The article argues that feminist theory needs a concept of objectivity as part of its working epistemology. “Objectivity” is not, as has been argued by some contemporary feminists, inevitably a “dichotomist male epistemological construct,” leading to psychological distance and the hierarchies of “knower” and “known” that have victimized many groups in liberal society. The article analyzes Catherine MacKinnon's critique of “objectivity” as one of the most explicit, sophisticated and compelling theories demonstrating current feminist mistrust of “objectivity.” It finds that even MacKinnon uses “objectivity” in a one-dimensional manner, equating epistemological objectivity with political objectification.

The interpretation of Edmund Burke as a laissez-faire economist has a long pedigree but is inaccurate. Rather, Burke is best seen as a moderate Whig who believed that governmental social and economic policy should be based on pragmatic and prudential considerations. However, utilitarian rule-making makes most sense when the rules can be formulated in terms of realizing some more abstract goal. This goal Burke obtained from his reading of the Scotch moral sense writers, who convinced him that man has an innate moral nature which can be improved through association with other men in society. Consideration of Burke's writings on a variety of specific economic and social issues, ranging from poor relief and economic reform to the slave trade, confirms this instrumental interpretation of Burke's economic thought.

Liberalism needs a theory of fundamental rights. Since rights belong to persons, a theory of rights should be linked to a conception of the person. The courts have never undertaken to develop such a conception. The implications of adopting competing positivist, deontological or empiricist conceptions of the person are explored. Because of the weaknesses of each, an eclectic “politics of rights” approach is advocated. On this approach, the validity of a claim of right is enhanced by its formal neutrality and congruity with legal precedent, but also depends on careful assessment of what recognition of the right would mean for actual persons in the concrete political situation.

This article argues that there has been a movement in Catholic political thought from a position of doctrinal neutrality concerning forms of government — provided that they promote the common good — to an endorsement of democracy as the morally superior form of government. It traces the various theoretical and practical elements in the Catholic tradition that have favored or opposed liberal democracy, giving particular attention to the ambiguity of medieval theories, the centralizing and authoritarian tendencies in the early modern period, and the intense hostility of the nineteenth-century popes to French and Italian liberalism. After analyzing the emergence of neo-Thomistic theories of democracy in the twentieth century and their influence on Christian Democratic parties in Europe and Latin America, the article concludes that John XXIII's encyclical Pacem in Terris (1963) and the discussion of democracy by the Second Vatican Council in Gaudium et Spes (1965) marked the abandonment of earlier opposition to liberal democracy and a decisive commitment to democracy and human rights.

Tocqueville saw democracy as a form of government and society that was basically valid yet liable to produce unpleasant, even disastrous, surprises. Today we may look on one of the major manifestations of democracy, the welfare state, in like fashion. Although it marks an enhancement of economic justice, it has had some disturbing consequences. These include the rise of an immense federal bureaucracy and (if we understand the welfare state as comprising the phenomenon of “consumer capitalism”) a trivialization of liberty and public life. What, then, must we do? I suggest in this article that Christianity provides a clue — the value of which is not confined to Christians. Christianity indicates a radically new way of looking at political and social matters; spirit is prior to order, and suffering is prior to action. These principles suggest a way of countering the evil consequences of the welfare state and thus, not merely saving the welfare state, but giving it a new spiritual and prophetic value.