Although the figure of the wise judge may be a universal trope, respect is not automatically accorded every person who passes judgment on another. To be perceived as legitimate, judges must occupy an institutional status with the power to decide controverted cases and must have access to specialized or even sacred knowledge and moral authority. Historically, Asian judges could claim legitimacy through their connection to transcendent legal principles, such as dhamma or dao or shari’a. In contemporary Asia, however, conceptions of law and legal legitimacy have become pluralistic, contested, and contradictory. Judges may to some extent retain a connection to the sacred and the transcendent, yet that connection is no longer sufficient in itself to insulate their judgments—or their character—from criticism. How, then, can the “good judge” be distinguished from judges who fall short of the mark? In this Special Issue, five distinguished scholars explore the crisis of legitimation as it affects judging and judgment in Sri Lanka, India, China, Indonesia, and Thailand.

Drawing on textual and ethnographic research conducted over the last five years, this article analyses an important genre of judicial practice in South and Southeast Asia that has been almost entirely ignored by socio-legal scholars: Buddhist systems of judging. Using the judicial system of one monastic group in contemporary Sri Lanka as a case-study, it argues that Buddhist judging requires more than just the internalization of moral principles, as is often assumed. According to Buddhist (monastic) principles of judging, legal procedures—similar to those used in state legal settings—are equally essential. These procedures govern everything from making legal complaints, to the structuring of trials, to determining jurisdiction, and many other topics. By examining Buddhist judicial systems, this article not only casts new light on the pluri-legal landscape of Asia; it also offers new reflections on the intersection of religion-based and state-based systems of law in the contemporary world.

The Indian Supreme Court has long enjoyed an almost mythic reputation for progressive and creative jurisprudence, but a series of recent scandals is beginning to erode this well-settled authority. One of the most troubling of these incidents has been an allegation of sexual harassment and intimidation by a Court staffer against then sitting Chief Justice of India (CJI) Ranjan Gogoi. This article draws on media analysis and ethnographic research conducted in the immediate aftermath of the “CJI Scandal” to explore what it means for judges and judging in contemporary India. I argue that the justices’ response to the allegations are part of a broader shift in Indian judging. Far from being the product of an institution imbued with mythic qualities, judging in India is increasingly coming to represent an example of mythos, or “an assertive discourse of power and authority … something to be believed and obeyed.”

This article analyzes the ambitious Case Quality Assessment System (CQAS) that the Supreme People’s Court of China (SPC) promoted during the first half of the 2010s. It offers a case-study of Court J, a grassroots court located in an affluent urban metropolis of China that struggled to come out ahead in the CQAS competition. The article discusses how the SPC quantified judging and the problems created by the metricization process. The CQAS project is analyzed as a case of metric fixation. By identifying the problems that doomed the CQAS, the article points out the challenges facing the authoritarian regime in subjecting good judging to quantitative output standards. The CQAS is a metric that judges judging. It reveals how judging is viewed by the party-state. The article concludes by discussing the legacy of the CQAS. Though it nominally ended in 2014, key indicators that it introduced for supervising judges are still used by the Chinese courts today. The CQAS presaged the growing centralization that the Chinese judicial system is undergoing today. Though the SPC has terminated the tournament-style competition that defined the CQAS, the metric remains the template used to evaluate judging.

In May 2018, Artidjo Alkostar retired from the Supreme Court of Indonesia after a judicial career spanning almost two decades. Over this period, he presided over many of Indonesia’s most prominent and controversial criminal cases and became renowned for routinely rejecting corruption appeals and increasing prison sentences. In the celebratory publications that marked his retirement, Alkostar was held up as a model judge, with senior legal figures, including Supreme Court judges, singling out his strong work ethic, integrity, simplicity of character, and firmness. Curiously absent from the list of praiseworthy attributes were pre-requisites for effective judging, including adequate legal knowledge, transparent legal reasoning and decision-making, objectivity and avoiding the perception of bias. An analysis of Alkostar’s most notorious decisions suggests that he, and the judges who served with him, did not always clearly display these pre-requisites. This article considers what this says about judging in Indonesia and what might, in practice, be the defining characteristics of a good judge there.

This article examines how Thai courts of the first instance deal with run-of-the-mill criminal cases. How do judges deal with criminal trials of a rather routine nature, often involving defendants from ethnic minorities and reflecting the particular conditions in the provinces concerned? Drawing on participant observation and interview research conducted mainly in two provinces in different regions of the country, the article examines the challenges faced by judges and court officials in dealing with heavy caseloads in a highly bureaucratized system where acquittal rates are extremely low. How far do such cases shed light on how judging is carried out in the majority of Thai courts? What kind of challenges do Thai judges face in adjudicating minor but often messy cases in order to fulfil societal expectations in line with their own understandings of justice?

Since the fall of socialism in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and some states of Southeast Asia, the international financial institutions and individual donor states have initiated wide-scale legal-aid programmes to assist these states in their transition from socialism to a market economy. Whereas the aid from financial institutions vis-à-vis recipient states is often agreed upon specific conditionalities, the donor states design their foreign legal aid according to individual preferences, although sometimes with references to universal goals. Currently, various donor states provide legal aid to Uzbekistan. Given the fact that Uzbekistan is the former Soviet Republic that still bears multiple traces of a socialist legal system and additionally integrates indigenous informal law, this research provides an analysis of how different donor states base their legal-aid activities on entirely different philosophies and levels of gravity, and how receptive the hybrid structure of Uzbekistan’s law is towards such aid.

Legal transplants are broadly recognized as one of the main mechanisms by which donor states influence the legal development of recipient states. The experience of China, however, challenges convention. While, in recent years, China has been one of the largest capital-exporting countries in the world and has mobilized law to protect its investment in high-risk recipient states, legal transplants have, to date, not played a major role in China’s approach to law and development. This article examines this puzzle through the case of China’s participation in formulating Vietnam’s 2018 SEZ Bill. In doing so, this article sets forth a number of hypotheses as to why Chinese law has thus far not assumed the form of legal transplant. The example of the SEZ Bill demonstrates how Chinese legal transplants depend as much on the “pull” of recipient states as they do on the “push” of the donor. The case-study of the SEZ Bill raises important questions not only for Chinese law and development, but also, more generally, for the viability of “second-order” legal transplants: those from an Asian donor to an Asian recipient.

This paper focuses on the conflict of norms in the interface between the “transplanted” formal law and the local social norms in the land-law reforms in Vietnam and Myanmar, each representing different legal families, while sharing commonness in that both have attempted law-making in the post-colonial independence period in order to restore the basis of the livelihoods of the local population. Both of the legal concepts of “land-use right” (quyen su dung dat) in Vietnam and “land-use right for cultivation” (loat paing kwint) in Myanmar have been the product of law-makers’ restorative attempts at farmland security, while intentionally avoiding usage of the term “ownership” that would result in the capitalist transaction of land as a commodity. However, the contemporary land-law reforms led by donor-oriented “legal transplant” in these countries have resulted in the plunder of such policy, by reintroducing the same mechanisms of land exploitation as existed in the colonial days. Roaring protests of the local agricultural population seem to be a rising-up of the social norm descended from the immemorial past as an unwritten Constitution to bring an end to the centuries-long movement of “legal transplant” of the modern capitalist law.