Institutional economists have analyzed permissionless blockchains as a novel institutional building block for voluntary economic exchange and distributed governance, with their unique protocol features such as automated contract execution, high levels of network and process transparency, and uniquely distributed governance. But such institutional analysis needs to be complemented by polycentric analysis of how blockchains change. We characterize such change as resulting from internal sources and external sources. Internal sources include constitutional (protocol) design and collective-choice processes for updating protocols, which help coordinate network participants and users. External sources include competitive pressure from other cryptocurrency networks. By studying two leading networks, Bitcoin and Ethereum, we illustrate how conceptualizing blockchains as competing and constitutional polycentric enterprises clarifies their processes of change.

This paper considers Douglass C. North's ‘puzzle’ concerning China's household responsibility system (HRS) and offers a possible solution. China's HRS, which has evolved over the past four decades to become its dominant form of rural land ownership, has stimulated spectacular economic growth and poverty reduction; however, it is based on a type of ownership which is far removed from the property rights regime which North regarded as essential. Two features of the HRS merit attention. The first is ‘split ownership’: this refers to the allocation of different aspects of ownership, including rights of access, use, management, exclusion and alienation, to a range of individual and collective actors with interests in the land in question. The second is polycentric governance: rules governing land use are derived in part from community-level action and in part from state intervention. We argue that in explaining the functioning of the HRS we need to move beyond the narrow conception of legally enforced private property rights on which North relied. We should instead embrace understandings of ownership as an emergent, diverse and complex institution, of the kind emphasized by A.M. Honoré's legal theory of ownership and Elinor Ostrom's theories of the common-pool resource and polycentric governance.

The need of further research on the interlink between culture and institutions has been strongly advocated by economists and institutionalists alike. However, bringing together culture and institutions within an organic framework, though, is a non-trivial operation. This is due to the complexity of the synergies between cultural aspects and institutional devices. This special issue attempts to start filling this gap and to build an ad-hoc systemic platform for disseminating such a debate. To this purpose, it brings together an organic collection of contributions in well-established conceptualisations of both culture and institutions, supported by robust and consistent methodological applications. The essays presented in this work provide consistent evidence and conceptual perspectives supporting the idea that the synergies between cultural and institutional aspects are of paramount importance to understand human behaviour, individuals' choices and societies' patterns. They also improve the theoretical, empirical and methodological understanding of the role of institutions and culture in different geopolitical and socio-economic realms. By doing so, these contributions place this special issue as prelude to further research on the co-evolution of culture and institutions and on its possible implications on different societal aspects, human development and well-being.

The relationship between firms’ owners and managers is a quintessential example of costly principal–agent interaction. Optimal design of monetary incentives and supervision mechanisms are the two traditional ways of reducing agency costs in this relationship. In this paper, we show evidence which is consistent with a third mechanism: firms have managers whose economic preferences are aligned with owners' interests. We uncover differences in economic preferences between managers employed in firms controlled by two distinct classes of ‘patrons’: employee-owned firms (worker cooperatives) and conventional investor-owned firms. In a high-stakes lab-in-the-field experiment, we find that co-op managers are less risk-loving and more altruistic than their conventional counterparts. We do not observe differences between the two groups in terms of time preferences, reciprocity, and trust. Our findings are consistent with existing evidence on worker cooperatives, such as their tendency to self-select into less risky industries and their compressed compensation structures.

In robot torts, robots carry out activities that are partially controlled by a human operator. Several legal and economic scholars across the world have argued for the need to rethink legal remedies as we apply them to robot torts. Yet, to date, there exists no general formulation of liability in case of robot accidents, and the proposed solutions differ across jurisdictions. We proceed in our research with a set of two companion papers. In this paper, we present the novel problems posed by robot accidents, and assess the legal challenges and institutional prospects that policymakers face in the regulation of robot torts. In the companion paper, we build on the present analysis and use an economic model to propose a new liability regime which blends negligence-based rules and strict manufacturer liability rules to create optimal incentives for robot torts.

Oliver E. Williamson, who died on May 21, 2020 at the age of 87, was one of the most influential social scientists of modern times. In 2009, he was co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics. As of mid-October 2021, he had been cited an astonishing 317,838 times according to Google Scholar. His measured influence outdistances that of even his fellow Nobel Laureates Elinor Ostrom (230,667), Douglass C. North (187,577) and Ronald H. Coase (123,686). This special issue of the Journal of Institutional Economics brings together a distinguished roster of scholars to remember Williamson, to elucidate some of his key ideas and influences, and to extend the reach of his ideas to new arenas.

