20.1 Introduction

This chapter offers an analysis of the South China Sea (SCS) Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v The People’s Republic of China) (SCS Arbitration) and the corresponding arbitral award (the Award),Footnote ¹ using a popular animated film as a lens. The film is Disney’s Raya and the Last Dragon (Raya), which tells the story of the fictional land of Kumandra, a once-prosperous nation, and its peaceful and united people, where hundreds of years ago, magical dragons lived harmoniously amongst humans. Then evil spirits called the Druun mysteriously appeared and began to ravage the once wealthy unified nation. The people of Kumandra, distrusting each other, splintered into five warring nations/tribes: Fang, Heart, Tail, Spine, and Talon. It is against the backdrop of these fictional nations fighting each other for scarce resources that I approach this analysis. Law and Film has become a relatively mature discipline, and within the broader field of “law-in-film,” there is now extensive scholarship that studies the impact of film in shaping our expectations of legal processes and how the public at large view law and justice.Footnote ² It has been said that film is an effective tool to communicate ideasFootnote ³ and the emotional impact of a film may shape public opinion. The conflict in Raya effectively communicates that conflict over scarce resources and overlapping territories cannot be resolved by aggression, mutual distrust, and lack of cooperation. This chapter analogizes the themes in Raya with the factual background of the SCS Arbitration with the aim of reshaping international support to help bring about compliance with the Award. While the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention) lacks a compliance mechanism, this chapter envisages that the Convention’s conciliation procedure may offer a way forward if China does not voluntarily comply with the Award.

The first part of this chapter will introduce the SCS Arbitration, conducted under Annex VII of the UNCLOS, and discuss the enforcement of such awards. The second part of the chapter will explore further whether the Award may be capable of “enforcement,” if necessary, through alternative, more practical means. The third and final part of this chapter will present a path for a cooperative process that reimagines bringing China back to the table in light of the dispute resolution strategies and tactics used in Raya and their potential to inspire renewed efforts towards a settled outcome.

20.2 The Annex VII Arbitration between the Philippines and China

As a voluntary dispute resolution mechanism where the parties submit their dispute to one or more arbitrators who render a binding arbitral award, arbitration is further distinguished by the principle of party autonomy. However, arbitration can only effectively function within the framework of a legal system establishing some “coercive” rules. In inter-State arbitration, these coercive rules will not always extend to the types of recognition and enforcement processes seen in international commercial arbitration. The Award issued in favor of the Philippines in the SCS Arbitration has yet to be enforced or even recognized by China. The Philippines finds itself in a conundrum as the recipient of a binding arbitral award against China that, to this day, lacks an avenue of enforcement.

The Philippines initiated the SCS Arbitration proceedings on 22 January 2013,Footnote ⁴ invoking Article 287 of the UNCLOS, to which both the Philippines and China are party. The Convention provides compulsory third-party dispute settlement when parties cannot settle a dispute by negotiation, conciliation, or other peaceful means. States that do not make a written declaration setting out their choice of procedure for dispute resolution are deemed to have accepted Annex VII arbitration, as is the case between China and the Philippines.Footnote ⁵ Accordingly, the SCS Arbitration was heard by an arbitral tribunal operating under UNCLOS Annex VII.

The Philippines requested the constitution of the tribunal under Annex VII (the Tribunal) and on 22 January 2013 appointed the first Tribunal member under Article 3(b) of Annex VII of the Convention. On 23 March 2013, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) President appointed the second Tribunal member for China upon the Philippines’ request pursuant to Articles 3(c) and 3(e), which empower the ITLOS President to make such an appointment when a party fails to choose their party-appointed arbitrator within the allowed period.Footnote ⁶ Article 3(e) requires the ITLOS President to make such an appointment from a list of arbitrators maintained by the UN Secretary-General within thirty days of receiving such a request and in consultation with the parties. China did not participate in this process. Thereafter, the Philippines requested the President of ITLOS to appoint the three remaining members of the Tribunal under Article 3(d) and (e). On 24 April 2013, the President of ITLOS completed the constitution of the five-member tribunal, including the appointment of the Tribunal President. On 5 July 2013, the President of the duly constituted Tribunal requested the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to serve as registry for the proceedings,Footnote ⁷ which the PCA accepted, and the Philippines acceded to. Consistent with its stance that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction in the case, China neither confirmed nor refused approval of the PCA registry appointment.Footnote ⁸ The seat of arbitration was in the Netherlands.Footnote ⁹

