3.3.1 Contributions to Climate Change and Its Impacts

Brazilian GHG emissions reached 2,175 bn tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO₂e) in 2019 (SEEG 2020), placing Brazil as number seven in the ranking of the world’s largest emitters. Emissions from the energy sector grew 1 per cent in 2019 compared to the previous year to 413 million tons of CO₂e. Meanwhile, emissions from deforestation increased 19 per cent, to 968 million tons of CO₂e – making this the main contributor to the increase in emissions, responsible for 44 per cent of the country’s emissions.

Due to deforestation, Brazil is still far from being a low carbon economy. Emissions per capita exceed 10t CO₂e/inhabitant (2018) and are still higher than the global average of 7t CO₂/inhabitant (SEEG 2020). The agricultural states of Pará and Mato Grosso are responsible for most of the country’s emissions. Livestock activity has contributed to the increase of emissions, in addition to deforestation. On the other hand, the most industrialized state in the country, São Paulo, which represents one-third of the national GDP and has one-fifth of the country’s population, occupies fourth place (SEEG 2020).

Despite the economic downturn resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic, GHG emissions in Brazil in 2020 increased by 8 per cent compared to 2019 (SEEG 2020). This was due to the lack of government command and control policy in tackling illegal deforestation and forest fire prevention.

The relevance of Conservation Units and Indigenous Lands for the protection of the Amazon has been extensively documented by numerous studies (Adeney et al. Reference Adeney, Christensen and Pimm2009; Barber et al. Reference Barber, Cochrane, Souza and Laurance2014; Noltea et al. Reference Noltea, Agrawal, Silvius and Soares-Filho2013; Soares‑Filho et al. 2010), in the sense of reaffirming the fundamental role that these areas play in curbing illegal deforestation and, therefore, in reducing Brazilian GHG emissions (Guetta et al. Reference Guetta, Oviedo, Bensusan, Setzer, Cunha and Fabbri2019).

Regarding climate change impact, extreme weather events are predicted to intensify and become more frequent, causing severe impacts on the six Brazilian biomes, coastal areas, the food system and security and water availability. The country’s fishing potential may be reduced by 6 per cent over the next forty years, and by 2030 the country could lose about 11 million hectares suitable for agriculture. In turn, food insecurity could increase due to the decrease in subsistence agricultural production, with a consequent lack of food for populations directly exposed to climatic adversity. The effect of climate change will be concentrated mainly in the poorest regions of Brazil and will accentuate social inequalities (PBMC Reference Assad and Magalhães2013).

3.4.1 Climate Change Commitments

Brazil signed and ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Brazil adopted its first voluntary commitment to cut GHG emissions in 2009, as part of the pioneering National Act on Climate Change Policies (PNMC). The legislation committed the country to a deviation in emissions between 36.1 per cent and 38.9 per cent by 2020, compared to projections from a business-as-usual scenario.

The adoption of PNMC meant a significant evolution of the institutional and legal framework on climate change. It was no longer an international agenda alone, but part of the country’s development agenda, involving economic sectors, civil society and all levels of government in the policy formulation process (Hale et al. Reference Hale2018; Senado Reference Souza, Souza, Harari, 63Nunes, Greco and Marengo2019). The PNMC functioned as a guide for the implementation of decentralized climate policies developed by states and municipalities, based on their exclusive constitutional powers, whether within the scope of command and control of activities that generate GHG emissions (article 23, VI), or in concurrent legislative authority on the environment and pollution control (article 24, VI). Based on this shared power, some states and municipalities, such as the state and the city of São Paulo, had already enacted their climate laws before the Federal government.⁴

The 2010 decree stated that gross Brazilian emissions should be between 2,068 Mt CO₂e and 1,977 Mt CO₂e by 2020, including sectorial plans to cut emissions economy-wide. The most significant was the Plan for Deforestation Prevention and Control in Amazonia, in which the target was to slash deforestation rates 80 per cent by 2020 compared to the 1996–2005 average. The agriculture sector plan established that Brazil should recover 15 million hectares of degraded pastures – a figure that would be double in 2015 by the NDC for 2030 (Angelo and Rittl 2019).⁵

Brazil achieved impressive results by reducing the deforestation rate in the Amazon by 83.5 per cent from 2004 to 2012. During this period, forest destruction fell from 27,772 km² to 4,571 km² a year. In 2010, the Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation and Burning Practices in the Cerrado Region was also created, resulting in a 33 per cent reduction of deforestation in that biome by 2018. During this period, action was taken to improve land use and land tenure regularization; create more conservation units; create and improve environmental monitoring systems; strengthen environmental surveillance; promote sustainable productive activities; and create economic incentives for forest conservation. Several federal agencies were mobilized to implement and monitor such plans, in addition to the creation of a high-level governance structure (SEEG 2018).

