On March 12, 1996, President Clinton signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 also known by the names of its principal sponsors, Senator Helms (R-NC) and Representative Burton (R-IN), as the Helms-Burton Act. The United States thereby enacted a Bill that ‘internationalizes’ an essentially bilateral conflict with Cuba, which can be traced back to the Cuban Revolution, 37 years ago. The Act strengthens economic sanctions against Cuba, intending to protect property rights of Americans, eventually improve the human rights situation, cause the removal of the Castro regime3 and lead to the establishment of a democratically elected government.

International law as it applies to armed conflict necessarily treads a fine line between irrelevance to and complicity in its subject matter. The emergence of this body of law has been slow and painful, its foundational irony being that the treaty establishing the basis of modern international humanitarian law – the Nuremberg trials – was signed by the Allies on the same day that the United States dropped its second atomic bomb on Japan. This uncertain beginning, combined with the central role that nuclear weapons came to play in Cold War foreign policy, render it hardly surprising that the legal status of this most devastating class of weapons remained unclear for over half a century and is likely to remain so for some time to come.

In recent years the religious skyline of Dutch cities has changed considerably. Besides traditional Protestant and Catholic churches new buildings of worship (e.g., mosques, Hindu and Buddist temples) have been built. Newly-established religions have contributed considerably to a religious diversification in society. How does law reflect these changes? Does it take this pluralism into account? Generally speaking, law always lags behind developments in society. There is a good reason for this: society as a whole has to adapt to these changes, and law, which is an institutional form of basic social norms, must moderate this adaptation. The presence of these newly or not established religions puts tolerance to the test: both the tolerance of society as a whole and the tolerance expressed in the law.

The various provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) envision import regulations being triggered because of features or characteristics of products seeking entry into a country's customs territory, not because of the processes utilized in producing or harvesting such products. The origins of this emphasis on products rather than processes dates from at least the GATT decision in the Belgian Family Allowances case, and was explicitly articulated in the well-known and controversial 1991 GATT panel decision in United States – Restriction on Imports of Tuna from Mexico. The precise language of the panel decision in that latter case provided that import measures must be designed to regulate the imported item because of its features or characteristics ‘as a product’, and not because of ‘harvesting’ techniques that may have been employed in gathering or collecting the item. Obviously, this product rather than process oriented approach makes it difficult for non-product based national environmental laws to pass muster under the GATT. By excluding such laws from the ambit of what the basic substantive provisions of the GATT permit in the form of import regulation, national governments are forced to seek the protection of the exceptions of GATT Article XX. These, however, have been very narrowly construed, with the impression given being that of unreceptivity to measures aimed at protecting the environment.

During the last few years, constitutional democracy has again become a hotly debated issue among constitutional scholars, political scientists and philosophers in Europe and the United States. Several scholars have written profound comments on the ideals of constitutionalism and democracy, and their place in contemporary political systems. While many proclaim the enduring validity of constitutional democracy, others make a plea for a radical redefinition of the concept.

What makes international law binding? This is a question that has often interested theorists and jurists. It has been regarded as identical with the question of what is the basis of obligation in international law. The meaning of the question being asked is sometimes not entirely clear. Being concerned with the binding force of international law may be easier to understand than speaking of the basis of obligation. It would be reasonable to assert that to talk of the binding force of law has a more accurate and specific connotation than referring only to the impact of obligations under the law. The meaning of the question being asked is sometimes not entirely clear. Being concerned with the binding force of international law may be easier to understand than speaking of the basis of obligation.1 It would be reasonable to assert that to talk of the binding force of law has a more accurate and specific connotation than referring only to the impact of obligations under the law. This is a minor point but is worth noting.

The principle of the exhaustion of local remedies is generally considered to be firmly established in international law. States are said to be virtually unanimous in recognizing it. The International Court of Justice considers the local remedies rule an important principle of customary international law. The character of the principle as one of general international law is also recognized by virtually all the learned writers who have considered the question.