The development of international organisations and the increasing significance of their role in a wide range of fields, has put at issue the adequacy of the rules governing their operation, with regard to the needs of modern justice. In particular, the question of the scope of the immunity from jurisdiction of international organisations is the subject of some debate, as the multiplication of disputes involving international organisations has led courts to address this topic with increasing frequency.1

The extent to which judicial review is granted and effectively exercised is a key element for the evaluation of any modern legal system. The principle of judicial review provides a basic protection for individuals and prevents those exercising public functions from abusing their powers to the disadvantage of the public. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the circumstances in which the courts in the United Kingdom have been prepared to intervene in order to provide relief for unlawful administrative action have expanded in spectacular fashion.2 The incorporation in the UK of the European Convention on Human Rights on 2 October 2000 in the UK marks a significant change in this field.

The relationship between the global and the local is one of critical importance to all regions of the world. In the resolution of the tension between the irresistible surge of globalisation and the undeniable facts of society as it actually exists in the various localities which together comprise the very world which is presumably the object or the subject-matter of globalisation, law lies at the forefront. It is, one might say, the very intellectual battlefield which we have selected for the resolution of the major problem facing human society at the turn of the century. The purpose of this article is therefore to investigate, in a somewhat narrative fashion the relationship between the global and the local in the context of law in South East Asia. The topic is clearly too large to be dealt with in a short space with the rigour and articulation it really deserves, but it is hoped that the approach adopted will provide some kind of a frame of reference for regarding, studying, and hopefully improving, the law in the South East Asian region; and will perhaps focus a pencil of light on the problems of the global and the local in this particular regional context.

In September 2000 the European Commission published its long-awaited proposed replacement for Regulation 17, the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (hereafter the draft regulation).1 The debate on the draft regulation has focused on the abolition of the notification system, the role of the national courts, and the role of the national competition authorities (hereafter the NCAs). However, there is one significant overlooked issue, namely the extent to which the investigation provisions of the draft regulation comply with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR).2 Given the paucity of the ECtHR's case law in 1961 it is understandable that the implications of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereafter ECHR) for the investigative provisions of what was to become Regulation 17 were not at that time given any great consideration by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. However, there is now an extensive human rights case law, developed by the Strasbourg authorities which, it is argued, casts a major shadow over the Commission's existing and proposed investigative powers. It is further argued that the case law of the European Court of Justice (hereafter ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (hereafter CFI) in respect of fundamental rights as general principles of law, does not provide an equivalent standard of protection to that offered by the ECtHR.

Amnesties presuppose a breach of law and provide immunity or protection from punishment. Historically amnesties were invoked in relation to breaches of the laws of war and were reciprocally implemented by opposing sides in an international armed conflict. The impact of the two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century, however, had considerable implications not only for the use of amnesties, but also for their legality under international law. The scale of the First World War precipitated a new phase of unilateral amnesty for the victors and prosecutions of war criminals for the defeated aggressor states.1 This precedent was followed after the Second World War,2 with the establishment of the first ‘international’3 criminal court, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. However, the horrors perpetrated during the Second World War also prompted the development of a branch of international law aimed at recognising and protecting human rights in an attempt to prevent such atrocities being repeated.

A pressing issue of the day requiring authoritative resolution is whether public officials when in office carrying out their official functions may be prosecuted by the courts of other countries for alleged international crimes. Objection has been made, though not by the Danish Government, to a new ambassador appointed by the State of Israel, taking up his appointment as head of the Israeli diplomatic mission in Copenhagen, on the ground of his implication in war crimes. Recently, criminal proceedings were brought in the French courts against Colonel Ghadaffi as the serving Head of the State of Libya for complicity in acts of terrorism resulting in the destruction of a French civil aircraft and death of all its passengers. Writing critically of the Lords' decision in the Pinochet case, Henry Kissinger talks of the tyranny of judges replacing that of government, of prosecutorial discretion without accountability and warns that ‘historically the dictatorship of the virtuous has often led to inquisitions and witch hunts’.

Third party procedure has the merits of saving time and expenses and of preventing inconsistent decisions through eliminating the duplication of proceedings. Because of these procedural merits, third party proceedings (called ‘Part 20 proceedings’1 in the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR)) are often instituted to bring a claim for contribution. In English law, contribution claims are allowed under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (hereafter the 1978 Act) between wrongdoers such as tortfeasors and defaulters in contracts. Not all legal systems allow contribution claims in such wide circumstances. A third party claim form (called a ‘Part 20 claim form’ in the CPR) may be served out of the jurisdiction under the CPR Rule 6.20(3 A),2 which provides for a special base of jurisdiction for third party proceedings in the case where the third party is a ‘necessary or proper party’ to the claim against the Part 20 claimant. The service is, however, subject to the permission of the court which will not be given unless England is judged to be clearly the most appropriate forum under the forum conveniens discretion.

Party autonomy is the basic principle for international contracts. By making a ‘choice of law’, the parties to a contract can agree amongst themselves which law is to regulate their contractual relationship. In international transactions, the law of the parties' choice replaces the law that would otherwise have governed the contract, including the mandatory rules (ius cogens) of the latter law. Article 3 of the 1980 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (hereafter: the ‘Rome Convention’) fully recognises this principle of party autonomy. Under Article 3 the parties are free to choose whichever law they deem appropriate to govern their contractual relationship. It is not even necessary for the transaction to display some connection with the chosen law.

This comparison involves the study of two very different forms of remedy. These are the Scottish Arrestment and the English Freezing Order.2 The Freezing Order is a relatively recent common law creation which contains features unusual amongst Convention jurisdictions. The continental origins of the Arrestment over 400 years ago, and its existence in a jurisdiction based upon the Civil Law unaltered by the Code Napoleon, have given rise to a remedy which is a member of the same family as its continental equivalents but different again. Indeed as we shall see, these measures are so different that most of the possible features of remedies of their type lie in the contrast.

Britain's Trident nuclear missile programme has long been politically controversial. In 1999, the controversy entered the judicial arena in Scotland, in two cases involving ‘direct action’ against Trident installations by anti-nuclear activists. In both cases, the actions were intended not as protests against Britain's nuclear-weapons policy, but rather as actual operations to disable the weapons themselves. The acts were, in other words, in the nature of acts of sabotage. Both incidents led to criminal prosecutions. In both cases, the accused parties sought to use international law as a defence. In both cases, the Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary—the highest court for criminal cases in Scotland—rejected the defence. In the process, however, the Appeal Court had occasion to expound upon some controversial points regarding nuclear weapons. Each of these cases will be discussed in turn.

The previous contribution on the current developments in Transport focused on problems of financing new infrastructure and on the allocation of the true costs of transport among those who generated them.1 In 1999 a directive on charging heavy vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures was finally adopted.2 During the period under review, infrastructure matters and safety and environmental concerns remained high on the agenda of the Common Transport Policy. As far as individual modes of transport are concerned the most significant developments have been in rail transport where a package of measure to open up this market has finally been adopted. The required legislation to liberalise all modes of transport has also now been adopted.