The Arctic Regions have been a fascinating subject of study for a long time, mainly because of man’s strong desire to conquer the unknown. The military interest in those regions did not develop until recent years. With the straining of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States after World War II, the strategic significance of the Arctic soon became very real. This significance was appreciably diminished with the invention of intercontinental ballistic missiles but the more recent development of the nuclear missile-launching submarine has given the Arctic waters a new military importance. Of course, nuclear submarines could also be of considerable commercial interest. By borrowing the Arctic Ocean, merchant submarines could drastically shorten some of the present maritime trading routes. The exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic regions is already in process of giving new commercial meaning to the old Northwest and Northeast Passages. In the circumstances, an inquiry into the legal regime of the Arctic waters is timely. Two basic principles of the law of the sea are involved: the right of innocent passage, and the freedom of the seas. The present study will concentrate on the right of innocent passage. An investigation will be made into the legal status of the Arctic waters constituting what is commonly known as the Northwest Passage, on the North American side of the Pole, and the Northeast Passage or Northern Sea Route on the Soviet side. The basic question is whether or not the right of free and innocent passage in favour of foreign ships applies to those waters.

The need to strengthen international co-operation in the rational exploitation of the fishery resources of the high seas is a question which has become of growing importance in recent years. Increased efforts devoted to research and the exploration of the seas are constantly revealing the contribution which these resources may make to the improvement of standards of nutrition, while both states and private enterprise are becoming ever more conscious of the economic potential which these resources represent. At the same time new techniques and equipment are being developed to make the exploitation of fishery resources both easier and more profitable. However, it is generally recognized that fishery resources are not inexhaustible, and in many instances the urgent need for conservation measures has become apparent. In addition, the regulation of the conduct of fishing operations is now necessary in fishing grounds which are intensively exploited.

Depuis Que La Seconds Conférence Sur le droit de la mer, tenue à Genève en 1960, a échoué dans sa tentative de fixer de manière uniforme la largeur de la mer territoriale et de la zone de pêche des Etats, la situation a évolué sans cesse dans le sens de l’extension des compétences étatiques vers la haute mer.

Avant 1960, plus de vingt pays revendiquaient déjà des eaux territoriales ou une zone de pêche de douze milles marins, et quelquefois davantage. A ces Etats sont venus s’ajouter au moins une quinzaine d’autres qui ont étendu leur mer territoriale à douze milles, tandis que 25 environ ont opté pour une zone de pêche de douze milles, tout en conservant des eaux territoriales plus exiguës. Parmi ces derniers, il convient de mentionner en particulier les signataires de la Convention européenne sur les pêcheries, du 9 mars 1964, qui consacre au profit de l’Etat riverain l’établissement d’une zone de pêche de six milles, ainsi que d’une zone additionnelle de même largeur où l’exclusivisme est tempéré par certains droits réservés aux co-contractants, quelle que soit, par ailleurs, la largeur de la mer territoriale de chacune des parties. Si l’on considère que 28 Etats ne possèdent pas de littoral et que, d’autre part, 9 pays ont étendu leurs compétences au-delà de douze milles, on constate que les deux tiers des Etats côtiers (environ 72 sur 107) acceptent maintenant et même soutiennent la tendance à l’extension des zones de pêche exclusives — quand ils ne vont pas jusqu’à élargir tout simplement leurs eaux territoriales.

The roots of the South West Africa dispute relate back to the events that took place at the end of World War I and led to the creation of the League of Nations mandates system. More particularly, the conflict between the United Nations and South Africa cannot be understood except by tracing the manner in which South West Africa became a part of that system. The “great compromise” hammered out by President Wilson and the Dominion ministers at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 produced a three-tiered system of mandates which reflected in a sliding scale a varied balancing of national and international interests. The result of the compromise was a divergency of interpretation that has endured to this day and in considerable measure has fostered and sustained the dispute in its present-day dimensions.

—THE HONORABLE PAUL MARTIN

The International Legal Status of Formosa has long been a subject of vigorous political and academic debate. Twenty-three years after the termination of the Second World War the matter remains completely unresolved; yet it is of fundamental importance. As one writer has stated, “The question of the international status of Taiwan has been the central issue of dispute between the People’s Republic of China and a number of western states and has constituted the primary obstacle to the establishment of formal relations between mainland China and Canada.” In the words of another scholar:

The Formosa problem is perhaps the most important cause of the hostile relationship between the United States and Communist China. Its prolonged unsettlement creates a highly dangerous situation in the Far East. As a result, many international problems, such as Chinese recognition, the seating of Communist China and disarmament remain unsolved. Accordingly, an early settlement of the Formosan problem is necessary.

