal Council (the Swiss government) directed at terminating ECHR membership, failed to gain the approval of the other Council members. In addition, there have been repeated interventions by non-governmental organisations (e.g. Amnesty International Switzerland), several civil society associations (e.g. foraus, Verein “Unser Recht”, Informationsplattform humanrights.ch), and academic think tanks (e.g. the Swiss Centre of Expertise in Human Rights) stressing the importance of the Convention protection mechanism for Switzerland. Nevertheless, it is not unlikely that the present critical debate will result in changes of Swiss law, cutting back on the direct and the indirect domestic influence of the ECtHR on the Swiss legal order.

CRITICISM OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

CRITICISM IN THE MEDIA, ACADEMIA, POLITICAL ARENA, AND THE JUDICIARY

High-circulation media in Switzerland presents, on the whole, a balanced view of the debate on the ECtHR. Usually, newspapers like “Blick”, “Tagesanzeiger” and “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” try to picture the full range of opinions of the political spectrum.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

What's so bad about genocide denial? Several countries (largely in Europe) have banned denial of the Nazi crimes against the Jews. French Armenians have tried repeatedly to pass legislation banning Armenian genocide denial. Rwanda has banned denial of its genocide. The European Union Framework Decision calls on Member States to ban denial of genocide and crimes against humanity. Statutory violations can be enforced with prison sentences. One must add to this a general loathing of genocide denial. Even those who would tolerate genocide denial, describe it as offensive, vile and disgusting. This often comes with a call for non-legal responses to genocide denial ranging from education and counter-speech to ‘informal censorship’ (i.e. when libraries, social media outlets, newspapers, and other non-state actors refuse to engage with genocide deniers).

While there is a consensus that genocide denial is harmful, the harm is rarely spelled out. Instead, the focus is on the genocide denial bans. Reactions include shock (‘how can a free society ban a view about the past?’), assertions of the importance of history, and well-intentioned efforts to cabin the problem by narrowing the zone of acceptable genocide denial bans. These last efforts take two forms. Either one creates a hierarchy of genocides in which some killings (i.e. the Holocaust) become more important than other genocides. Or one makes an argument based on geography: given the deportation of 80,000 Jews during the occupation, France can (possibly) ban Holocaust denial; but the Ottoman genocide against the Armenians is another matter entirely since it did not occur on French soil.

These attempts to justify legal toleration of genocide denial make it easy to pass over a central question of the Denialism and Human Rights conference: what is it about denial that poses harm? For some of the types of denial discussed at this conference, the harm is relatively easy to see. For example, denial of global warming encourages states, corporations and individual consumers to make decisions that will exacerbate climate change. Likewise, the South African government's denial of AIDS led it to restrict access to anti-AIDS drugs. The harms here are immediate and visceral.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Why is poverty continuously sidelined as a human rights concern? Can it be the case that we are collectively in denial about the true extent of this global social problem? And if denial is taking place, what should the law do about it? If we identify a form of self-deception as the ‘root cause’ of the sidelining of poverty as a human rights concern, what follows from a legal perspective? In addressing these questions, this contribution defends two theses:

Summary

‘No amount of intellectual sophistication can ground us in reality when our emotional wounds are serious enough.’ (Grille 2013)

‘In the words of Dr. Robert Block, the former President of the American Academy of Pediatrics, “Adverse childhood experiences are the single greatest unaddressed public health threat facing our nation today.” And for a lot of people, that's a terrifying prospect. The scope and scale of the problem seems so large that it feels overwhelming to think about how we might approach it. … [A]t first I thought that we marginalized the issue because it doesn't apply to us. That's an issue for those kids in those neighborhoods. Which is weird, because the data doesn't bear that out. … But then, the more I talked to folks, I'm beginning to think that maybe I had it completely backwards. If I were to ask how many people in this room grew up with a family member who suffered from mental illness, I bet a few hands would go up. And then if I were to ask how many folks had a parent who maybe drank too much, or who really believed that if you spare the rod, you spoil the child, I bet a few more hands would go up. Even in this room, this is an issue that touches many of us, and I am beginning to believe that we marginalize the issue because it does apply to us. … The single most important thing that we need today is the courage to look this problem in the face and say, this is real and this is all of us.’ (Burke Harris 2014)

‘Given the epidemic of violence against children, the multiplicity of its forms, its cross-border nature, and the fact that children are not safe even in their own homes, the campaign to abolish it is still in its early stages. … The elimination of all violence against children and freedom from violence in all its forms will … remain the human rights imperative of the next decades to come, if not of the twenty-first century.’ (Lenzer 2015)

INTRODUCTION

Nazism was aggressive and utterly racist, to a degree unparalleled in human history.

