Scholars debate whether the recent conversion of millions of Latin Americans to evangelical Protestantism bodes well for democratic participation or reinforces authoritarian culture and practices. Using a resource model, this study examines the link between participation in religious organizations, political engagement, and political participation in Brazil and Chile. Survey data indicate that religious organizations, particularly Protestant ones, can provide skills that members can transfer to political activity; and that different religions can result in different politics.

This article examines business political behavior in Colombia during the scandal-ridden presidency of Ernesto Samper (1994-98), highlighting the mechanisms by which grupos (diversified economic groups) undermined the ability of organized business to present collective political positions. Evidence that the presidential campaign had been funded by drug traffickers prompted business associations to demand Samper's resignation. But grupos, the firms of which are affiliated with associations, supported the president. This division weakened the position of organized business regarding the resignation, as well as its own political legitimacy. This study argues that grupos face strong incentives to act outside business associations to advance their particular interests. Scholars assessing the strength of organized business in Latin America will increasingly encounter the impact of grupos on business institutional responses to policy.

The Guatemalan military dominated the country's politics for nearly half a century, but its political power declined during the 1990s. Democratically elected presidents Alvaro Arzú (1996–2000) and Alfonso Portillo (2000–2004) subordinated the armed forces to their authority and thereby gained an unprecedented opportunity to reduce the role of the military and institutionalize democratic civil-military relations. Unfortunately, neither of these tasks was accomplished. An analysis of the level of democratic control, combining Alfred Stepan's military prerogatives indicators with a newer system of measurement and classification designed by Samuel Fitch, shows that the armed forces retained substantial institutional autonomy and de facto legal immunity when Portillo left office in 2004. The role of the military in Guatemalan society, moreover, expanded again under Portillo after declining under Arzú. This study finds that the lack of sufficient civilian commitment to reform, rather than resistance from the armed forces, was the principal cause of these disappointing outcomes.

After seven decades of Mexican judicial subordination, President Ernesto Zedillo in 1994 introduced judicial reforms that increased the independence and judicial review powers of the judicial branch. The willful creation of a judiciary capable of checking the power of the president and the ruling PRI appears to counter political logic; but it makes sense as a political “insurance policy” to protect the ruling party from its rivals. PRI politicians, newly unable to control political outcomes at state and local levels and unsure if they would continue to dominate the national government in the future, opted to empower the Mexican Supreme Court as a hedge against the loss of office. This article argues that the likelihood of the reforms' producing an empowered judiciary increases as the ruling party's probability of reelection declines.