Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Abbreviations for Rawls’s texts
- Introduction
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- 174 Race
- 175 Rational choice theory
- 176 Rational intuitionism
- 177 Realistic utopia
- 178 The reasonable and the rational
- 179 Reasonable hope
- 180 Reasonable pluralism
- 181 Reciprocity
- 182 Reconciliation
- 183 Redress, principle of
- 184 Relective equilibrium
- 185 Religion
- 186 Respect for persons
- 187 Right: concept of, and formal constraints of
- 188 Rights, constitutional
- 189 Rights, moral and legal
- 190 Rorty, Richard
- 191 Ross, W. D.
- 192 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
- 193 Rule of law
- 194 Rules (two concepts of)
- S
- T
- U
- W
- Bibliography
- Index
178 - The reasonable and the rational
from R
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Abbreviations for Rawls’s texts
- Introduction
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- 174 Race
- 175 Rational choice theory
- 176 Rational intuitionism
- 177 Realistic utopia
- 178 The reasonable and the rational
- 179 Reasonable hope
- 180 Reasonable pluralism
- 181 Reciprocity
- 182 Reconciliation
- 183 Redress, principle of
- 184 Relective equilibrium
- 185 Religion
- 186 Respect for persons
- 187 Right: concept of, and formal constraints of
- 188 Rights, constitutional
- 189 Rights, moral and legal
- 190 Rorty, Richard
- 191 Ross, W. D.
- 192 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
- 193 Rule of law
- 194 Rules (two concepts of)
- S
- T
- U
- W
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Beginning with the Dewey Lectures (“Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” (1980) in CP), Rawls distinguishes between the reasonable and the rational. The reasonable is a particular form of practical rationality, but it is not always easy to understand what distinguishes it from the rational. At times it seems that the reasonable is the broader category: Rawls explains that a course of action may be rational in the sense of being in a person’s narrow interest, but nonetheless unreasonable because unacceptable to others (LHMP 164). At other times, however, it seems that the rational is the broader category: especially in PL, the principles of justice are said to be merely reasonable, not rationally justified in some deeper sense. How can we make sense of these distinctions?
In TJ, Rawls writes that his contractarian theory of justice “conveys the idea that principles of justice may be conceived as principles that would be chosen by rational persons, and that in this way conceptions of justice may be explained and justified. The theory of justice is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of rational choice” (TJ 3, 16). This striking claim was soon subject to severe criticism, and Rawls eventually abandoned it (PL 53 n.7). Even in TJ, it is clear that Rawls is operating with more than one conception of rationality, and much of his later work is devoted to clarifying their differences.
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- Information
- The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon , pp. 692 - 697Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014
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