In his book on the principles governing the exercise of the royal power of dissolution of Parliament, Dr. Eugene Forsey cites as one of the Canadian precedents of grant and refusal of dissolution, the actions of Lieutenant-Governor Thomas R. McInnes in British Columbia in 1898 and 1900. Owing to the pressure of space, the constitutional issues raised in the Pacific Coast province received but scant notice in Dr. Forsey's study. These issues are, however, of the first importance in the constitutional history of Canada, not only because they involved the exercise of the royal power of dissolution in an unusual and arbitrary manner, but because they led, finally, to the intervention of the federal government and the removal of the Lieutenant-Governor from his appointment.

In part, the crisis which developed in British Columbia sprang from the peculiar personality of the Lieutenant-Governor himself. Like Sir Charles Metcalfe, Thomas Robert McInnes was a man with a strong sense of duty—that quality emerges clearly from his correspondence; he was likewise a man of strong views which he held strongly. There was little of the compromiser or mediator about McInnes. He wore no velvet glove nor did he speak with a soft voice. He lacked in great measure that suavity and self-effacement so necessary to the successful incumbency of Government House. One thing he did not lack was courage, an admirable quality, but dangerous when backed by stubbornness rather than by discernment.

There have been numerous studies of Canadian cyclical experience during the Great Depression beginning in 1929. Similarly, the cyclical experiences of 1937–8 in both the United States and the United Kingdom have been fairly popular subjects for examination. However, it is interesting that no intensive analysis of Canadian experience during the 1937–8 recession has been made, but rather it has been treated as an afterthought to studies of the 1929 downturn instead of receiving the specialized attention which it merits. As a result there are doubts about its exact timing, about the magnitude of the fluctuations involved, about the influences exerted upon Canadian activity by the comparable American and British recessions, and certainly there has been a tendency in some recent works to provide a very facile interpretation.

The 1937–8 recession is a subject of interest for several reasons. It is the last pre-war cyclical movement, and roughly coincides with similar economic changes in Canada's major trading partners. Cyclical movements in Canada do not always coincide with those in the United States, as was evident in 1948–9 and 1926–7, but when they do, a close examination of what has happened in Canada and of possible interrelationships between the Canadian and American experience may improve our understanding of Canadian cyclical patterns. This paper first represents a modest attempt to single out those sectors of the economy in which the cyclical downswing was concentrated, and second offers a tentative interpretation of the causal elements at work in this particular cycle.

Recently, and within a period of about twelve months, two monographs on empirical studies of demand have appeared, each reporting on the related economic and statistical theory as well as the results of extensive studies of data. Nearly two decades having now passed since the publication of the two other memorable volumes in this field, an attempt will be made in this paper to compare the recent works not only with each other, but also with these earlier classics.

The revival of interest in the Pareto-Slutsky approach to the theory of demand, occasioned by the papers of Hicks and Allen and Schultz occurred before the publication of any of the four volumes under review and each contains some account of this theory and its empirical implications. Allen and Bowley, concerned entirely with the analysis of data on family budgets, used the theory in the derivation of their hypothetical form of the relation between expenditure on a particular commodity and total expenditure (now commonly called the Engel curve). They showed that if a consumer behaves according to the postulates of the theory and if in addition his pattern of tastes is of a special variety, then his Engel curves will be linear. This is the main empirical implication deduced and subjected to test by these authors. Schultz's elegant account of the theory of demand is written with profound knowledge of the Pareto and Slutsky contributions and still must be classed as “modern” in all respects.

Since its return to power in 1951 the Conservative party of Great Britain, in its programme to restrict the influence of government in the economy and ensure greater scope and freedom for private enterprise, has projected television for the first time into the arena of partisan politics. And with the emergence of television as a political issue public attention has been focused on the relative merits of public service versus commercial television. The Government's announcement in May, 1952, that “in the expanding field of television provision should be made to permit some element of competition” touched off a controversy of unusual intensity and breadth of interest. Two years later the debate culminated in action by Parliament permitting the introduction of commercial competition.

From the beginning, opposition to commercial television was vehement and articulate because of the strong conviction that television (to a far greater extent, indeed, than sound broadcasting) is a force, potentially at least, capable of revolutionizing the lives of men and reshaping the course of civilization. Thus, Herbert Morrison, deputy leader of the parliamentary Labour party, declared in December, 1953, just prior to Parliament's approval of the Government's proposal, that the debate on television policy was the most important since the war. Statements concerning the gravity of the change came from diverse groups—the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the universities, the Labour party, a substantial segment of British industry, and even the Conservative Government itself.

In the controversy between Professor Chamberlin and Mrs. Robinson and their respective supporters concerning what Professor Chamberlin calls “monopolistic competition,” and Mrs. Robinson has named “imperfect competition,” neither side seems ever to have referred to Marshall's Industry and Trade. In the field of history of economic doctrines and analysis, only three writers seem to have given serious attention to the work. Two of these wrote before the publication of either The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, or The Economics of Imperfect Competition. The other, though he comes to the conclusion at which this paper also arrives, fails to mention a number of notions presented by Marshall in his analysis of markets under conditions less than perfectly competitive.

Industry and Trade is not mentioned in the report of the “Round Table on Monopolistic Competition” found in the American Economic Review of June, 1937. In addition—chronologically this series of articles should be put first—no writer participating in the Economic Journal's “Symposium” of 1930 mentions Industry and Trade, while Professor Sraffa mentions it only once in the famous article which is considered by some to have been the beginning of the “revolutionary” new approach. Professor Chamberlin makes no reference to Industry and Trade either in the text of, or bibliographies to, the fifth or sixth editions of The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, and Mrs. Robinson cites Industry and Trade only once, on a minor point, in The Economics of Imperfect Competition.

Bitter disputes regarding the relation of morals to politics did not begin with Machiavefli but have been almost continuous since his time. No wonder, therefore, that the conflict has broken out in our own day with specific reference to American foreign policy. Now, as in times past, the proponents of differing viewpoints utter harsh and dogmatic judgments concerning one another. This is probably unavoidable if one considers that the issue is both vital and highly controversial, but recent arguments have thrown more heat than light upon the ancient dilemma. It is therefore proposed, in this paper, to ascertain what nub of truth there is in the arguments.

Most jarring to American traditions are the central tenets of what might be called the “realpolitik school” of American policy. There are many advocates of this view, but it finds its most complete expression in the writings of Hans J. Morgenthau. Although the theories of this school have many ramifications, its central position might be stated somewhat as follows:

International politics consists of a struggle for power between nations. This struggle goes on continuously and, apparently, never ends. Since each nation is only interested in maximizing its own power, the one true guide to a successful foreign policy is “the national interest.” Idealism is sentimental and Utopian. The brute facts of power render idealism not only a luxury but a delusion.