In several works Teresa Brennan examines how, contrary to social notions of the separate and contained self, all that exists in the natural world is connected energetically. She identifies a “foundational fantasy” whereby the ego comes into existence and is maintained by the notion that it controls the mother. The effects of this fantasy are socially oppressive and, in the technological era, environmentally disastrous. M;y examination of narratives and images in ancient myth, popular culture, literature, and art suggest ways to counteract the destructive fantasy through re-symbolization of the relation to what Brennan understands as the original/living nature, which is correlated to the mother's body.

The life and work of Rousseau the musician and aesthetician has been forgely neglected in the debate about Rousseau's views on women. In this paper, I shall introduce a new text and a new female figure into the conversation: Collette, the shepherdess in Le devin du village, an opera written by Rousseau in 1752. We see an ambiguity in Collette—the text often expresses one view while the music expresses another. When we take Collette s music seriously the following picture emerges: the natural desire of women to be free, a fairly active female agency, an incipient rebellion against the social role of women, and a final acceptance of the role of wife. This view of Collette supports the thesis that for Rousseau women are not naturally subordinate to men but are taught to be subordinate because it is required for the maintenance of the patriarchal family, the cornerstone of civil society. We see many glimpses of Collette's true, unsocialized, nature, especially in the melodies she sings, it is in song, the first and hence most natural language of humans, that we see Collette's longing for freedom. But she ends by singing the praises of civil society, albeit a rural society, and thus implicitly accepting the subordination she is destined to suffer at Colins hands.

Because “rape” has such a powerful appraisive meaning, how one defines the term has normative significance. Those who define rape rigidly so as to exclude contemporary feminist understandings are therefore seeking to silence some moral perspectives “by definition.” I argue that understanding rape as an essentially contested concept allows the concept sufficient flexibility to permit open moral discourse, while at the same time preserving a core meaning that can frame the discourse.

Linda Nicholson argues that because gender is socially constructed, feminist theorizing must be about an expansive multiplicity of subjects called “woman” that bear a family resemblance to each other. But why did feminism expand its category of analysis to apply to all cultures and time periods when social constructionism led lesbian and gay studies to narrow the categories “homosexual” and “lesbian”? And given the multiplicity of genders, why insist that feminist subjects are different, resembling women rather than a multiplicity including women as well as not-women and not-men?

Linda Nicholson's book The Play of Reason: From the Modern to the Postmodern admirably integrates history and philosophy to demonstrate the historical characteristics of reason and arguments in its name. I argue that she nonetheless retains a modernist dependence on the specter of unreason to document the reasonableness of her own positions. This specter continually recreates hegemonic “reasons.” Feminist theory, I argue, should confront more fully its continued dependence on the other of reason.

Nicholson's political philosophy is distinctively grounded in history. The Play of Reason: From the Modern to the Postmodern argues that such “grounding” phys as much of the foundational role demanded of philosophy as can coherently be played by anything—and that such a foundation is, pragmatically, enough. I focus on two moves: (1) thinking historically as a model for thinking cross-culturally, and (2) historicizing “all the way down,” as a way of exorcising the demand for the ahistorical grounding of epistemology.

This essay is a response to comments made by Shane Fhelan, Cheshire Calhoun, and Naomi Scheman on my book The Play of Reason: From the Modern to the Postmodern (1999). I reiterate my belief that we best approach the issue of consensus and dissension in second’ Order justifications of social and political claims not philosophically but sociologically, politically, historically. I suggest similar approaches for dealing with the question of meaning. This mow signals an endorsement not of indifference but rather of commitment and humility.