The Philippines filed the arbitration to address aspects of the legal dispute between the parties’ respective rights and entitlements in the South China Sea after failed bilateral and multilateral negotiations (involving other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member States) and consultations with China.Footnote ¹⁰ Meanwhile, the Philippines ably characterized the subject matter in these proceedings as involving only the interpretation and application of relevant UNCLOS provisions and thus falling well within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Philippines argued that China’s claim to “historic rights,” together with China’s “nine-dash line” and associated action, was effectively preventing the Philippines from exercising its rights under the Convention, to wit:

China, through public statements, diplomatic correspondence, and proactively, by way of China’s occupation or control of eight maritime features in the SCS, had claimed “sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the waters, seabed and subsoil of the South China Sea”Footnote ¹³ outside the entitlements allowed under UNCLOS but claimed by China to fall within its territory as encompassed by the “nine-dash line.” According to China, “its ‘historic rights,’ which are said to pre-date and exist apart from the Convention, entitled it alone to exercise ‘sovereign rights’ in these areas, including the exclusive right to exploit living and non-living resources, and to prevent exploitation by other coastal States, even in areas within 200 nautical miles (nm) of their coasts.”Footnote ¹⁴ The Philippines alleged that China’s exaggerated maritime claims and attempts to enforce them were contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect and had violated the Philippines’ rights under the Convention.Footnote ¹⁵ The Philippines went on to argue both:

The Philippines expertly crafted its submission not as one concerning territorial sovereignty or maritime boundary delimitation but rather as a request for the determination of whether certain “insular features in the South China Sea were either rocks (entitled to a 12 nm territorial sea), low-tide elevations with no territorial sea, or islands (entitled to a 200 nm zone),”Footnote ¹⁷ even though sovereignty over the features in question remained disputed between the parties.

The Tribunal held it had jurisdiction to decide the South China Sea case under UNCLOS.Footnote ¹⁸ Thus, the issues raised by the Philippines were determined to be arbitrable and within the Tribunal’s remit.Footnote ¹⁹ On 12 July 2016, the Tribunal issued its unanimous merits Award.

Commentators have hailed the Award as a “landmark,” the most crucial part of which is the Tribunal’s finding that “China’s claim to ‘historic rights’ to the living and non-living resources within the ‘nine-dash line’ is incompatible with the Convention to the extent that it exceeds the limits of China’s maritime zones as provided for by the Convention.”Footnote ²⁰ Interpreting the text of the Convention, the Tribunal held that the Convention grants exclusive sovereign rights in favor of the coastal State to the living and non-living resources within its exclusive economic zone and that, under the Convention, claims of sovereign rights over living and non-living resources would generally be incompatible with claims of historic rights to the same resources, specifically if such historic rights are claimed to be exclusive, as in China’s case.Footnote ²¹ The Tribunal concluded that by its text, the Convention has comprehensively addressed the rights of other (coastal) States within the areas of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and leaves no space for an assertion of historic rights.Footnote ²² The Tribunal further concluded that upon China’s accession to the Convention “any historic rights that China may have had to the living and non-living resources within the ‘nine-dash line’ were superseded, as a matter of law and as between the Philippines and China, by the limits of the maritime zones provided for by the Convention.”Footnote ²³

The invalidity of China’s “nine-dash line” implied a recognition of the integrity of the Philippines’ full 200 nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the West Philippine Sea. In effect, the Award affirms that the Philippines’ maritime area is in fact bigger than the combined land area of all its islands and that all the living and non-living resources, such as fish, gas, oil, and other natural resources, in this huge maritime area belong to this archipelagic State – the Philippines.Footnote ²⁴ Additionally, the Award would, in ordinary circumstances, also be expected to secure the freedom of the high seas in this part of the world. The waters and fish in the high seas, including the mineral resources outside the extended continental shelf, unequivocally now form part of the global commons,Footnote ²⁵ and are therefore res communis.