Political economists assume that global externalities, such as pandemics and climate change, require global or multi-national solutions. Yet, many aspects of these externalities can be addressed at the micro-level. As Elinor Ostrom pointed out, what scholars perceive as global externalities are in fact nested externalities that are organized in multiple, overlapping scales. By drawing on Ostrom's oeuvre, we explore the notions of nested externalities, polycentricity, and co-production in the context of pandemic governance. We highlight two crucial features of pandemics: first, preventative measures such as social distancing are co-production processes that cannot be provided by governments alone. Second, pandemics, much like climate change, pose nested externalities problems at different levels. Thus, pandemic externalities are better viewed as collective action problems arranged at multiple, nested, and/or overlapping scales. Finally, we propose an alternative institutional take that considers the nestedness of pandemic externalities and the diversity in institutional conditions across jurisdictions.

This contribution commemorates Oliver Williamson, who recently passed away, as one of the founding fathers of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). It does so by touching on some of the details of his personal life and connecting these with his professional career. The latter was devoted to putting the study of institutions on the economic agenda. Closer scrutiny reveals that three phases may be identified. Williamson first developed an interest in analysing vertical integration. During the second phase, he elaborated this interest in TCE, and during the third, he positioned his contributions within the area of institutional economics. Furthermore, the article considers the various influences of institutional and organizational economists on Williamson. Finally, the article considers the reception, criticism, and further elaborations of Williamson's contributions.

We propose a micro-founded theory of diversified firms. The theory suggests that diversified firms exist because they allow better deployment of factors that, because of sub-additive contracting costs, are hard to trade in fractions. Firms diversify into industries in which these factors are more productive than any alternatives available in the factor market. Like markets, diversified firms allow specialization by enabling factors to be used on a larger scale. The individual businesses making up a diversified firm exhibit specific similarities in behavior.

We present an experiment that sets up a context of production of a common output obtained by using production means that are randomly and unequally distributed. Before the production phase, subjects must choose a distributive principle for the output division, under ignorance of the allocation of the production means. Subsequently, they make a distributive choice fully aware of their luck and performance. The aim of the experiment is to test, first, whether ordinary subjects in an impartial situation are capable of converging on a fair principle of distribution – able of redressing the arbitrariness of the initial production means allocation; and second, whether these same ordinary subjects are capable of actually following that principle in a real distributive choice that excludes coercion, reputation effects and other forms of social pressures. The main finding is that a distributive rule that redresses initial inequalities is both accepted ex-ante and actually applied ex-post by most individuals. Our conclusion is relevant for the issue of realism of normative theories of justice and the possibility of institution design aimed at implementing distributive justice principles and policies.

We investigate the impact of professional networks on men's and women's earnings, using a dataset of European and North American executives. The size of an individual's network of influential former colleagues has a large positive association with remuneration, with an elasticity of around 21%. However, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using various fixed effects as well as a placebo technique, we find that the real causal impact of networks is barely positive for men and significantly lower for women. We provide suggestive evidence indicating that the apparent discrimination against women is due to two factors: first, both men and women are helped more by own-gender than other-gender connections, and men have more of these than women do. Second, a subset of employers we identify as ‘female friendly firms’ recruit more women but reward networks less than other firms.

This contribution commemorates Geert Hofstede, who recently passed away, as a pioneer in the study of culture and institutions. It does so by touching on some of the details of his personal life and connecting these with his professional career. The latter was devoted to developing the paradigm of national cultures based on empirical analysis, and to relate it to organisational behaviour. Closer scrutiny reveals that four distinct phases may be identified. Hofstede first started as an ‘undercover’ engineer and next moved to social psychology. During the second phase, he developed the first four dimensions of natural culture. During the third, Hofstede connected these national dimensions to organisational ones. During the last, he added two new cultural dimensions and developed additional practical applications. Finally, the article considers the reception, criticism, and further elaborations of Hofstede's contributions.

Joseph Campbell describes a narrative pattern for a hero's journey. ‘A hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from the mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellow man’ (2008: 30). This paper looks at Oliver E. Williamson's life through Campbell's lens and reveals his journey, challenges, and triumphs not only for himself but also for all students of the science of organization.

The literature on collective action has poorly addressed processes of incremental institutional changes within organizations. This paper helps fill this gap by shedding light on how the community-based management of an organic label has changed following its formal recognition as a ‘participatory guarantee system’ (PGS). Ostrom and Basurto's (2011) analytical tool is useful to describe the changes in collective rules to address collective action problems that take place in standard-setting and labeling activities. Using original data collected from the Ecovida Agroecology Network – the oldest and largest PGS in Brazil –, we study the multi-scale changes in governance rules from the 1970s until today. We pay particular attention to the links between the institutional consolidation of PGS, its recognition by public authorities, and its adaptation to legal rules. We detail analytical operators indicating whether the introduction of the PGS rules at the national level was bottom-up or top-down. Our findings emphasize how local communities have been able to both adapt their governance system in response to the official arrangements concerning organic regulations, and influence national public arenas where these arrangements are defined. This form of co-management has been accompanied by a significant increase in the number of PGS-certified farmers.