In 2015, Brazil submitted a reduction target under the Paris Agreement, becoming the first major developing country to commit to reduce its emissions in relation to a base year, as opposed to reductions based on projected emissions or per unit of GDP. Its NDC committed the country to a 37 per cent reduction in emissions by 2025 and 43 per cent in 2030 compared to 2005 levels and the publication of a National Adaptation Plan, in 2016 (Brasil 2020).

However, since the election of President Jair Bolsonaro in 2019, this structure has been collapsing. Climate action plans were paralysed and their governance structure extinguished. Likewise, the Amazon Fund, specially created to obtain international financing for mitigation and adaptation to climate change, has been threatened (SEEG 2018). Deforestation in the Amazon increased by 29.5 per cent in 2019, the worst rate in the last eleven years and the third highest in the historical series that began in 1988 (INPE 2020).

3.4.2 Climate Change at State Level

Nineteen out of twenty-seven states have passed a legislation establishing a climate change policy. Most of them, sixteen, were approved between 2007 and 2012. Not all state policies have clear mitigation and adaptation strategies, though. Seven states with a climate policy have defined neither mitigation nor adaptation strategies. In these cases, the climate initiative exists only ‘on paper’. Twelve states have defined their mitigation strategies, with specific foci depending on the emissions profile of each state. In the Amazonian states such as Acre, Amazonas and Rondônia where most emissions come from deforestation, mitigation efforts focus on environmental services and deforestation prevention and control. In São Paulo and Minas Gerais, mitigation action is more centred in the energy and transportation sectors. Only eight of these states have developed their inventories, which are central to mitigation planning. Regarding adaptation, less than half of the policies (only eight) have defined actions. They are most related to environmental disaster risk management, centred in areas vulnerable to climate related events, such as flooding and landslides. Such strategies do not incorporate future climate change projections for their territories, which is essential to plan the urban space and coastal areas in order to guarantee the best use and occupation of these spaces, the safety of people and economic and social development.

In terms of institutional mechanisms for policy implementation, fifteen states have created a Climate Forum or Climate System, which count on the participation of state secretaries and agencies, municipalities, academia, private sector and civil society organizations. In most cases, these institutional arrangements played a key role in the policy elaboration and approval phases. They were created with the aim of developing a climate change policy in the first place, but after the policy approval not all forums kept active. In some cases, a specific governmental body related to the climate issue has absorbed the policy implementation. Fifteen states have created a climate change board, management, department, superintendence or coordination within their governmental structure. Table 3.1 summarizes states’ climate change policies.

3.4.3 Climate Change at Municipal Level

Twelve out of 5,570 municipalities have a specific law establishing a climate policy, corresponding to a population of over 30 million people (IBGE 2010). Between 2003 and 2011, six cities approved their climate change laws (Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Feira de Santana, Manaus, Palmas, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo) and five municipalities (Fortaleza, Porto Alegre, Recife, Santos and Sorocaba) approved theirs after 2014, with greater attention to adaptation. Not all municipal policies have clear mitigation or adaptation strategies. Seven out of the twelve municipalities have mitigation strategies and six of them have adaptation actions. Three municipalities have defined neither mitigation nor adaptation actions. Most mitigation strategies include setting or planning to set GHG emission reduction targets. Other actions involve green areas conservation and energy efficiency. The adaptation strategies mainly involve the civil defence and urban planning sectors.

Coastal cities represent an important gap in Brazil’s local climate policies. They are considered even more vulnerable to climate change for their geographical specificity, their interface between continent, atmosphere and ocean, and because they are places with a high concentration of people and structures – which changes these events to the status of disasters, since people and structures can be severely affected. Brazil has a coastline of almost 7,500 km, where many – and some of the most important – cities in the country are located and where most of the population is concentrated. Only five coastal cities (Fortaleza, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and Santos) have an adaptation strategy.