As an offshoot of the invalidity of the “nine-dash line,” the Philippines’ other claims were also predominantly decided in its favor. The other salient points of the Award may be broadly categorized as involving a ruling on either “the status of certain maritime features in the South China Sea or the legality of Chinese activities in the South China Sea.”Footnote ²⁶

The Tribunal ruled that the Spratly Islands do not generate an EEZ because they are not islands in a strict legal sense but are instead categorized as rocksFootnote ²⁷ or low-tide elevations. The Tribunal concluded that the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands (including Itu Aba, Thitu, West York, Spratly Island, South-West Cay, and North-East Cay);Footnote ²⁸ the high-tide features at Scarborough Shoal;Footnote ²⁹ the high-tide features at Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef;Footnote ³⁰ the high-tide features at Gaven Reef (North) and McKennan Reef, are all considered rocks.Footnote ³¹ They are not, in their own natural condition and without relying on external human intervention, capable of sustaining human habitation within the meaning of Article 121(3) of the Convention, nor of sustaining an economic life of their own, and thus have no EEZ nor continental shelf.Footnote ³²

Having already invalidated the “nine-dash line,” the Tribunal also concluded that there is no legal basis under the Convention for China’s claim of any entitlement to maritime zones in the area of Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Subi Reef. Being low-tide elevations, they generate no entitlement to maritime zones of their own that would overlap with the entitlement of the Philippines to an EEZ and continental shelf generated from baselines on the island of Palawan.Footnote ³³ Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are well within the Philippines’ 200 nm off Palawan Island. As between the Philippines and China, Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal lie within the Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf.Footnote ³⁴

As the Convention is clear on coastal State rights in EEZs and on continental shelves,Footnote ³⁵ the Tribunal held that China had breached UNCLOS provisions and violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights to its EEZ and continental shelf,Footnote ³⁶ as underpinned by the events and acts committed by China in the years leading up to the filing of the arbitral proceedings, such as

Although the Award is binding,Footnote ³⁸ the UNCLOS does not provide for an enforcement mechanism, unlike for instance, the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism, which has the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The DSB is the official WTO body with powers to monitor disputants’ compliance with dispute settlement reports/rulings and to authorize, upon request by the party invoking the dispute settlement procedures, suspension of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements if no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within the mandated period.Footnote ³⁹

The UNCLOS and the WTO Agreements have notable similarities in their structure and scope in that they are both multilateral agreements having a broad mandate and reach. They both include arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism that the parties may choose to resolve their disputes.Footnote ⁴⁰ But, while these similarities exist, significant differences remain concerning enforcement. Where a dispute settlement report has been adopted, and the losing WTO Member fails to correct its breach of the relevant WTO rules, the DSB can authorize the prevailing State party to take appropriate countermeasures.Footnote ⁴¹ Disputes over the scope of such measures may themselves be the subject of Panel and Appellate Body proceedings.Footnote ⁴² Such measures are not made available to State parties as part of the UNCLOS dispute settlement regime,Footnote ⁴³ although general international law will continue to apply. In respect of damage caused by pollution of the marine environment, States are to ensure the availability of compensation through their domestic legal systemsFootnote ⁴⁴ and to cooperate in the implementation and development of international law on liability and compensation.Footnote ⁴⁵

Arbitration under UNCLOS can also be compared and contrasted with investor-state arbitration. In both UNCLOS and International Conve-ntion for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention) an award of a tribunal is binding on all parties to the proceedings and each party must comply with it pursuant to its terms.Footnote ⁴⁶ However, in respect of ICSID arbitration, if a party fails voluntarily to comply with an award, the other party can seek to have the pecuniary obligations recognized and enforced in the courts of any ICSID member State as though the award were a final judgment of that State’s courts.Footnote ⁴⁷ There is no similar mechanism available in UNCLOS.Footnote ⁴⁸

This is not however to suggest that this type of remedy (i.e., imposition of countermeasures as in the WTO) or legal process (enforcement action in respect of pecuniary obligations before a national court as in investment treaty arbitration) would be helpful or even effective in the SCS Arbitration. The latter does not involve trade issues or pecuniary obligations, and economic sanctions or judgments in respect of unmade payments do not seem appropriate.

Nevertheless, the Award in favor of the Philippines remains final and binding between the parties and must be complied with by the parties to the dispute.Footnote ⁴⁹ The Award is without appeal as the parties had not agreed to an appellate procedure in advance.Footnote ⁵⁰ Failure by one State party to participate does not change nor affect the final and binding nature of the Award.

