Recent research into the psychological and neurobiological underpinnings of psychopathy has raised the question of whether, or to what degree, psychopaths should be considered morally and criminally responsible for their actions. In this article, we review the current empirical literature on psychopathy, focusing particularly on deficits in moral reasoning, and consider several potential conclusions that could be drawn based on this evidence. Our analysis of the empirical evidence on psychopathy suggests that while psychopaths do not meet the criteria for full criminal responsibility, they nonetheless retain some criminal responsibility. We conclude, by introducing the notion of rights as correlative, that even if psychopaths were to be fully nonresponsible, imposing some form of civil commitment would still be warranted.

This article presents a case study of decision making in a drug court located the southwestern United States. This study seeks to fill a gap in research on decision making by attending to the ways that drug court officials navigate the demands of a court that is dedicated to both therapy and criminal justice. This analysis differs from previous research by viewing the drug court as a “hybrid organization” and asking how the staff members interact in the decision-making process. Additionally, this research provides an opportunity to investigate the concerns over collaborative decision making raised by critics. The data from this case study reveal that as a hybrid organization, the drug court staff often divides along institutional lines by allowing the counseling staff to manage treatment and the judge to manage punishment. When tensions arise, they are resolved by the structure of the court, which is hierarchical rather than collaborative.

What role does judicial subject matter expertise play in the review of agency decisions? Using a data set of decisions in which the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) is reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, we investigate this question and find that greater subject matter expertise does make it more likely that a judge will vote to reverse an agency decision.

We use interviews with corporate lawyers and a data set of contracts to explore an elite area of legal practice: sovereign bond lending. Sovereign debt lawyers work at prestigious global law firms, yet the contracts they produce include some terms that defy explanation. Lawyers often account for the existence of these terms through origin myths. Focusing on one contract term, the pari passu clause, we explore two puzzling aspects of these myths. First, we demonstrate that the myths are inaccurate as to both the clause's origin and the role of lawyers in contract drafting. Second, the myths often are unflattering, inaccurately portraying lawyers as engaged in little more than rote copying. We probe this disjuncture between the myths and lawyers' actual practices and explore why contracts origin myths might hold such appeal for this elite segment of the bar.

The 2007 debate over the retention of Singapore's male sodomy law provision set off a vigorous and passionate public debate reminiscent of the US culture war. However, the Singapore government's final decision reflects an interesting compromise. The law was retained, but its moral content was severely curtailed. This article critically examines this episode and explores the political dynamics driving the compromise. Enriching public choice theory on interest group capture, this article argues that the ruling party's political dominance coupled with limited but real political competition is surprisingly effective in aligning the government's position with the preference of the majority despite concerted pressure from well-mobilized minority interest groups. Current legal scholarly work on this debate has focused on the “vigorous debate” in the English-language forums. In this article, the examination of the contemporaneous discourse in Chinese and Malay newspapers enables a more accurate and comprehensive appreciation of this culture war episode.

Indian constitutional framers sought to tie their new state to ideas of modernity and liberalism by creating a government that would ensure citizens' rights while also creating the conditions for democratic citizenship. Balancing these two goals has been particularly challenging with regard to religion, as exemplified by the emergence of a peculiarly Indian understanding of secularism which requires the nonestablishment of religion but not the separation of religion and state. Supporters argue that this brand of secularism is best suited to the particular social and historical circumstances of independent India. This article suggests that the desire to separate religion and state is integral to any understanding of secularism and that, consequently, the Indian state neither is nor was meant to be secular. However, Indian secularists correctly identify the Indian state's distinctive approach to religion-state relations as appropriate to the Indian context and in keeping with India's constitutional goals.

Drawing on original survey research, this study examines how lay Muslims in Malaysia understand foundational concepts in Islamic law. The survey finds a substantial disjuncture between popular legal consciousness and core epistemological commitments in Islamic legal theory. In its classic form, Islamic legal theory was marked by its commitment to pluralism and the centrality of human agency in Islamic jurisprudence. Yet in contemporary Malaysia, lay Muslims tend to understand Islamic law as being purely divine, with a single “correct” answer to any given question. The practical implications of these findings are demonstrated through examples of efforts by women's rights activists to reform family law provisions in Malaysia. The examples illustrate how popular misconceptions of Islamic law hinder the efforts of those working to reform family law codes while strengthening the hand of conservative actors wishing to maintain the status quo.

This introduction to the symposium on Keith J. Bybee's All Judges Are Political—Except When They Are Not provides a brief synopsis of the book's main argument and identifies some of the unsettled questions generated by the author's innovative treatment of courtesy, hypocrisy, and law.

In All Judges Are Political—Except When They Are Not: Acceptable Hypocrisies and the Rule of Law (2010), Keith Bybee considers the hypocrisy of modern law—that is, the widespread view that judges are both principled and partisan—by drawing an analogy with courtesy. Both law and courtesy contain and manage the diverse and potentially divisive interests that would, were they not contained, disrupt social life. In this essay I extend this argument by considering whether the relationship between law and courtesy is more than merely analogical. I suggest that both systems are aspects of larger historical developments out of which emerged the modern subject and the modern state, creating a social world made up of apparently bounded individuals and institutions. As such, law and courtesy do more than conceal and contain interests and subjectivity; they produce the unruly, partisan subjects they are designed to manage.

This essay critically examines Keith Bybee's All Judges Are Political, Except When They Are Not. Although Bybee's creative use of the cultural form of courtesy helps us better understand the consensus-building and legitimating features of rule-of-law systems, it overlooks the role that rude dissent can play in exposing the violent, exclusionary, and materially disadvantaging aspects of such systems. Using examples of outing closeted public figures and the rude AIDS activism of the 1990s, this essay explores the rule of law from the perspective of those who are subject to it.

The author explains the origins of All Judges Are Political—Except When They Are Not: Acceptable Hypocrisies and the Rule of Law (2010) as a response to a fundamental question posed by legal realism: How can the judicial process be permeated with politics and yet remain an accepted part of a legitimate legal system? The author demonstrates the ongoing importance of this question by examining debates over the place of constitutional law in the law school curriculum and by assessing public perceptions of the Supreme Court's ruling on health care reform. The author then addresses the critical appraisals presented by the symposium contributors. The critiques are taken as road maps for extending the author's arguments in new directions.

The implementation and enforcement of civil rights laws in the aftermath of the mid-twentieth-century rights revolution has been a prominent concern for a multidisciplinary group of scholars. This article reviews a recent literature that is devoted to better understanding the dynamics of judicial authority and enforcement power and, in particular, how courts are frequently empowered to enforce laws through complex interactions with an array of public and private actors. The article emphasizes new books by Charles Epp and Sean Farhang, which each examine different features of this enforcement process. In The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. (2010), Farhang explores the frequency with which Congress has chosen to enforce its civil rights statutes through incentivizing private litigation. In Making Rights Real: Activists, Bureaucrats, and the Creation of the Legalistic State (2010), Epp examines how civil rights are enforced and transformed through the relationship between administrators, activists, and lawmakers within bureaucratic organizations. Together, these books expand our understanding of the politics and processes of implementing rights in practice and, more broadly, challenge and enrich our perspective on the effectiveness of the American state in enforcing rights. The often complex series of self-conscious legislative, judicial, and administrative choices and interactions necessary in order to deliver rights protections requires that we view policy enforcement from a broader institutional and political perspective. From that perspective, we can see that effective implementation is far from automatic.