Summary

CRITICISM OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Summary

The inadequate commitment of academia to climate change research, and the neglected, under-developed state of climate justice, must be addressed and counter-acted. The following paper aspires to pay a small contribution to that specific cause. This essay is based on the fact that climate change is undermining the fulfillment of internationally protected human rights, like the rights to health and life; the right to food, water, shelter, property; rights associated with livelihood and culture; with migration and resettlement; and with personal security in the event of conflict. The worst effects of climate change are principally felt by those whose rights protections are already insufficient. In this essay, I highlight these risks and advocate their consideration. Additionally I ask questions such as: what are the human rights repercussions of climate change, and how does the extensive organisation of international human rights law and knowledge, convey that phenomenon? Where does international human rights law overlap with or provoke duties under the embryonic climate justice regime? Where should climate change strategies challenge human rights essentials? My ambition is to clarify the confusion covering this area of study, and by examining the relationship between climate change and human rights, an attempt is made to discover, examine, and analyse their most essential links.

INTRODUCTION

It seems to me that any discourse on climate justice would be incomplete without a reflection on climate change denial. However, allow me to start by stressing the need to draw clear distinguishing lines between, denialism, denialist, and denial. Scholars tend to use them interchangeably, as if these terms refer to the same thing, but from the perspective of the author of this paper on the issues at stake, they do not signify the same idea.

So, the first realisation on the topic at hand is that we need to construct a comprehensive theory that will explain denialism's essence. In an Aristotelian sense, discovering the essence of the subject of our concern, requires breaking it down into its most essential elements. In the same line of reasoning, any epistemological discourse, implies a quest for Truth, while approaching on occasions at the ‘unconcealedness’ of the ‘aletheia’ in language. This is not the purpose of this paper, but by staying with that train of thought, I will just touch upon a necessary philosophically driven clarification.

Summary

Turkey's relationship with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) goes hand in hand with the country's bid to join the European club. This bid shapes the attitudes of almost all circles in the country towards the ECHR. Turkey was founded on the ruins of the theocratic Ottoman Empire in the early 1920s. The founders of modern Turkey launched a modernisation campaign based on the western values of secularism, democracy and rule of law. With the idea of creating a modern public society, an extensive reception of western law was launched and conceived of as an instrument of social transformation. As such, an apparent conflict arose between traditional law and the needs of the society in so far as it aspired to organise itself by western standards and values. At the opening ceremony of the Ankara Law School, the founder of the Republic Mustafa Kemal stated: ‘We are attempting to uproot the old principles of law by formulating completely new laws. We are establishing these institutions to educate a new generation of jurists from the very beginning with new principles.'

During the Second World War, the young republic struggled with economic and political turmoil, which pushed the country to remain neutral in the war. Political developments on the European continent and in Turkey following the end of the war overlapped. Turkey held its first multi-party general elections in 1946 while Europe was working on establishing a system that could guarantee a permanent peace on the continent. When ten countries established the Council of Europe (COE) with the Treaty of London on 5 May 1949, the new Republic saw parallels between the founding principles of the COE and the Republic. Being a member of the COE was seen as another step forward to further establishing the European lifestyle in the country. On 13th April 1950 Turkey became the thirteenth member of the COE. This early membership places Turkey among the founding members of the Council.

While Turkey has been defining and refining its identity in the eyes of the Europeans, being a party to European human rights instruments is seen as sine qua non in the construction of its European identity.

Summary

CRITICISM OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the activity of its Court (ECtHR) are not very well covered by the Italian media. Actually Italian newspapers and the media frequently confuse the ECHR with EU law and, even more frequently, the ECtHR with the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This is emblematic of the very low level of the Italian media. Sometimes decisions delivered by the Luxembourg Court are attributed to the Strasbourg Court and vice versa. The situation is a bit better in the political world, although many politicians show not to know the difference between the two European Courts while the academia and the judiciary seem to be more used to the terminological ‘hidden dangers’ caused by the human rights architecture in Europe. There is no connection between the lack or presence of criticism and the status of the Convention and the ECtHR's judgments in the national legal system, although the degree of ‘invasiveness’ of the ECHR – especially after decisions n. 348 and 349/2007 of the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) – is a factor which makes the decisions of the ECtHR more perceivable by the relevant actors, especially judges and political powers. There have been some exceptions to the impermeability of the media towards the activity of the ECtHR, probably the most important example in this respect is offered by the Lautsi saga. After Lautsi I many politicians reacted very badly, for instance Mariastella Gelmini – at that time Minister for Education – said the crucifix is a “symbol of our tradition”, and not a mark of Catholicism, Silvio Berlusconi – at that time ‘Prime Minister’ – defi ned Lautsi ‘not acceptable for us Italians. It is one of those decisions that make us doubt Europe's common sense’. However, the toughest reaction was that of Ignazio La Russa, at that time Minister for Defence, who said on TV – during a very popular talk show (‘La vita in diretta’):

Anyway, we won't take away the crucifix! They can die! The crucifix will remain in all schools’ rooms, in all public rooms! They can die! They can die! Them and those fake international organizations that count for nothing!