We develop a theory of state formation shedding light on the rise of the first stable state institutions in Bronze Age Mesopotamia. Our analysis suggests that the mix of adverse production conditions and unforeseen innovations pushed groups favored by old technologies to establish the state by granting political and property rights to powerless individuals endowed with new and complementary skills. Through these reforms, the elite convinced the nonelite that a sufficient part of the returns on joint investments would be shared via public spending and, thus, to cooperate and accumulate a culture of cooperation. Different from the main alternative theories, we stress that: (1) group formation is heavily shaped by unforeseen shocks to the returns on both risk-sharing and innovation; (2) complementarity in group-specific skills, and not violence, is key determinant of state formation; (3) military, merchant and, especially, religious ranks favored state formation and culture accumulation.

This is the second of two companion papers that discuss accidents caused by robots. In the first paper (Guerra et al., 2021), we presented the novel problems posed by robot accidents, and assessed the related legal approaches and institutional opportunities. In this paper, we build on the previous analysis to consider a novel liability regime, which we refer to as ‘manufacturer residual liability’ rule. This makes operators and victims liable for accidents due to their negligence – hence, incentivizing them to act diligently; and makes manufacturers residually liable for non-negligent accidents – hence, incentivizing them to make optimal investments in R&D for robots' safety. In turn, this rule will bring down the price of safer robots, driving unsafe technology out of the market. Thanks to the percolation effect of residual liability, operators will also be incentivized to adopt optimal activity levels in robots' usage.

The impact of trust on economic performance has been widely explored, but the reasons for its variability across countries are not well understood. We analyse the effect of the quality of government at the regional level on individual generalized trust in a multi-country context across regions in Europe. Social phenomena are often subnational and a number of public services are provided at a subnational level; the trust of individuals living in the same country may, therefore, differ by region depending also on the quality of the local government. As a proxy of the quality of institutions, we use the European Quality of Government Index, calculated at the regional level over 27 European Union (EU) countries. The analysis conducted on data extracted from the European Social Survey 2012 refers to 142 regions from 15 EU member states. Considering the clustered nature of the data, a multilevel approach is used. The findings show that living in a region with high-quality local government positively influences individual trust. This positive association survives the inclusion of several contextual regional variables.

Institutional inertia as one of the underlying reasons for hysteresis is often ascribed to external factors such as the distribution of wealth and income. Complementing these findings, the paper focuses on important internal factors, which render institutions stable and which prevent fast institutional changes, namely the role of mental models. Their importance is derived from the analysis of an important set of institutions, which can be described as enabling rules. Such rules enable actors to do certain things, such as speaking a language or playing chess. In doing so, enabling rules arguably require complementary mental models, which contain not only knowledge about the rules and the context in which they are applied, but also about how to apply the rules successfully. An important implication of this conceptualisation is that institutions and their representation are interdependent and mutually stabilising.

Claims that colonial political institutions fundamentally affected the probability for democratic governance in the post-colonial period are probably among some of the most contested in institutional analysis. The current paper revisits this literature using a previously unused source of empirical information – the Statesman's Yearbook – on a large number of non-sovereign countries in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Our analysis shows that neither the size of the European population nor the existence of institutions of higher education appear to be important for the subsequent democratisation of countries decolonised during the latter half of the 20th century, while the existence of representative political bodies during the late colonial period clearly predicts the existence and stability of democracy in recent decades. Successful transplants of democracy to former colonies thus seem to crucially depend on whether recipients had time available to experiment around and adjust the imported institutions to local practices.

Local governments in autocracies typically undercompensate residents for their land and take it through eminent domain, while residents lack effective formal channels for bargaining with them. I find that some residents nonetheless can defend against such predation through extralegal land bargaining. By sending resistance signals to challenge the legitimacy of local governments, publicize their grievances, and garner public sympathy, such residents embarrass governments, make it likely higher-level governments will punish local governments, and spur concessions. Such signals, however, are often costly or unavailable, so only resistant entrepreneurs can send them. I illustrate the argument by treating ‘nail-house resistance’ in China as a resistance signal: by refusing to vacate their houses, engaging in violence or self-burning, or turning to the media, some residents stop land takings or gain compensation. The findings enrich our understanding of the political and moral economy of land bargaining and institutional change in a transitional autocracy.