20.3 Compliance Mechanisms for the SCS Arbitral Award

Years after the UNCLOS was adopted, scholars like Professor Robin Churchill have suggested that UNCLOS should have included the type of non-compliance procedure now found in several multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).Footnote ⁵¹ Professor Churchill has further elaborated that

In the case of the SCS dispute, would the non-adversarial nature of NCPs have led to a creative path in addressing, for example, the issues of the “nine-dash line” claim based on China’s so-called “historic rights” and of China’s encroachment on the Philippines’ EEZ?

Non-compliance mechanisms (NCMs) may be considered a better alternative to the more traditional and adversarial dispute settlement mechanisms that may be resorted to under UNCLOS, such as the ICJ, ITLOS, and even Annex VII arbitration. Although the primary aim of NCMs is not dispute settlement, they nonetheless often produce that effect.Footnote ⁵³ This may be attributed to the following: firstly, they provide a reportorial mechanism on how State parties implement their treaty commitments; secondly, if there are allegations of acts of non-compliance, they offer a venue for examining these incidents; and thirdly NCMs offer mechanisms for direct support to address these incidents.Footnote ⁵⁴

When the Philippines filed the arbitral proceedings in 2013, an NCM was not available. However, the Philippines’ foreign policy (then led by the late President Benigno Aquino) was to obtain an unequivocal and enduring ruling that would outline the rights of the Philippines to its EEZ and its continental shelf, and recognize its citizens’ unhampered rights to the fish, oil, gas, and other natural resources in these zones for its own use and benefit. The Chinese government’s strategy, on the other hand, was to seek to muster international support for its stance as well as garner political capital from its own citizens.

The economic and military might of China seem daunting to a smaller developing State like the Philippines, but the SCS Arbitral Award has given the Philippines political and moral leverage. However, although the Philippines obtained the best possible outcomes from this arbitration against China, the nature of the claims raised by the Philippines lend themselves to a most difficult enforcement or compliance process: for example, in respect of the claim of sovereign rights as compared with China’s “nine-dash line” claim to “historic rights”; EEZ boundaries; classification of a land feature as either an “island” or rock; the claimed violation by China of its international navigation and marine conservation treaty obligations during law enforcement and land reclamation activities;Footnote ⁵⁵ illegal fishing and harvesting by Chinese nationals; and violation of UNCLOS obligations to protect the marine environment.Footnote ⁵⁶ The issues raised by the Philippines did not entail trade or investment interests, but rather “largely non-economic calculations.”Footnote ⁵⁷ Such interests are not easily quantifiable in monetary terms, unlike for example a commercial dispute involving a mining contract and its interpretation or application, which might be unilaterally submitted to binding arbitration,Footnote ⁵⁸ and dealt with through a monetary award. A claimant making these kinds of claims, as the Philippines did, is generally looking for a resumption of compliance by the other party rather than compensation. At the same time, the claims went beyond ordinary claims of maritime pollution or violations of marine conservation that might more obviously have been susceptible to multilateral NCPs, if such procedures had been available, or simply to “performance review information (self-reporting)”;Footnote ⁵⁹ or where improved compliance might be brought about through direct support such as by providing technical and financial assistance.Footnote ⁶⁰

As a push-back of sorts, without an outright butting of heads with China, the Philippines can and must continue to exercise its rights and jurisdiction over its 200 nm EEZ and its 12 nm territorial sea. Entering into multilateral arrangements with other neighbouring coastal States on the conservation and management of living resources in the high seasFootnote ⁶¹ could arguably be viewed as a form of unilateral “enforcement,” as a confirmatory act of the ruling that China’s “nine-dash line” claim is inconsistent with UNCLOS and that the high seas, as part of res communis, shall be enjoyed as a global commons.Footnote ⁶² The conclusion of a new agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ) emphasizes that the “high seas and marine ABNJ are open for legitimate and reasonable use by all States, and may not be appropriated to the exclusive sovereignty of any one State.”Footnote ⁶³

Further, UNCLOS does include provisions on support for developing State partiesFootnote ⁶⁴ to assist them in discharging their primary marine environmental obligations, including technical assistance.Footnote ⁶⁵ Such assistance may be provided in the form of scientific, educational, and other technical assistance programmes aimed at marine environmental conservation and marine pollution control and prevention;Footnote ⁶⁶ as well as “marine research and exploitation of the deep seabed; providing available scientific information relevant to the conservation of fish stocks and catch and fishing statistics.”Footnote ⁶⁷ This assistance could help the Philippines advance its marine science technological capacity or even strengthen the country’s existing technology infrastructure for the exploration and exploitation of its marine resources,Footnote ⁶⁸ its EEZ, and continental shelf. This would help the Philippines exercise its rights under UNCLOS, consistent with the SCS Arbitration Award.