In terms of institutional mechanisms for policy implementation, ten out of the twelve cities established a Climate Forum or Committee, with the participation of municipal secretaries and agencies, universities and research institutes, private sector and civil society organizations. A summary of these municipal climate policies is shown in Table 3.2.

3.4.4 Climate Change Policy Construction Process

The development and implementation of climate mitigation and climate adaptation policies at the three levels of government in Brazil relies on several institutions that establish dialogue and coordination, information sharing, capacity development, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation across the different levels of government. These institutions and their roles are described in Table 3.3.

However, in recent years, federal institutions at the federal level – the Interministerial Committee on Climate Change, the Interministerial Commission on Global Climate Change and the National Climate Change Fund – have been affected by the climate change denialist position of the current government (dos Santos Estevo 2021). The work of the Brazilian Panel on Climate Change has also been affected by funding reductions, as has the Brazilian Forum of Climate Change.⁶

3.5.1 The Favourable Context for Decentralized Policymaking

As in other countries (e.g., Rabe Reference Rabe2008), decentralized and experimental climate policymaking has emerged in Brazil in a context of bottom-up climate policymaking seeking to fill a void left by federal inaction. The city of Santos, in the state of São Paulo, illustrates this case. In the absence of a national and state adaptation strategy and already feeling the effect of climate change, the local government of Santos started developing its adaptation plan in 2015 and published it a few months after the National Adaptation Plan (PNA) in 2016. As a coastal city, Santos is highly vulnerable to climate change, primarily due to the risks related to relative sea-level rise; the occurrence of extreme events of rain, storm surges, and storm tides; and the socio-environmental consequences of these events (Marengo et al. Reference Marengo and Scarano2017; Souza et al. Reference Souza, Souza, Harari, 63Nunes, Greco and Marengo2019).

The PNA was approved seven years after the approval of the National Policy on Climate Change, which suggests that, at the federal level, adaptation has taken a longer time to be internalized. Furthermore, for Brazilian specialists (Di Giulio et al., Reference Di Giulio, Marques, Lapola and Torres2016a), the PNA falls short of what is needed in relation to adaptation policies. Its implementation has been interrupted by the current federal administration. At state level, only the Federal District developed an adaptation plan, which is currently under public consultation.⁷

In Brazil, the metropolitan level is essential for environmental protection and climate governance. Although climate change effects are localized, they are often linked to transformations and disruptions in ecosystems and ecological processes that include multiple jurisdictions. Therefore, a coordinated response by governments at multiple scales is more efficient in responding to climate impacts (Keskitalo et al. Reference Keskitalo, Juhola, Baron, Fyhn and Klein2016; Nalau et al. Reference Nalau, Preston and Maloney2015). For example, measures involving water management and flood protection systems, such as warning systems that require effective communication and coordination mechanisms, go beyond municipal boundaries. Public transportation also needs to be thought of at the level of the metropolitan region, with the collaboration of municipalities. However, climate change is not considered in any existing political–institutional structures and public policies at metropolitan level (Sathler et al. Reference Sathler, Paiva and Baptista2019; Torres et al. 2019). Metropolitan regions along with Integrated Development Regions (RIDEs) concentrate 54.3 per cent of the country’s population (IBGE 2010). Therefore, it is essential that the federal and state governments promote action at the metropolitan scale, acting as interlocutors and encouraging the dissemination of climate policies and the creation of institutional arrangements that enable the construction of an integrated climate agenda at the inter-municipal level.

One example of articulation at municipal and metropolitan scales is the Reconecta Program at Campinas Metropolitan Region, in the state of São Paulo, headed by the municipality of Campinas. While not explicitly a climate change policy, the programme focuses on ecosystem services and supports the integration of conservation and recovery measures for fauna and flora in the twenty municipalities that are part of the metropolitan region. The programme has INTERACT-Bio Project as a partner, it is coordinated and implemented by ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability (Interact-Bio 2021).

