The paper addresses itself to two questions left underdeveloped in the literature on representative-constituent relations. First, what does the representative see when he or she sees a constituency? Second, what consequences do these perceptions have for his or her behavior? The paper reverses the normal Washington-oriented view of representative-constituent relations and approaches both questions by examining the representative in his or her constituency. The paper's observations are drawn from the author's travels with seventeen U.S. House members while they were working in their districts. Member perceptions of their constituency are divided into the geographical, the reelection, the primary and the personal constituencies. Attention is then given to the home style of House members. Home style is treated as an amalgam of three elements – allocation of resources, presentation of self, explanation of Washington activity. An effort is made to relate home style to the various perceived constituencies. Some observations are made relating constituency-oriented research to the existing literature on representation.

This study of 364 leadership selections in the U.S. House from 1789 through 1977 discovered that Democrats have a higher proportion of appointed leaders than Republicans; their leaders move between posts in an ordered succession; their appointed leaders are often “removed from above” by their elected ones; and their leaders are subjected to infrequent and unsuccessful caucus challenges. Republicans rely upon election to choose their leaders; their leaders' rate of interpositional mobility is very low; their appointed leaders were never removed by their elected ones; and their leaders face the contests at the same rate as the Democrats do, but the incidence of successful challenges is much greater. They are “removed from below.”

Majority vs. minority status had little statistically significant impact upon leadership contests and what variation appeared indicated that challenges were more frequent in the majority party where the stakes are higher and the rewards are greater than in the minority. Regardless of electoral consequences, however, Republican leaders are more vulnerable to caucus defeat than Democratic ones, which lends further support to the contention that party identity is more important than party status.

According to Walter Dean Burnham, party realignments “result in significant transformation in the general shape of policy.” Through the analysis of House roll-call data, the New Deal realignment is examined to determine whether, in fact, a significant transformation took place and, if so, what its characteristics were. It was hypothesized that if a new political agenda emerged at that time, at least some of the stable policy dimensions which Aage Clausen finds as characterizing the modern Congress should have developed during the New Deal period. In terms of content and level of partisan voting evoked, the government management and the agricultural policy dimensions do take their modern form during the New Deal. A social welfare dimension developed but had not, by the late 1930s, taken its modern shape. It is argued that a major transformation of policy did take place and that, in the process, the ideological distance between the parties increased. This realignment, however, did not immediately change regional voting patterns within each party.

This paper concerns the relationship between voters and corrupt politicians. An explanation is suggested for why voters would discount even credible information that a candidate is corrupt. Then the results of an experiment designed to test a necessary condition in this explanation are reported. The principal implication of this exploratory study is that corrupt elected officials are immune from electoral reprisal because voters rather easily trade off the information that a candidate is corrupt in return for other things they value in the candidate.

A time-series analysis of individual level, perceptual data disconfirms the J-curve theory of the black urban riots (i.e., that they arise because a period of progress was followed by a sharp decline) and suggests that ambiguities surrounding black people's perceptions of their economic situation probably led to the frustration that culminated in urban violence.

The methodological component of the research deals with such problems of relative deprivation-based research as: (1) the substitution of aggregate, objective-level indicators for perceptual theoretical concepts; (2) the correspondences between objective and perceptual data on both a point-by-point basis and across time-series patterns; (3) the empirical implications of failing to look at important subgroup distinctions; and (4) the crucial assumption of all forms of relative deprivation theory that future expectations of need fulfillment, especially in the period of rising satisfactions, are a function of current levels of need fulfillment. The research calls for modifications in the structure and application of relative deprivation theory in light of the findings in these areas.

This paper has the twofold purpose of exploring how and whether it may be said that value arises from human need and, in particular, how the value of equality may arise from an alleged human need for recognition. It traces two opposite dispositions toward recognition, one seeing it as destructive of the minimum conditions for political life, the other viewing it as the principal agency through which men achieve their humanity. The concept of a basic human need is then exposed to the criticism of “social apperception,” which apparently renders meaningless the concept altogether. Nevertheless, two “faces” of recognition are explored – one affirming that common human nature in virtue of which all men are said to be equal, and the other, affirming the concrete specificity of each individual. The paper concludes by arguing that this second aspect of the drive for recognition, which is viewed by some as the primary political obligation, is actually not a legitimate aspiration of political life.

In legislatures and committees, a number of issues are voted on separately, leading to an outcome consisting of positions on each of these issues. I investigate the effects this separation of issues has on collective choices, assuming a very abstract collective choice model, whose assumptions are presupposed by many less abstract models, notably spatial models. Assuming the model, if there exists an undominated outcome (one to which no winning coalition prefers any other feasible outcome), it must be chosen in the absence of vote trading, although vote trading can (perversely) lead to a very different outcome. But vote trading does not necessarily lead to a “voting paradox” situation, contrary to several recent papers. The model enables us to define a natural solution concept for the case where every feasible outcome is dominated. Variations on this concept are explored. The effects of weakening the model are investigated.

“Political gerontology” is the study of the political aspects of aging and the aged. Although psychology and sociology have research subfields concerning aging, this interest is just beginning to develop systematically within political science. Consequently, this article describes theory and research from several disciplines which together provide a foundation for research in “political gerontology.” Demographic analysis suggests that old people constitute a continuously growing component of the American population. Social-psychological analysis indicates that the aged are likely to engage in substantial political activity. Political analysis suggests that old people are likely to make increasing demands upon the political system. This multidisciplinary knowledge base, combined with the predicted increasing political salience of the aging population, suggests the contours of a research agenda for “political gerontology.”

Political scientists have devoted considerable attention to the ways in which economic power can be translated into political influence. Yet there has been little empirical research capable of confirming or denying general hypotheses about the political implications of various aspects of economic structure. This article seeks to begin filling this gap by first identifying five aspects of economic structure likely to affect an industry's political influence (firm size, industry size, market concentration, profitability, arid geographic dispersion) and then testing these aspects by analyzing how well they account for variations among industries in their success at securing public policies of benefit to them, especially in two policy arenas: federal corporate income taxes and state excise taxes. What emerges most clearly from this analysis is an empirical confirmation of the popular hypothesis linking firm size to political influence with respect to both federal corporate tax policy and state excise tax policy. Beyond that, we find reasonably strong negative relationships between political influence and market concentration, profitability, and industry size – the latter lending interesting support to Mancur Olson's argument about the political disabilities of large groups. In the process, the article suggests a potentially fruitful new way to get beyond the case study approach in studying the impact of economic power on political influence, and thus a way to bring to bear more powerful methodological tools on this central issue of modern democracy.