Summary

The call for papers for the Maastricht conference on ‘Denialism and Human Rights’ referred to Thabo Mbeki, former South African President: ‘After having rejected the scientific wisdom about AIDS, former South African President Thabo Mbeki and his government were directly responsible for many avoidable deaths according to research by Harvard University’ (The Guardian, 2008).

On the face of it, present-day South Africa has moved beyond this kind of AIDS denialism, with the present government embracing scientific approaches to HIV prevention and treatment. However, I argue that AIDS denialism is still very present in South Africa, especially in our courts’ approach to the ‘intentional’ transmission of HIV to sexual partners. This paper, therefore, examines the implications of the recent North Gauteng High Court decision in Phiri v. S. for potential charges regarding the wrongful transmission of HIV, and questions the appropriateness of the court's decision in the context of public health efforts to curb the HIV epidemic.

I employ Stanley Cohen's analysis of the elementary forms of denial as a basis of my argument that Phiri v. S. is an instance where the South African courts, when they should have affirmed human rights, instead provided for denialist defence mechanisms, so facilitating the denial of the human rights of those infected and affected by HIV and AIDS in South Africa.

INTRODUCTION

On the face of it, present-day South Africa has moved beyond the kind of AIDS denialism that was espoused by former President Thabo Mbeki. The current South African government embraces scientific approaches to HIV prevention and treatment and South Africa presently has the largest HIV antiretroviral programme in the world, despite isolated concerns regarding delivery.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding these advances, a form of AIDS denialism is still very present in South Africa, especially in our courts’ approach to the ‘intentional’ transmission of HIV to sexual partners. This paper, therefore, examines the implications of the recent North Gauteng High Court decision in Phiri v. S. for potential charges regarding the wrongful transmission of HIV, and questions the appropriateness of the court's decision in the context of public health efforts to curb the HIV epidemic.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

It might sound oxymoronic that the concept of denialism could be applied to, and discussed in, the context of international organisations and institutions. Denialism is understood as a behaviour (or behavioural pattern) which primarily concerns individuals or groups of people. Its content could be extended to additionally cover sovereign states. However, even in such cases it would principally be the population of a state exhibiting denialism as a form of personal conduct when dealing with a specific issue or when trying to avoid dealing with it. Indeed, it is in the nature of people, either individually or in unison, to refuse to accept facts, events or beliefs which are widely held by others, even when they are objectively regarded as being true, accurate and scientifically correct. In such instances denialism could be perceived as a means of self-preservation. To have done otherwise could have led to facing new realities contradicting what was understood as the absolute truth for many decades or even for centuries.

The above considerations also apply to states. Particularly so when to deny facts or events is used for domestic consumption promoting the agenda of the government of the day or when it has reached the stage of becoming official state policy. In the latter case denialism will influence foreign relations and dealings with third countries. Often the acceptance by one state of an event or historical situation vehemently denied by another state could lead to breakdown in diplomatic relations.

While individuals and states exhibit the attributes of denialism and could spend time, energy and money to promote and to defend their position, international organisations do not prima facie have the characteristics associated with denialism. Here lies the oxymoron: during the exercise of their mandate and the implementation of their goals, as laid down in the constitutive instrument and interpreted through their action (or inaction), international organisations may exhibit denialism in the sense of deliberately refusing to do one or both of the following, which fall within their legitimate powers and functions: (a) adopt specific measures; and (b) order Member States to follow a particular behaviour or to abstain from it.

Summary

The 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide is also the year of the revision by the Grand Chamber of the Doğu Perinçek v. Switzerland judgment rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on 17 December 2013. We will focus here on one of the arguments set forth by the ECtHR in 2013, which disfavours the Swiss criminal jurisdictions in this case of genocide denial: the problematic argument of the absence of a ‘general consensus’ on the 1915 genocide. This contribution aims to shed light on the paradoxes and consequences of such an argument that calls, notably, for a historical perspective – and demands, in particular, that we look back on the history of international criminal law.

‘[T]hey will persist. And you won't yet have come to their real plan: they do not, in spite of what they say, intend to make history, but rather modify irreversibly what happens when a community consents.’