Due to the localized nature of many climate change effects, it is important that regional and local governments can design their own adaptation policies (Biesbroek et al. Reference Biesbroek, Termeer, Klostermann and Kabat2014; Termeer et al. Reference Termeer, Dewulf and van Rijswick2011). For instance, while coastal regions need to enhance their resilience to floods, mountainous regions may need to focus on landslides. Following tragic landslides in the mountainous region of Rio de Janeiro,⁸ the National Civil Defence and Protection Policy (Act No. 12,608) was approved in 2012, which instituted the National Civil Defence and Protection System. The focus of public policies at the federal level shifted from post-disaster response and reconstruction to preventive actions, which mainly seek to safeguard human life and have been influencing state and municipal policies. This has had a significant impact at the local level, where climate change adaptation planning is strongly related to the civil defence department (Di Giulio et al. Reference Di Giulio, Marques, Martins and Lemos2016b). Decentralized action in Brazil involving risk and disaster management has contributed to the development and implementation of actions with the potential to adapt to the effects of climate change at local level.

However, decentralized and uncoordinated climate action may lead to profound disparities between different regions in a federation, resulting from distinct capacities, resources and assets that local and regional governments have to adapt to climate change (Gordon Reference Gordon2015). That is the case of the municipalities and regions within the state of São Paulo, which have different levels of resilience and capacities. To reduce such disparities, the State launched a programme (‘Resilient Municipalities’) to support thirteen selected municipalities and the Metropolitan Region of Santos in the design of their adaptation and resilience plans; the pilot phase started in 2021 (São Paulo Governo do Estado 2021).

Moreover, Brazilian cities have faced difficulties when putting such plans into practice. Many climate policies fail to get implemented due to insufficient financial resources (Barbi and de Macedo Reference Souza, Souza, Harari, 63Nunes, Greco and Marengo2019). Participation in transnational municipal networks (TMNs) is a path taken by most Brazilian cities which have climate policies. Several cities have joined the ICLEI network, whose methodology in the Green Climate Cities Programme includes helping cities find financing for their climate actions. In the case of Santos, the city engaged in the ProAdapta Project, supported by GIZ. Another possibility is to consider climate action budget in the multi-year municipal plan.

The emphasis on decentralization in the cooperative Brazilian federalism model without defined distribution of responsibilities may be a source of tension (Viswanathan Reference Viswanathan2014). When states or municipalities do not carry out their responsibilities, there is no adequate mechanism for the federal authorities to remedy the situation.

Municipalities with flexibility and capacity to establish their own climate policies can also experiment with innovative solutions for combating climate change (Biesbroek and Lesnikowski Reference Biesbroek, Alexandra Lesnikowski, Jordan, Huitema, van Asselt and Forster2018) and become a model for other municipalities. This is the case of Santos and Campinas, which are leading the way to climate adaptation in their metropolitan regions, engaging the neighbouring municipalities in climate planning.

3.5.2 The Scope for Experimental Policymaking and Associated Learning

The main mechanism of policy diffusion and social influence in Brazil is policy learning – using established definitions of policy learning as the generation of knowledge on resolving a policy problem and of lessons on best strategies to secure policy adoption (May 1992). Informal institutions such as networks involving officials and experts within and between governments can facilitate policy diffusion processes in a federation, particularly the development and sharing of policy lessons (Butler et al. 2016; Vinke-De Kruijf and Pahl-Wostl 2016). Climate policy diffusion in Brazil is supported by TMNs, mainly ICLEI, C-40 and 100 Resilient Cities, and other institutional arrangements, such as the Brazilian Association of State Environmental Entities (ABEMA) at state level and the National Association of Municipal Environmental Entities (ANAMMA) and the Forum of Environmental Secretaries of Brazilian Capital Cities (CB27), both at local level. By engaging in TMNs and in these other institutional arrangements, it is expected that governments will learn from one another’s experiences in designing and implementing climate policies.