Functional independence of international institutions is a sine qua non to their effective operation. Current international law reveals that international organizations have a legal capacity and certain privileges and immunities bestowed upon them by their member states to ensure their independence and that of their staffs. One vital component of functional independence is the freedom of travel for all members of the international staff. In examining the features of freedom of travel necessary for international organizations to discharge their responsibilities effectively, C. W. Jenks wrote:

The freedom of movement which is necessary comprises more than the absence of any special restrictions; it includes the usual facilities for official travel, such as diplomatic or other special visas, priorities where these are necessary, exemption from immigration regulations and formalities, and similar measures; taken cumulatively these facilities involve a considerable saving of time and energy and are therefore an important element in securing the expeditious and unhindered travel necessary to the prompt discharge of international responsibilities.

The decision of the ICAO Council on April 1, 1968, to convene a meeting of an ICAO legal subcommittee on the revision of the Warsaw Convention is the latest in a series of moves to shore up this 40-year-old Convention which has been tottering on its foundation since late 1965-early 1966 when the United States of America threatened to denounce it. The purpose of this note is to examine briefly the main problems discussed in relation to the revision of the Warsaw Convention since the unsuccessful Special ICAO Meeting held in February 1966 to consider the Warsaw passenger limits, and to indicate the lines along which further exploration of these problems has been made.

In sharp contrast to the high hopes raised by the reconstitution of the International Court of Justice in 1946, its subsequent record has been somewhat less than inspiring; and its impact as an organ for the settlement of disputes has been anything but spectacular. Established as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, it broods at The Hague in idle splendour, waiting hopefully for the occasional suit to be taken before it. Despite the hopes, the promise and the optimism, recourse to adjudication is exceptional, infrequent, and limited to disputes of minor importance.

Writings on the Court are suffused with lamentations over the chasm between the idealized aspirations of its founders and its actual performance. From the depths, however, the call is heard; the vision of the jurists becomes the burden of the reformers — the burden of recasting the machinery of world order. Political theorists, lawyers and institutional reformers are all prepared to shoulder the burden, and each considers it his duty to add to the literature on the Court yet another “epilogue for the improvement….”

Among the Middle Powers, Canada has the unique opportunity and great potential for achieving nuclear status in view of her immense natural resources (being the leading producer of uranium), industrial capacity, and advanced technology. For a number of reasons, including the arrangement for joint continental defence with the United States, however, Canada has deliberately refrained from embarking on the development of a nuclear armoury and has become an ardent supporter of international disarmament. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the negotiating processes for a nonproliferation treaty in the council of nations, the unequivocal position of Canada aroused interest and commanded attention.

The concept of non-proliferation can be simply stated. It is based on the belief that a spread of the weapons of mass destruction enhances international tensions, accelerates the arms race, and increases the likelihood, or at least the possibility, of a general nuclear war. The larger the number of states possessing these weapons, the greater the risk of a nuclear conflict breaking out through accident, or miscalculation, or sheer adventurism. Nuclear dissemination thus adds a new and dangerous dimension to the maintenance of international equilibrium and affects the very foundation of the world public order.

Le Problème de l'immunité de juridiction des Etats étrangers a été abordé par la Cour Suprême du Canada dans l'affaire Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba S.A. v. The Steamship Canadian Conqueror & The Republic of Cuba, il y a quelques années. La Cour de I'Echiquier s'est prononcé également dans l'affaire Château Gai Wines Limited v. Le Gouvernement de la République Française. Certains aspects du problème ont été examinés par la Cour Suprême dans The Municipality of Saint John v. Fraser-Brace Overseas Corporation et notamment l'exemption d'un gouvernement étranger à 1'égard des taxes imposées par les autorités locales. Sir Lyman Duff a étudié la question dans l'affaire des Légations et on pourrait également citer les décisions dans Republic of Poland v. Dessaules et dans l'affaire Reference re Powers of City of Ottawa. Parmi les jugements non rapportés, on peut encore mentionner: World Wide Airways v. The Government of Cuba et Lazarovitch v. Consulat Général de Grèce.