20.4 Reimagining Compliance: Film and Reality

Having envisaged aspects of a unilateral “enforcement” of the Philippines’ rights under the SCS Arbitral Award, we may now examine the potential for China’s cooperative compliance. Reimagining even a powerful State like China voluntarily complying with the Award is not far-fetched. China has quite a history of voluntarily complying with its international obligations, and, despite appearances, still aims to be seen as a rules-based player. China is not completely immune to the reputational costs of completely disregarding the Award and “compliance with the arbitral award may also be in China’s national interests.”Footnote ⁶⁹ China did participate in the arbitral proceedings in certain ways, despite its repeated claims that it did not recognize the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and all the proceedings therein. Indeed one writer describes China’s non-participation as only “nominal.”Footnote ⁷⁰ China’s behavior during the arbitration and after the Award was issued showed China maintaining “informal communications with the tribunal to partially comply with some requirements during the proceedings.”Footnote ⁷¹ For instance, although China did not submit a counter-memorial to the Tribunal, it issued a position paper (identifying what China said it believed were the reasons for the Tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction) corresponding to the Tribunal’s timeline on 7 December 2014. China’s embassy in the Netherlands requested, by way of a note verbale deposited with the PCA, as the registry, that its position paper be forwarded to the Tribunal. Finally, China reiterated all of its counter-arguments in a remark by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) released on 24 August 2015.Footnote ⁷²

China is not oblivious to how the international community will react to a hardline stance of complete non-compliance. Proof of this is seen in China’s efforts to garner international support for its claims. Indeed, public opinion has mattered to China because at the time of the proceedings, it alleged that it had the support of about sixty-five other States, of which, eventually, thirty-one would publicly confirm, and four would deny this.Footnote ⁷³ When a ruling was issued, five States opposed the Award, and nine States would not mention the Award, but issued neutral statements. At the same time, thirty-three gave positive statements without necessarily calling for China to comply, and only seven outrightly called for the parties to comply.Footnote ⁷⁴ As of 2020, Vietnam and Malaysia tacitly supported the Award by rejecting China’s “historic rights,” while Indonesia “endorsed” the Award, with Taiwan stating that “any claim inconsistent with international law should not be accepted.”Footnote ⁷⁵ As at August 2, 2021, the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and the Center for Strategic and International Studies had “identified 8 governments that have publicly called for the ruling to be respected, 35 that have issued generally positive statements noting the verdict but have stopped short of calling for the parties to abide by it, and 8 that have publicly rejected it.”Footnote ⁷⁶

Meanwhile, the United States continues to assert a foreign policy consistent with the law as the Tribunal viewed it. The US Navy conducts ongoing freedom of navigation operations and naval exercises with allies and partners and the US Air Force has ramped up military surveillance flights in the region. India aligns with US policy, supporting freedom of navigation and overflight in the SCS and deploying its Indian Navy warship to the SCS. Japan has recognized the Award by performing anti-submarine drills in the SCS.Footnote ⁷⁷ All these activities underscore the “geo-strategic significance”Footnote ⁷⁸ of the SCS – a “strategic maritime link between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean stretching from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Taiwan.”Footnote ⁷⁹ The SCS connects the eight South-East Asian countries of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam; as well as China and Taiwan “into global trade flows and is essential for their livelihoods and food security.”Footnote ⁸⁰ Viewed through this lens, the SCS conflict patently reflects a desire from all parties (including the nominal parties who submitted position papers or indirectly benefitted from the Award) to ensure the integrity of their territories, bearing in mind their respective national interests, as permitted under the UNCLOS.