The year which marks the centenary of the Armenian genocide is also the year which sees a legal challenge against the ruling of 17 December 2013 by the ECtHR in the case of Doğu Perinçek v. Switzerland. In this ruling, the Court (by five votes to two) found Switzerland guilty of having violated the applicant's freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR. The holder of a law doctorate who ‘considers himself as an historian and writer’, Perinçek is the Chairman of the Turkish Workers’ Party (recently renamed ‘Homeland Party’ – Vatan Partisi) and the founder of the Talaat Pasha Committee, the aim of which is to rehabilitate and defend the memory of the principal instigator of the 1915 Armenian genocide – the ‘Ottoman Hitler’.

Among the various arguments presented by the ECtHR in support of its overruling of the Swiss courts in this genocide denial case, one stands out as deserving particular attention here. According to the Court, the denial expressed by Doğu Perinçek when he described the Armenian genocide specifically as an ‘international imperialist lie’ poses no problem from the point of view of human rights, as it supposedly only denies the legal characterisation of the genocide (rather than the facts themselves): a characterisation which, in this particular case, is apparently not the subject of ‘general consensus’.

Summary

Denialism is a useful lens through which to think about children's legal and social situation. Diagnosing it might also be a relatively effective way of producing progress. By pinpointing explicit or implicit premises in the reasoning of those who would justify unjust treatment of a group and showing the premises entail denial of something demonstrably true, one might make greater headway in converting those others than one might by presenting the case in favour of just treatment. Many people cannot open their minds to others’ views until forced to see problems with their own views.

FORMS OF DENIALISM REGARDING CHILDREN

I identify below four forms denialism takes in discourse concerning children, or in other words, four types of premises – usually implicit rather than explicit, perhaps even unconscious in most instances – that underlie asserted justifications for treating children in certain ways that, from an objective perspective, are harmful. The four forms of denialism are moral, conceptual, descriptive and empirical. One could categorise or characterise the phenomenon I describe differently; the typology I adopt is not itself important, but simply a means of imposing order on the analysis. The four forms I identify are inter-related and mutually reinforcing.

MORAL DENIALISM

The problematic moral premise is a denial of children's equal moral status. By ‘moral status’ I mean the relative position a being occupies, in a moral hierarchy, by virtue of which it commands moral concern. To the extent a being has moral status, moral agents must pay its interests or integrity some regard in their decision making. If a being is of lesser or no moral status, moral agents may give less or no weight to its interests in rational decision making.

The view that children are of inferior moral status relative to autonomous adults, and therefore less worthy of moral regard, used to be explicit, just as a similar view was once explicit regarding slaves, women, and mentally disabled persons. Today it is more commonly implicit. Outwardly almost no one today says children are of lesser moral worth relative to adults. But it seems implicit in many arguments as to why children should not receive certain protections or benefits that they are simply less deserving of moral regard than are adults.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses denial and acknowledgment in public responses to information about human rights violations. It draws on the findings from a series of qualitative studies investigating ordinary people's understanding of, responses to (including actions and inaction), and emotional and cognitive reactions to information about human rights violations. This work complements existing theorisations of denial and offers an empirically grounded formulation of denial and acknowledgment to illustrate the varied and complex modalities in which they find expression in people's behaviours and attitudes.

The first part of the chapter briefly summarises the key features of denial in the original formulations by Freud and then developed by Cohen. In bringing these two formulations together it proposes a psychosocial theorisation of denial as generated by a conglomerate of social and psychological influences.

The second part of the chapter is dedicated to ‘acknowledgement’, the opposite of denial. It introduces the ‘3M’ model delineating the psychosocial factors fostering a ‘connectedness’ with human rights and humanitarian issues that is manageable, meaningful and sustainable for individuals.

Quotes from the studies’ participants will illustrate how people ‘do’ denial and acknowledgement, how empathy and connectedness with the sufferer is blocked through denial but also how the connectedness can be fostered and integrated into everyday morality, enabling action and ongoing active respect for human rights principles.

Questions about knowledge and action are central to any exploration of denial and acknowledgment. That is, what and how much people know about human rights violations, and what they do in response to that knowledge. Hence, at the core of formulations of denial and acknowledgement is a tension between, on the one hand, knowing and not knowing, and on the other, the self-protective ‘switching off‘ and the intentional ‘turning away’. Throughout the chapter I will return to these tensions and the dynamism between what could be paraphrased as ‘I wish but I can't’ and ‘I could but I won't’. The ‘I can't’ refers to not being able to intervene, viewed here as an automatic selfprotective defence mechanism which includes helplessness and disassociation resulting from trauma. The ‘I won't’ refers to the conscious turning away that has to be justified and accounted for.

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