The availability of multiple forums for policymaking offers some advantages for combating climate change. Federalism, in particular, makes it possible for state and municipal level to adopt climate policies to compensate for the void left by another level of government’s inability or refusal to deal with climate change (Derthick Reference Derthick and Rabe2010). In the context of federal inaction on climate change by the Bolsonaro administration, multiple Brazilian states and municipalities have engaged in institutional arrangements through which they commit to reduce their carbon emissions. One example is the Brazilian Alliance for Climate Action (ACA), established in 2021 to mobilize state and local authorities, business leaders, investors, academics, the press, religious bodies and civil society organizations to increase climate action (ACA Brasil 2021). Six months after its creation, four states and nineteen municipalities had signed the declaration, assuming the responsibility of meeting the Brazilian NDC and collaborating to make it even more ambitious.

Another example is the ‘Governors for Climate’ movement, within the framework of the Brazil Center on Climate, which sent a letter to US President Joe Biden signed by twenty-four state governors proposing strategic partnerships between the USA and their states on the eve of the 2021 Leaders’ Climate Summit (CBC 2021). With this, they seek to reactivate and create state forums on climate change, attract investments and establish connections between states and international funding agencies, and overall, find opportunities and compensate for the void generated by the national government’s refusal to address climate change.

At the same time, at municipal level, the Forum of Environmental Secretaries of Brazilian Capital Cities (CB27) published the Letter in Defence of Biomes, a document that reinforced the idea that the defence of Brazilian biomes is a necessary condition for the preservation of biodiversity and essential for the climate emergency mitigation and adaptation (CB27 2021). Time will tell whether these mobilizations at state and local levels will be translated into consistent policy mitigation and adaptation strategies.

A well-functioning federal state should facilitate an effective multi-level climate governance system in which all levels collaborate to develop and implement synergistic climate policies based on their experience and resources, thus achieving the balance between centralization and decentralization (Carlson Reference Carlson2009). However, the current administration is hindering multi-level climate governance, essential when it comes to sectors such as land use management, energy, water resources and others. President Bolsonaro was elected and supported by ‘ruralists’, the large rural landowners bloc in Congress, who are interested in agriculture expansion, reduction of conservation areas and authorization for increased use of pesticides (dos Santos Estevo Reference Brief2021). This situation illustrates what Jordaan et al. (Reference Jordaan, Davidson, Nazari and Herremans2019) describe as political conflicts and ideological divisions arising from political polarization between different governments in a federation undermining the emergence of effective forms of multi-level climate governance. Overcoming this current political polarization in Brazil is one of the country’s biggest challenges in order to promote multi-level climate governance.

Furthermore, federal structures may enhance climate change resilience through collaborative projects, networks and co-funding arrangements that enable the opening of paths to meet the needs of affected areas, to build capacity at local level for managing climate risks and to address underlying differences between jurisdictions regarding exposure to climate hazards and their adaptive capacity (Pahl-Wostl et al. Reference Pahl-Wostl, Lebel, Knieper and Nikitina2012). In Brazil, some federal funding such as the Climate Fund have been compromised by the federal government, making it difficult to build resilience to climate change.

Federated entities can also act in concert through their own networks, horizontal coordinated climate governance, where they can collaborate and share knowledge with one another (Hanssen et al. Reference Hanssen, Mydske and Dahle2013). At local level, one example is the participation of 109 Brazilian cities in the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, a global alliance of local governments voluntarily committed to climate change mitigation and adaptation (GCMCE nd). ICLEI has mobilized Brazilian cities and supported the consolidation of a strategic network of institutions committed to the implementation of long-term national strategies, comprising the Brazilian Association of Municipalities (ABM), the National Front of Mayors (FNP) and the National Confederation of Municipalities (CNM) (ICLEI 2021).

Within the multiplicity of forums for the formulation of climate policies, regulatory overlaps and coordination deficits within a federation can hinder collaboration and generate inefficiencies in the adoption and implementation of climate policies (Jordaan et al. Reference Jordaan, Davidson, Nazari and Herremans2019). In Brazil, a sector related to climate governance, such as land use management, is a source of tension between different levels of government.

Brazilian federalism has provided a favourable context for decentralized and experimental policymaking in climate change governance in the country, especially at local level, where municipalities are leading the way to adaptation strategies. Cooperation between municipalities through transnational municipal networks and international cooperation has collaborated to the policy diffusion of climate strategies in the country. The availability of multiple forums for climate policymaking at the subnational level has played an important role, especially at a time when the federal government is actively dismantling the national climate agenda.