The SCS Arbitral Award gives the disputants a reality test. The Award makes it clear that, by international law standards, the rules favor one party or are less favorable to the other, and international opinion may thus be influenced to retract or confirm public support. Therefore, public opinion (or international support) is central to a reimagined path of voluntary compliance by China with its international law obligations, or cooperation, as it were. While China has exerted certain efforts to influence international public opinion through think-tanks releasing position papers and other scholarly legal articles, there are also different modes of approach to such problems. Storytelling – compelling storytelling – can influence the discourse that shapes public perception (even international support), in general, and specifically concerning the SCS Arbitration. “The intermingling of truth and fiction in legal discourse is nothing new … and the best, most compelling stories are the ones that adapt familiar narrative forms featuring recognizable character types driven by ordinary feelings, motives, and desires.”Footnote ⁸¹

In Raya, the answer to the question of “How does one go back to the negotiating table?” was hardly clear-cut. Still, the film eventually reached its primary goal – to have everyone cooperate to defeat the Druuns and give everyone an acceptable and fair slice of the proverbial pie. Although the situation in relation to the SCS Arbitration appears to be untidy, as in Raya, the Award can be used as a tool not to force “cooperation” from China but to impress upon China that it is to its best (reputational) interest to follow a path of cooperation.

In Raya, the Heart tribe and its chief became the “guardians” of the ancient Dragon Gem that not only kept evil Druuns away but also served to remind the peoples of Kumandra of their past, and of how the Druuns had ravished their lands, laying them to waste. The peace in Kumandra was fragile and kept barely intact by the Dragon Gem. Despite the advantage of having in its possession the Dragon Gem, the Heart tribe wanted to reach out to the other four tribes to ensure continuing peace in the region. The Heart tribe lowered its defenses and invited the leaders of the other tribes with their delegates to “share a meal.” However, Heart trusted all the opposing parties without caution, without an exit plan, and certainly without obtaining as much information as they could about the conflict and the negotiating positions and intentions of the other tribal chiefs. While everyone was busy enjoying the festivities, the only daughter of the Fang tribe’s tribal chief tried to steal the Dragon Gem from its highly secured vault. As the Heart tribe tried to stop the thief, other tribe leaders and their delegates made their own attempts to steal the Dragon Gem, which broke into pieces. This paved the way for the Druuns to resurface and lay waste to Kumandra once again.

The situation is different in the SCS dispute. The Award itself is the Philippines’ “shared meal” strategy – here is a paradigm that is rooted in international law and that the (international) “public” can get behind. However, the Philippines’ “shared meal” strategy is rules-based, and the Philippines is fully informed of everyone’s interests and positions, unlike in the film. In effect, and ironically enough, the Award itself becomes a source of expectations for compliance with international law, now or through future legal processes. After the Award was issued, China released a statement, a portion of which stated that

This statement reflects that China does understand, and indeed recognizes, that the arbitral Award forms part of a broader paradigm in the South China Sea region. Every coastal State impacted by this Award may look to it as an authoritative statement of rights and obligations.

One potential pathway forward reimagines bringing China back to the table through conciliation. Conciliation is a well-established international dispute resolution process: “The main purpose of conciliation is to lead the parties to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute; its function is not to settle a dispute by applying law per se, but rather to bring the parties to an agreement by way of negotiation and compromise.”Footnote ⁸³ Conciliation is also an UNCLOS process and in fact one of the options that other Filipino experts suggested, after the Philippines filed the arbitral claim, would have been preferable. Consider for instance the successful UNCLOS conciliation launched by East Timor with Australia,Footnote ⁸⁴ that the latter opposed initially but which eventually led to an amicable agreement between the parties with the assistance of the Conciliation Commission.Footnote ⁸⁵ There is nothing in the UNCLOS rules that prevents any State party from resorting to other “informal” conciliatory measures or even voluntary modes of compliance, even after a binding arbitral award has been issued, as in the case of the SCS Arbitral Award.

An audio-visual experience of a story can be an effective tool, and a film such as Raya and the Last Dragon may help us in distilling pathways forward to bring all concerned parties towards a settlement. A film can show heroes and anti-heroes and develop a narrative that persuades the public to choose sides. Although Raya was the apparent central character and the Heart tribe were presented as the “good side,” the movie nonetheless characterized the anti-heroine (Namaari of the Fang tribe) as likeable and someone the public can also support if she chooses to do the “right” thing. In the end, both Raya and Namaari were essential cogs in the machinery that would restore Kumandra to its peoples.